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Over one-third of infrastructure projects that are started are not finished and many more 
face delays. However, the consequences of delayed water projects have not been studied closely. My 
five-paper dissertation examines key economic and policy questions under conditions of poor 
water supply and delayed infrastructure investment in Kathmandu, Nepal. 
In my first paper, I estimate household costs of water infrastructure delay. I compare coping 
costs borne by 1,500 households in 2001 and 2014. I find that coping costs more than doubled due 
to significant capital investments and expenditures. There is a relationship between poor reliability 
and higher coping costs, and infrastructure delays can have significant household economic and 
financial costs. 
My second paper explores how the reliability of piped water services affects household time 
use using time diaries. I examine the relationship between piped water reliability and time spent 
collecting water and other activities. I show that under conditions of intermittent water supply, 
increased reliability is related to increased time collecting water. 
In my third paper, I examine household preferences around water tariff structure and fair 
prices. I jointly estimate household preferences for increasing block tariffs and fixed charges in a 
seemingly unrelated probit model. I ask respondents what they think a “fair water bill” is for a 
randomly assigned quantity. I find that households support a water tariff that increases with the 
quantity of water, but there is no evidence suggesting households support increasing block tariffs. 
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My fourth paper examines the market structure and firm operations of small-scale private 
water vendors in Kathmandu Valley. I estimate city-wide flows of water and money and assess firm 
profitability. I find that water vendors supply 20% of the water for households and businesses in 
Kathmandu. Additionally, the vending market seems to be competitive.  
My final paper reviews the hedonic property value model and its application in developing 
countries in estimating demand for piped water. Market premiums vary from -$39 to $938 per 
month. 37% of market premiums are not statistically significant. Hedonic estimates are sensitive to 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
In the last three decades, significant progress has been made towards providing sustainable 
access to improved drinking water sources for the world’s population (WHO and UNICEF, 2017). 
However, there remains a critical gap in the supply of clean, reliable drinking water. With climate 
change, rapid population growth and urbanization, existing water supply systems and resources 
are becoming more stressed. Investments in water supply have not kept pace with the need for 
piped water in cities (OECD, 2016). When development projects do get funded, there are still large 
challenges. Over one-third of infrastructure projects that are started are not finished (Williams 
(2017), Rasul and Rogger (2018) in Bancalari (2020)), and many more face delays or temporary 
abandonment (e.g., 60% of sewerage projects in Peru (Bancalari, 2020)). As such, the average 
project is burdened by both cost overruns and benefit reductions (Flyvbjerg, 2016). 
While there are many economic studies that illustrate the effects of completed water 
infrastructure projects (Duflo and Pande, 2007; Meeks, 2017; Alsan and Goldin, 2019; Sequeira et 
al., 2019), there are two key gaps. First, the consequences of delayed and abandoned water 
infrastructure projects have not been examined closely. Second, the current economic and policy 
research on water supply has been mostly cross-sectional and piece-meal, focusing on either 
households, small businesses, or water utilities, often with a singular geographic focus. 
For the first gap, there are many unanswered questions. What happens to a city’s 
inhabitants when investments are delayed? Under these conditions, how can policymakers and 
utility managers work with households to recover costs that are direly needed? With a gap in public 
supply, what role does the private sector play in water provision? When households and firms 
adapt, what does that mean for the delayed project and future projects?  
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A few clues about the consequences of delayed water infrastructure can be found in related 
literature. There is a nascent literature focusing on intermittency (Andey and Kelkar, 2009; 
Ercumen et al., 2015; Burt et al., 2018) and age of water pipes (Bhalotra et al., 2018). Bancalari 
(2020) finds that early-life mortality increases with unfinished sanitation projects due to cuts in 
water supply during installation, stagnant water in excavation pools, and large building sites that 
divert heavy traffic to residential areas. Historical analysis of piped water, sanitation, and 
chlorination provides some understanding of differences between early and late adopters. In 
Finland, for example, a delay in adoption by smaller cities and towns resulted in more effective 
investments with higher measurable returns, “when necessary complementary aspects of 
development had already improved” (Peltola and Saaritsa, 2019). These works indirectly illustrate 
mechanisms by which delayed infrastructure investments can affect households. Broader impacts 
of project delays – social, political, and economic – remain not well documented. 
For the second gap, there is limited knowledge around how household behaviors, 
investments, and preferences change over time; market structures of private water vendors; and 
the role of local contexts. A major barrier to the holistic study of water systems is the lack of 
complementary datasets, collected over time. As a result, it has been difficult to study dynamics 
within one water supply ecosystem and then make appropriate policy and investment decisions. To 
increase the effectiveness of investments in large development projects, decision makers need a 
more holistic understanding of a project’s consequences: intended and unintended, present and 
future, for households and businesses. 
My dissertation seeks to fill these two gaps in the literature. In five chapters, I examine key 
economic and policy questions related to water services under difficult conditions. In the first four 
chapters, I study households and small scale private water vendors under conditions of a long-
delayed infrastructure project, a municipal water utility failing to deliver adequate water to its 
users, and a rapidly growing urban population. These four chapters use Kathmandu as an 
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illustrative example and build upon work done in Kathmandu Valley, Nepal, in 2001. By following 
the same set of households, I am able to better understand the changing effects of a delayed 
infrastructure project with a deteriorating municipal water supply.  
Kathmandu Valley is an extreme example of urban water supply. Nepal is one of the fastest 
urbanizing countries in the world (UNDESA, 2014) and also one of the poorest (World Bank, 2019). 
As a result, the Kathmandu’s water utility is under tremendous stress to expand supply quickly, 
with few resources. Kathmandu has one of the worst performing water utilities in Asia, with little to 
no households having 24-hour service (Andrews and Yñiguez, 2004). There is an estimated supply 
gap of 75% in the dry season – with 90,000 cubic meters supplied of the 360,000 cubic meters 
demanded (Bhandari, 2014).  
The inadequacy of in-valley water resources to meet long-term demand was identified 
almost 50 years ago (Ching, 2018). The Melamchi Water Supply Project – with a 26.5 km long 
tunnel diverting 170 MLD from the Melamchi River to Kathmandu – was identified as a solution in 
1988 (Binnie and Partners, 1988), with feasibility studies conducted from 1990 to 1992 (Snowy 
Mountain Engineering Consultants, 1992). The Nepalese Civil War prevented much development 
from occurring in the 1990s. In 2000, the Asian Development Bank awarded a loan of $464 million 
to Nepal to implement the MWSP. Since then, the project has faced many challenges (Ching, 2018): 
failure to attract a private operator, withdrawal of key funders, public opposition to privatization 
(Domènech et al., 2013; Dhar, 2007), issues with contractors since beginning construction in 2009 
(e.g., failure to carry out work as scheduled, payment conflicts). As of January 2021, the residents of 
Kathmandu Valley continue to wait for the completion of the Melamchi Water Supply Project. 
As an extreme case of water supply, Kathmandu provides research opportunities to (1) gain 
pre-theoretical descriptive knowledge, (2) advance theoretical understanding, and (3) allow for 
preliminary assessment of new theoretical ideas before further theoretical or empirical work 
(Büthe, 2015). I leverage these opportunities to examine household coping costs over time, time 
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use patterns, and water tariff structure preferences. I also build a typology of water vendors and 
assess firm profitability and competitiveness. In the last chapter, I develop a framework for 
understanding hedonic valuation of piped water connections in low and middle income countries. 
Then I assess the reliability and accuracy of the measurements through conducting a meta-analysis. 
I provide brief overviews of each chapter below. 
Chapter 2 illustrates and quantifies the economic and financial costs of delays in water 
supply infrastructure investments. We compare coping costs borne by 1,500 households in 2001 
and 2014 to systematically understand how household behaviors, economic costs, and water 
sources have changed over time. This chapter makes two important contributions. It is the first to 
empirically document how coping costs and strategies have changed over an extended period 
under conditions of rapid population growth, increased water shortages, and delayed public 
infrastructure investment. Second, our advantageous research design allows us to control for time-
invariant household-level unobservables, strengthening the validity of our analysis of the 
determinants of coping behaviors and costs. 
This study estimates costs associated with five main coping behaviors: (1) water collection 
time, (2) private well installation and operation, (3) water storage and rainwater collection, (4) in-
house water treatment, and (5) payments to private water vendors and other informal suppliers. 
This study uses survey data collected from 1,500 households from 2001 and then resurveyed in 
2014. This chapter presents summary statistics of the coping costs, broken down into the five main 
behaviors and households with/without private water connections and private wells. Results from 
a multivariate analysis explaining the changes in household coping costs are also presented. The 
covariates include household demographic characteristics, water source characteristics, quality 
perceptions, and policy preferences. 
The third chapter builds upon the second chapter’s findings around decreased water 
collection time. The first study finds a dramatic decline in time spent collecting water that are 
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accompanied by increases in (1) household investments in water storage and private wells and (2) 
expenditures on vended water. The second study explores how the reliability of piped water 
services affects household time use – focusing on tradeoffs between water collection and labor, 
chores, and leisure. This work fills two gaps in the literature. First, little is known about how access 
to tap water affects allocation of daily time spent across multiple categories, including time spent 
collecting water both inside and outside the home, labor, chores, leisure, sleep.  Second, there is a 
nascent literature on intermittent water supply that examines the impacts of quality and reliability 
of a piped water connection.  
In this chapter, we use 2014 survey data from the same 1,500 households as in Chapter 2, of 
which 819 households reported time diaries. We ask household members to keep a time diary of a 
typical 24-hour day, in 30-minute blocks. Additionally, we include variables related to water 
collection times, consumption, and reliability in our analysis. First, we present descriptive analyses. 
We examine the profile of water collections and water collection time patterns throughout the day. 
We focus on the relationship between work (hours worked, employment) and water collection – 
using (1) visual examinations of time use graphs and (2) regression analysis. We also examine 
water collection’s relationship with other activities – chores and leisure. Then, we compare daily 
time use patterns of households with different types of water supply (with or without a private 
well, reliable or unreliable private water connection) using visual examinations of time use graphs 
and descriptive statistics. Second, we use OLS regressions to estimate the correlation between 
water collection time, water consumption, and water connection reliability. We also include 
robustness checks. We find that when tap water connections are more reliable, households spend 
more time on collecting water.  
The fourth chapter shifts from examining household behaviors to household preferences 
around water tariffs. There is a consensus among water utility managers and international donors 
that increasing block tariffs are best suited to balancing the multiple policy objectives of tariff 
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design. This notion is being challenged by researchers using simulations and empirical analysis 
(Whittington et al., 2015; Fuente et al., 2016). However, household preferences have been neglected 
– neither elicited by tariff designers nor studied by researchers. This chapter addresses this gap by 
directly asking the 1,500 households surveyed in 2014 about their preferences regarding key 
attributes of a water tariff. We collected information on households’ knowledge, attitudes, and 
perceptions about the water services in Kathmandu, as well as households’ urban environmental 
and infrastructure priorities. Using a seemingly unrelated probit model, we jointly estimate 
household preferences for increasing block tariffs and fixed charges. We also asked respondents 
what they thought a “fair water bill” would be for a randomly assigned fixed quantity of water. We 
analyzed these answers to determine whether respondents had a preference for increasing 
nonlinear tariff structures. We find that respondents support monthly water bills that increase 
linearly as the quantity of water use increases. 
This study is the first to directly ask households about their preferences regarding water 
tariffs and their structure, as well as their reasoning behind their preferences. As water pricing can 
present political risks, utility managers and politicians should not ignore household preferences. 
Additionally, households may be more likely to pay their bills and support a water utility that uses a 
tariff structure that is consistent with their preferences. Kathmandu’s water tariff at the time of the 
study was an increasing block tariff, typical of many utilities around the world. Our study challenges 
and tests two assumptions that tariff designers have made. First, that the water tariff structure 
selected by experts is consistent with household objectives. Second, that household objectives are 
equity, fairness, affordability, and economic efficiency. 
Chapter 5 enriches our depiction of water supply in Kathmandu Valley by examining small-
scale private water vendors. From Chapters 2 and 3, we build an understanding of the role vended 
water plays in household water supply. However, we are left with questions about the water 
vending sector, beginning with a basic understanding of market structure and firm operations. 
7 
Additionally, with unregulated private provision of essential services, there are concerns around 
firm profitability and market competitiveness. In this chapter, we examine the structure and 
complexity of the water vending supply chain. We use a mixed-methods research approach that 
incorporates data from structured household and vendor surveys as well as key informant 
interviews. First, we estimate city-wide flows of water and money, focusing on different points in 
the water vending supply chain. Through this exercise, we are able to build a typology of the types 
of water vendors that operate in Kathmandu. Second, we construct monthly accounts of revenues 
and costs using standard financial accounting methods. We are then able to assess firm profitability 
using four quantitative metrics and infer market competitiveness. 
With continued delays in infrastructure investment and deteriorating public water supplies, 
both private household capital investment and private water vendors begin to play a larger role. As 
a result, the system of water supply transforms, and the direct and indirect benefits and costs of the 
initial infrastructure project may no longer be representative. As vended water becomes more 
ubiquitous, does demand for piped water infrastructure change? Is vended water a stopgap 
measure? If so, how does it affect social and political pressure to complete the infrastructure 
project? Households may become accustomed to using vended water – does it affect long-term 
demand for piped water and confidence in the water utility to provide safe water? Can and will 
vended water become a sustainable and efficient part of a city’s water supply? The sight of water 
tanker trucks and bottled water is becoming more common across cities in the developing world. 
There remain many questions around the future of vended water and its effects on households. This 
study lays the groundwork for future research by carefully and systematically building an 
understanding of the water vending sector in one city. 
The final chapter moves away from Kathmandu and highlights the importance of building a 
holistic understanding of a water supply system. This study presents the first meta-analysis of a 
revealed preference method – hedonic property value model – for estimating demand for piped 
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water in middle and low income countries. Comprehensive reviews have been conducted for stated 
preference studies on household demand for improved water services (e.g., van Houtven et al. 
(2017)), but there have not been any conducted for revealed preference studies. This study fills this 
gap by assessing the validity and reliability of the hedonic method. Existing market premiums from 
hedonic studies vary widely, from -$1.26 per month to $938 per month; 37% of market premiums 
found are also not statistically significant. I identify common challenges and solutions for improving 
the accuracy of the hedonic method when used to estimate demand for piped water in developing 
countries. Its contributions are two-fold. First, I build a theoretical framework for systematically 
thinking through what goes into the hedonic estimate of household demand for piped water. This 
provides a basis for assessing the quality of and interpreting results from research papers. Second, 
as a meta-analysis, I comprehensively review and synthesize results from hedonic studies. I also 
compare the results from the hedonic studies to those from stated preference and coping cost 
studies to assess validity and reliability. 
Chapter 6 first describes the theoretical framework on which the meta-analysis is based. I 
then briefly examine the hedonic literature on drinking water from the United States. With this 
foundation, I develop expectations and hypotheses for its application in low and middle income 
countries. Moving to the meta-analysis itself, I systematically collect a set of 36 primary studies that 
provide 75 market premiums. For the meta-analysis, I use explanatory variables describing 
household characteristics, attributes of water supply, housing market characteristics; covariates 
related to research design and methods include research design, sample size, model specification, 
econometric methods, and quality variables such as having a research focus on water and date of 
publication. After assessing the hedonic valuation method for reliability and validity, I conclude 
with a checklist of suggested best practices for future hedonic valuation studies. 
Together, these five chapters demonstrate the importance of understanding the deep 
complexities of urban water supply from multiple perspectives. This dissertation advances 
9 
understanding of the economic costs and system-level consequences of deteriorating water supply 
and delayed public infrastructure investment on households and businesses. As policymakers, 
utility managers, and donors consider policies such as tariff reform, regulation of private water 
vendors, and future infrastructure investment, greater understanding of intended and unintended 
consequences can foster a more equitable, efficient, and sustainable system of water supply in 
Kathmandu and beyond.  
10 
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CHAPTER 2: THE COSTS OF DELAY IN INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENTS: A COMPARISON OF 
2001 AND 2014 HOUSEHOLD WATER SUPPLY COPING COSTS IN THE KATHMANDU VALLEY, 
NEPAL1 
2.1 Introduction 
In 2001, we conducted a survey of 1500 randomly sampled households in Kathmandu to 
determine the costs people were incurring to cope with Kathmandu’s poor quality, unreliable piped 
water supply system and to estimate their willingness to pay for improved piped water services 
[Whittington et al., 2002; Pattanayak et al., 2005]. At the time, there were two related policy and 
infrastructure changes under consideration that motivated our study. The first was the proposal to 
construct the Melamchi Water Supply Project (MWSP), a US$464 million package of infrastructure 
investments designed to bring water from the Melamchi River into the Kathmandu Valley 
[Whittington et al., 2004]. The project involves an interbasin water transfer of about 170,000 m3/d 
to be delivered through a 26 km long tunnel through a mountain. The second intervention being 
discussed by international donors was the possibility of engaging a private sector operator to 
manage the municipal water supply system. Both sets of projects, once completed, were expected to 
help improve piped water services in the Kathmandu Valley. 
Our 2001 study found that about 70% of the residents of Kathmandu Valley had a 
connection to the piped distribution network, but they typically received nonpotable water for only 
1–2 hours per day (h/d). Households were incurring coping costs of about US$5/month (m) (in 
2014 prices), approximately 2% of household income. Our 2001 estimates of coping costs had five 
 
1 This chapter previously appeared as an article in Water Resources Research. The original citation is as 
follows: Gurung, Y., Zhao, J., Kumar KC, B., Wu, X., Suwal, B., & Whittington, D. (2017). The costs of delay in 
infrastructure investments: A comparison of 2001 and 2014 household water supply coping costs in the 
Kathmandu Valley, Nepal. Water Resources Research, 53(8), 7078-7102. 
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components: (1) the value of time spent collecting water, (2) pumping costs from private wells, (3) 
in-household water treatment costs, (4) storage costs, and (5) payments for water purchased from 
vendors and others. The largest of these components was the value of time spent collecting water 
from outside the home, and these time costs were higher for poor households than for non-poor 
households. These coping costs were almost twice as much as the typical water bill of households 
connected to the piped water network and about 20% of their stated willingness to pay for 
improved services (24 h/d, 7 days a week). 
From 2001 until 2014, there was little additional investment in the municipal water supply 
system except for the MWSP. From 1996 until 2006, Nepal experienced political turmoil (the royal 
family was murdered by the Crown Prince) and civil war; as a result, there was rapid population 
growth in Kathmandu Valley due to massive in-migration. Additionally, Nepal’s economy has been 
one of the slowest growing in South Asia, and there have been difficulties in negotiating financing 
for new investments in urban infrastructure. As a result, progress on the MWSP has been much 
slower than expected. After years of discussion, in 2000 the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and its 
partners finally agreed to finance the MWSP. However, the World Bank pulled its support in 2002, 
due in part to the government’s failure to engage a private operator in the management of the 
municipal water supply system. Construction of the Melamchi tunnel did not begin until 2009. The 
project experienced further delays due to problems with the first contractor. At the time of our 
second survey in 2014, residents of Kathmandu still had not received any additional water supplies 
from outside the Kathmandu Valley. Most of these issues have now been resolved. New water 
supplies are expected to reach Kathmandu after the completion of Melamchi tunnel in 2017; 
associated investments in the rehabilitation and expansion of the water supply infrastructure in 
Kathmandu are scheduled for completion by 2020. 
In the summer of 2014, we attempted to reinterview all 1500 households in our 2001 
sample to determine how they managed to deal with the growing water shortage and the 
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deteriorating condition of the piped water infrastructure in Kathmandu and to compare their 
coping costs in 2014 with those we first estimated in 2001. Our broad objective was to understand 
and quantify the costs to households of delaying investments in piped water supply infrastructure 
in a large, rapidly growing city in a low-income country. Kathmandu’s experience over the 13 years 
from 2001 to 2014 is not unique. Because piped water supply infrastructure is so capital intensive 
[Whittington et al., 2009], it takes time to design, finance, and build large projects, but political 
stability and economic growth are essential for sustaining the investment process and cannot be 
taken for granted. Many cities in developing countries have experienced similar “lost decades” of 
investment in water supply infrastructure due to financial crises, civil war, or political turmoil 
[Swyngedouw, 2004]. 
In section 2, we describe the water supply infrastructure in 2001 and how it changed up to 
2014. Section 3 presents the background for understanding household decisions about coping 
costs, as well as a review of the literature on coping costs as an estimate of the benefits of 
environmental quality improvements more generally. Section 4 describes our modeling strategy 
and method for calculating coping costs. Section 5 discusses the 2014 fieldwork and presents a 
profile of sample households, contrasting their socioeconomic situation in 2001 and 2014. It also 
compares the water supply conditions of households in 2001 and 2014, both those connected to the 
piped water network and those that were not. In section 6, we then present the 2014 household 
coping costs estimates and compare these with our 2001 results. We also compare and contrast the 
2014 coping costs of households with different water supply conditions and of different income 
groups. Section 7 presents the results of multivariate analyses of the factors associated with the 
change in coping costs from 2001 to 2014. Section 8 summarizes our conclusions about the costs of 
delay in the Kathmandu municipal water sector. 
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2.2 Background  
In 2014, the population of Kathmandu Valley was approximately 2.7 million. The population 
of the urban areas of the Kathmandu Valley—Kathmandu metropolitan city, Lalitpur 
submetropolitan city and the municipalities of Kirtipur, Madhyapur, and Bhaktapur—have 
experienced especially rapid growth, from 674,000 in 2001 to 1,141,000 in 2014. Much of this 
increase was due to in-migration as people fled from the civil war in the rural areas and sought 
safety and better economic opportunities in the Kathmandu Valley [Muzzini and Aparicio, 2013]. 
The 2011 census reported that 44% of the total population in the valley was in- migrants from 
other parts of the country, mainly rural and other small urban areas [Suwal, 2014]. The population 
density of urban areas in the Kathmandu Valley increased as people crowded into the city, from 
10,262 persons/km2 in 2001 to 14,703 in 2011 [Subedi, 2014].  This in-migration was accompanied 
by unplanned construction on the edges of the city as agricultural lands in the valley were 
converted to urban uses, especially housing.  
The Nepal Water Supply Corporation (NWSC) oversees the municipal water supply and 
sanitation sector in the Kathmandu Valley [Bhandari, 2014]. The NWSC is owned by government 
(30%), municipalities (50%), private entities (15%), and employees (5%) [Bhandari, 2014]. 
Kathmandu Upatyaka Khanepani Limited (KUKL) is the service operator and provider in the 
Kathmandu Valley, with a service area of 150 km2 [Bhandari, 2014]. KUKL currently manages 35 
surface sources, 59 tube wells, 47 ground reservoirs, and 21 treatment plants [Bhandari, 2014]. 
KUKL lacked both the funds and the institutional capacity to respond effectively to the growing 
water crisis in the Kathmandu Valley, but providing piped water and sewer services to this rapidly 
growing, unserved population would have challenged even a well-financed, well-managed water 
utility. 
Over the past two decades, Nepal’s economic growth rate has lagged most other countries in 
South and East Asia [World Bank, 2016]. Nevertheless, by global standards, over the past 5 years 
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Nepal’s annual GDP growth rate has averaged a respectable 4.5%, and household incomes in 
Kathmandu have been steadily increasing [World Bank, 2016]. But this economic growth did not 
translate into significant increases in funding for the rehabilitation and expansion of KUKL’s water 
and sanitation infrastructure. Little international donor assistance stepped in to fill the gap. From 
2002 to 2004, KUKL received a grant from Japan for about US$25 million to improve KUKL’s 
municipal water facilities (i.e., the Manohara Water Treatment Plant, Min Bhawan and Singha 
Durbar Elevated Tanks, and the distribution line from the Shaibhu Reservoir to Lalitpur) 
[Kathmandu Upatyaka Khanepani Limited, 2015]. Aside from the ADB’s support of the MWSP, this 
was the only significant foreign assistance to the municipal water sector. 
The origins of the MWSP date back to Kathmandu’s 1973 Water Master Plan, which 
identified the need for new out-of-valley raw water sources [Binnie and Partners, 1973]. The Master 
Plan argued that in-valley water sources were inadequate to meet long-term needs and that out-of-
valley sources should be studied [Binnie and Partners, 1973]. Feasibility studies were conducted 
from 1988 to 1992 [Binnie and Partners, 1988; Snowy Mountain Engineering Consultants, 1992] on 
the option of bringing water from Melamchi River, situated outside the valley, through a 26 km-long 
tunnel. The first phase of this project was estimated to be able to supply an extra 170,000 m3/d and 
subsequent phases up to a total of 500,000 m3/d [Pant et al., 2008]. 
In 2000, the ADB awarded a loan to Nepal to help finance the US$464 million MWSP, 
conditional on institutional reforms, which included a private operator [Domenech et al., 2013]. 
Failure to attract private bidders resulted in a long delay in the MWSP. The ADB approved a major 
restructuring of the financing package for the MWSP, allowing the project to move forward 
[Domenech et al., 2013]. The private sector participation requirement was removed, as well as some 
of the social development initiatives in the original project [Asian Development Bank (ADB), 2008]. 
The ADB provided a US$137 million loan, Japan Bank for International Cooperation provided an 
additional US$47.5 million, and several other donors participated in the financing with smaller 
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amounts [ADB, 2008]. The government of Nepal promised to provide domestic counterpart 
financing of US$90.6 million. The revised project was estimated to cost US$317 million [ADB, 2008]. 
Originally, this revised MWSP was to be completed by the summer of 2016, but contractor delays 
and the 2015 earthquakes have pushed back the completion date to 2017. 
The result of this low level of investment in the municipal water supply infrastructure 
during this period has been that by 2014 urban residents of the Kathmandu Valley faced acute and 
recurrent water shortages and deteriorating water quality. Although KUKL managed to increase the 
number of residential connections from 167,000 in 2008, to 195,000 in 2013 [Kathmandu Upatyaka 
Khanepani Limited (KUKL), 2014], the total amount of water supply did not increase as the 
additional raw water from the MWSP had not yet arrived. KUKL [2014] estimates that it needs 
360,000 m3 of water per day to supply its existing customers. However, KUKL [2014] is only able to 
supply 150,000 m3/d in the wet season and 90,000 m3/d in the dry season. Thus, even when the 
first phase of the MWSP is completed, KUKL will still not be able to supply 360,000 m3/d. 
Households have responded in two main ways to KUKL’s inability to increase supplies. First, 
many drilled private wells to supplement their water supply from KUKL’s piped network. Second, 
households began purchasing increasing quantities of water from a new, rapidly growing private 
water vending industry. In 2001, there were only about 60–70 tankers in the Kathmandu Valley, 
with most operated by KUKL. By 2004, the number of tankers had grown to about 160, and five 
large-capacity boreholes had been drilled to supplement the tanker trucks’ use of natural water 
sources. Between 2004 and 2008, the number increased by an additional 500 tankers. By 2014, 210 
firms engaged in water vending and operated about 700 water tankers. 
In 2014, there were also approximately 200 bottled water firms in Kathmandu selling water 
mostly in 20 L plastic bottles (‘‘jars’’), in addition to the smaller 1 L bottles. In 2004, there were only 
about 5 bottled water enterprises. The Nepal Bottled Water Association (a trade association with 
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160 of the 200 registered firms in Kathmandu Valley) reports that today, only 25% of the drinking 
water used by households is supplied by KUKL. 
In summary, from 2001 to 2014 the private sector has stepped in to meet the growing 
household demand for improved water services. In the next sections of the paper we describe in 
more detail what these changes have meant to households in terms of increased monthly costs and 
inconvenience. 
2.3 A Review of the Theory and Literature on “Coping Costs”  
The theory underlying the relationship between the coping costs that a household incurs in 
dealing with unreliable, nonpotable water supplies and its demand for improved water supplies 
comes from the environmental economics literature on the measurement of the benefits and costs 
of pollution control [Mäler, 1974; Mäler and Wyzga, 1976; Cropper and Oates, 1992]. The costs of 
coping, or averting, behaviors (such as purchasing air conditioners to reduce exposure to air 
pollution) are used to estimate the value of environmental quality improvements.  
We present a simple theoretical framework to illustrate the relationship between coping 
costs and the economic benefits of improvements in a public water supply system. We follow 
closely the approach described in Pattanayak et al. [2005]. We assume the household has a health 
production function, and seeks to maximize its utility [Bartik, 1988; Larson and Gnedenko, 1999; 
McConnell and Rosado, 2000; Pattanayak et al., 2005; Cook et al., 2016b]. 
The household combines inputs of labor, money, capital, and environmental goods to 
produce utility-yielding services, conditioned on household preferences (𝜃). A representative 
household faces the following utility maximization problem: 
 max
𝑇𝐿 ,𝑇𝐶 ,𝑀,𝑍
𝑈(𝑇𝐿, 𝑍, 𝑆(𝐶(𝑇𝐶 , 𝑀), 𝑊(𝐺));  𝜃) (1) 
 𝑠. 𝑡.  𝑇 = 𝑇𝑊 + 𝑇𝐿 + 𝑇𝐶 + 𝑆 (2) 




The household values leisure (𝑇𝐿), a composite consumption good (𝑍), and health (𝑆), all of 
which enter directly into the utility function (equation (1)). Health is characterized by the number 
of sick days, which are a function of the public water supply (𝑊) and coping behaviors (𝐶). The 
public water supply (𝑊) and coping behaviors (𝐶) are assumed to enter the household’s utility 
function only by promoting health. The public water supply is a function of government policies 
(𝐺), such as infrastructure provision. If the water supplied by the government is not of adequate 
quality, quantity, or reliability, households choose a variety of coping behaviors (𝐶) by spending 
time (𝑇𝐶) and money on market commodities (𝑀) related to water. 
The household faces both a time and a budget constraint. Earned income is limited by the 
total amount of time available to the household (𝑇), which is spent on work (𝑇𝑊), leisure (𝑇𝐿), 
coping with the limitations of the public water supply system (𝑇𝐶), and being ill (𝑆) (equation (2)).  
Spending on the composite consumption good (𝑍) and market commodities related to water (𝑀), 
with prices 1 and 𝑝, respectively, must equal total income, which is the sum of exogenous income 
(N), such as returns on capital and remittances, and earned income, which is the product of the 
hourly wage (w) and the number of hours worked (TW ) (equation (3)). 
Households maximize utility by choosing how much time to devote to leisure (𝑇𝐿), paid 
labor (𝑇𝑊) and coping (𝑇𝐶), how much of the composite good (𝑍) to consume, and how much to 
spend on market commodities (𝑀) related to coping with an inadequate water supply. The water 
supply service level is assumed to be exogenously determined by the government; households 
cannot choose their current water supply regime [Cook et al., 2016b]. However, if the quality, 
quantity, or reliability of the services from the public water supply system change (𝑊(𝐺)), due for 
example to new infrastructure investment, the household’s optimal choices will also change. 
This theoretical framework helps us answer the question, “How much does a household 
value an improvement in the public water supply system from the status quo W(G0) to an improved 
situation W(G1)?” Using duality theory, the utility maximization problem can be transformed into a 
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cost minimization problem to obtain a utility constant willingness to pay (WTP) measure—the 
change in exogenous income that will compensate for a marginal change in public water supply 
services [Pattanayak et al., 2005]. This WTP measure, 
𝜕Ω
𝜕𝑊
, can then be described as the sum of the 



















Where Ω is the expenditure function in the cost minimization problem, and 
𝜕Ω
𝜕𝑊
 is the 
amount of exogenous income, 𝑑N, that could be taken away from the household to compensate for 
the change in utility 𝜕U as a result of a change (an improvement) in water services 𝜕W, holding the 
household at the initial welfare level, 𝑈0. The three terms that form the WTP function are (1) the 
coping costs in terms of financial expenditures and lost value of time spent coping, (2) lost value of 
time spent ill, and (3) monetary value of being ill [Cook et al., 2016b]. In this paper, our estimation 
of coping costs only includes the first term—the financial expenditures on commodities related to 
water (e.g., purchases of vended water, point-of-use water filters) and the value of time spent 
coping. 
This simple theoretical framework assumes households trade leisure time for work and that 
the wage rate is the marginal compensation for sacrificing time for money. Therefore, the 
incremental value of time is indicated by the wage rate [von Wartburg and Waters, 2004]. However, 
there is a rich literature on the value of time that has made many conceptual advances over this 
simple theoretical construction. This literature shows that there are many situations in which the 
household’s value of time will not approximate its wage rate. From example, if its members cannot 
control the number of hours they work at the market wage, time savings may not be easily 
converted to income, and the value of time saved in nonmarket activities will be less than the wage 
rate [von Wartburg and Waters, 2004]. Boardman et al. [2010] review the literature on the value of 
time spent in different nonwage activities and find that in many cases the values of time are 
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approximately 50% of after-tax wages. Most of these studies have been conducted in industrialized 
countries and examine tradeoffs households make between money and commuting time. However, 
there are a few studies from low-income countries that look specifically at the value of time 
households spend collecting water from outside the home. A discussion of these studies and how 
our study handles the value of time is carried out in the next section. 
Researchers observe the expenditures that households make on “coping strategies” to 
address the problems caused by unreliable, poor quality public water services. They then use these 
observational data to obtain a lower bound on household willingness to pay for improved water 
services. Economists typically interpret estimates of coping costs as a lower bound on households’ 
willingness to pay for environmental services for three reasons. First, households might be willing 
to pay more for service improvements but the market prices for coping activities are lower than 
their maximum willingness to pay. Second, there are often additional residual damages. In the case 
of households coping with unreliable, poor quality water supplies, 24/7 potable water from a 
private water connection would be an unambiguously better service than the service they can 
achieve through the coping expenditures. Third, estimates of coping costs typically cannot 
practically include all of the theoretically plausible coping cost expenditures. 
A portion of the coping cost literature focuses on water pollution in the United States 
[Abdalla, 1990; Collins and Steinback, 1993; Laughland et al., 1993]. However, our focus is on the 
literature that applies the theory of coping costs to urban water supply in developing countries. The 
review of this literature identifies (1) empirical drivers of demand for improved water supply and 
(2) theoretical refinements in the simple household production function model. Papers in this 
literature use regression analysis (either ordinary least squares or maximum likelihood estimators) 
to estimate the association between household coping costs and different covariates. These 
researchers have faced a common challenge. Heterogeneity in household preferences may 
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introduce systematic errors and bias the estimates of coefficients. Our data give us an opportunity 
to address this problem in a way that has not been used in the literature previously. 
Most of the literature on coping costs and household demand for improved water services 
uses cross-section observational data. There are only a few field experiments with randomly 
assigned interventions [Pattanayak et al., 2013; Jalan and Somanathan, 2008; Kremer et al., 2011; 
Ashraf et al., 2010]. Most papers use cross-section, observational data to examine the discrete 
choices households make to cope with unreliable, poor quality public supplies, and use random 
utility models to describe household choices [Madajewicz et al., 2007; Jessoe, 2013; Vásquez 2012; 
Katuwal and Bohara, 2011; Vásquez et al., 2009; Abrahams et al., 2000; Um et al., 2002; McConnell 
and Rosado, 2000; Larson and Gnedenko, 1999]. The independence of irrelevant alternatives 
assumption used in this literature is difficult to defend because some coping methods are arguably 
close substitutes (boiling, filtering, purchasing bottled water). However, these papers do provide 
guidance on which explanatory variables can be used to capture technology, tastes, and quantity of 
water use, which together define the coping cost function [Pattanayak et al., 2005].  
For example, the literature shows that perceptions of the water quality, quantity, and 
reliability of piped water supplies affect coping costs. Abrahams et al. [2000], Larson and Gnedenko 
[1999], and Um et al. [2002] all find a significant association between coping costs and perceptions 
of water quality. Madajewicz et al. [2007] find a significant association between coping costs and 
the provision of water quality information. Vásquez et al. [2009] and Vásquez [2012] find a 
significant association between coping costs and households’ perceived reliability of the piped 
water supply. Household socioeconomic and demographic characteristics are also commonly 
included in household models of coping cost decisions, e.g., education, number of children, age, 
income, and wealth [Larson and Gnedenko, 1999; McConnell and Rosado, 2000; Katuwal and Bohara, 
2011; Vásquez, 2012].  
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Different household water sources are also described in these models. Pattanayak et al. 
[2005] use explanatory variables that describe whether the household has a private water 
connection, the number of water sources used, and whether the household uses community 
sources. Jessoe [2013] and Cook et al. [2016b] similarly include explanatory variables to describe a 
household’s primary drinking water source. Vásquez et al. [2009] include variables for storage and 
bottled water use.  
One theoretical concern with the models of coping costs in the literature is that averting 
behaviors may provide the household utility through different pathways [Bartik, 1988; Cropper and 
Oates, 1992]. For example, Abrahams et al. [2000] found that in Athens, Georgia (USA) water quality 
differences other than health risk (e.g., taste, odor, and appearance) between the public supply and 
bottled water led to a 12% overestimate of households’ willingness to pay for the health benefits of 
improved water quality. Pattanayak et al. [2005] note that all of the various water sources used by 
households in Kathmandu have quantity, reliability, and quality dimensions, and that they can only 
include proxy variables for unit prices, household production, technology, and tastes. Given the 
numerous water sources used in Kathmandu, they caution that it is not possible to identify 
household willingness to pay for improvements in different attributes of the public water supply 
from their data. 
In a second study of coping costs in Kathmandu, Katuwal and Bohara [2011] model 
household coping strategies.  Like Pattanayak et al. [2005], they use cross-section observational 
data on household coping behaviors. Katuwal and Bohara [2011] find that wealth, perception of the 
quality of water piped connections to the public distribution supply, and exposure to information 
all have statistically significant effects on coping costs. 
Our study makes two contributions to the literature on household coping costs in the 
municipal water supply sector. First, we describe how coping behaviors and costs have changed 
over an extended period (from 2001 to 2014) in a city whose inhabitants have experienced rapid 
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population growth and political instability, in addition to a deteriorating water supply 
infrastructure. By revisiting the same households interviewed in 2001, this study describes how the 
economic costs experienced by households have changed as a result of a lack of investment in the 
municipal water supply infrastructure at the same time that private investment in the water 
vending industry and wells has increased. 
Second, our research design allows us to examine population heterogeneity in taste 
parameters. Because we have data on the same households in 2001 and 2014, we can use 
differences in household coping cost estimates as the dependent variable and thus control for time 
invariant household-level unobservables, such as taste preferences that have not changed from 
2001 to 2014. This strengthens the validity of our analysis of the determinants of coping behaviors 
and costs. 
2.4 Coping Costs Modeling Strategy and Calculation 
2.4.1 Modeling Strategy 
Coping cost functions, similar to the cost functions of firms, depend on unit prices of inputs 
and outputs, conditional on production technology and household preferences or tastes 
[Pattanayak et al., 2005]. Proxy variables are used to capture time-varying tastes, technology, and 
the quality of water used by the household. We replicate, with some modifications, the analysis 
done by Pattanayak et al. [2005] with the 2001 Kathmandu coping cost data, and we estimate a 
linear regression model relating total coping costs (𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡) to the set of observables in 
which we are interested (household demographic characteristics, water source characteristics, 
quality perceptions, and policy preferences). However, unlike Pattanayak et al. [2005], we are able 
to use two cross-sectional data sets. Additionally, we add to the model the respondent’s gender, 
reliability of the private water connection as measured by hours of service, having a private well, 
and quality perceptions, as suggested by the more recent coping cost literature. Equation (5) 
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illustrates our coping cost model, which uses differences between variables in 2014 and 2001 to 
eliminate unobserved factors that do not change over time: 
Important household demographic characteristics (vector ℎℎ_𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡) include income, 
education, gender, and number of children. Water source characteristics (vector 𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟_𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡) 
include having a private water connection, having a private well, having both a private water 
connection and a private well, reliability of the private water connection, and number of water 
sources used. Quality perceptions (vector 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑_𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡) are respondent ratings of taste, 
dirtiness, health risks, and reliability of piped water in year t (t = 2001 or t = 2014) in both the wet 
and dry seasons. Policy preferences (𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦_𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡) describe the respondent’s belief about whether 
water issues were the most serious environmental policy problems faced by the residents of 
Kathmandu Valley. Stochastic components (𝑢𝑖𝑡) capture the idiosyncratic effects of unobserved 
factors. 
2.4.2 Calculation of Coping Costs 
We disaggregate coping costs into the costs associated with five coping behaviors: (1) 
collection time, (2) private well construction and operation, (3) water storage and rainwater 
collection, (4) in-house water treatment, and (5) monetary payments to water vendors and other 
informal suppliers. Our categorization and calculation of coping cost components differs from the 
2001 construction by Pattanayak et al. [2005]. Rainwater collection system costs are separated 
from private well construction and operation and placed with water storage because these systems 
𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑖2014 − 𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑖2001
= 𝛽1(ℎℎ_𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖2014 −  ℎℎ_𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖2001)  +  𝛽2(𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟_𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖2014
−  𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟_𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖2001) + 𝛽3(𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑_𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑤𝑒𝑡𝑖2014
−  𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑_𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑤𝑒𝑡𝑖2001)  + 𝛽4(𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑_𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑑𝑟𝑦𝑖2014
−  𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑_𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑑𝑟𝑦𝑖2001)  + 𝛽5(𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦_𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖2014 −  𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦_𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖2001)  




often share equipment. The lifespan of all equipment has been changed to be 20 years, instead of 15 
years for wells and 30 years for rainwater systems and storage equipment. We next describe the 
calculation of the costs of each of these five components. We do not include estimates of costs of 
illness because we are not able to accurately attribute medical expenditures to poor water and 
sanitation conditions. 
2.4.2.1 Collection Costs (Time Spent) 
In our household interviews, we collected data to estimate the time households spend 
collecting water from outside the home. Household members spend time walking to and from water 
sources outside the home, as well as waiting at a source. Our households report an average of 1.2 
water collectors per household. Six hundred and ninety-four households have only one collector, 
149 have two, and three households have three water collectors. 
We estimate the costs of time spent collecting water by multiplying the self-reported 
amount of time by an assumed shadow price of time. Some might argue that time savings from not 
having to collect water would only have an economic value to households if they were devoted to 
income-generating activities. However, there are numerous reasons why households would be 
willing to pay for time savings that could result from improved water services besides devoting the 
time savings to paid labor, e.g., increased leisure, child care, food preparation, as well as schooling 
and preventative health activities. 
We did not undertake a separate study to estimate the shadow price of time in Kathmandu. 
Rather, we look to other studies in the literature where researchers estimate the economic value 
households place on time savings from not having to collect water. This benefit transfer approach 
(i.e., of transferring estimates of the shadow price of time from other study sites to the policy study 
site of interest—in our case Kathmandu) is common in economic analyses that need to estimate the 




Cook et al. [2016a] provide a comprehensive overview of estimates of the value of travel 
time in low-income countries. They begin with an overview of studies from the transportation 
sector, which find value of time estimates ranging from 18–86% of wages. Cook et al. [2016a] also 
review three papers that value time within the context of water collection. Whittington et al. [1990] 
find a value of 100% of unskilled wages in a small Kenyan town, even though there was no evidence 
that these time savings would be devoted to paid labor. Asthana [1997] find a value of 35% of the 
unskilled wage rate in rural India, and Kremer et al. [2011] estimate a value of travel time of only 
7% of the unskilled wage rate in rural Kenya. Cook et al. [2016a] themselves use a stated preference 
choice experiment to estimate a household-specific value of time spent collecting water. Their 
results from a random-parameters logit model suggest an average value of time spent collecting 
water of 18 Ksh/h (US$0.21 per hour), approximately 50% of the market wage rate. Using a latent 
class model, these authors find considerable heterogeneity in the value of time spent collecting 
water across four different groups of households. The first group (about one third of respondents) 
values time very highly (49 Ksh/h). A second, poorer group values time hardly at all (less than 1 
Ksh/h). The third and fourth groups value time at approximately 9 Ksh/h. 
In another study, DeVoto et al. [2012] find that in Tangiers, Morocco, households’ 
willingness to pay for the time savings and convenience associated with private water connections 
is high compared to public taps but not because a private connection improves health or 
opportunities for paid labor. Instead, these authors find that households are willing to pay for a 
private water connection because it increases the time available for leisure and reduces both inter- 
and intrahousehold conflicts over water. 
These studies provide strong evidence that many household place a positive value on the 
time spent collecting water. None of these estimates of the value of time rely upon evidence that 
households would devote time savings from not having to collect water to paid labor or income 
generating activities. In fact, DeVoto et al. [2012] show that households place a monetary value of 
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time savings devoted to non-income producing activities, including leisure. Based on these results, 
we believe that it is reasonable to assume that many households in Kathmandu likely place a 
monetary value on the time they spend collecting water from outside the home, even without 
evidence that these time savings would be allocated to paid labor or other income-generating 
activities. For our estimates of coping costs in Kathmandu, we rely on Cook et al.’s [2016a] findings 
from Meru, Kenya. 
As in Pattanayak et al. [2005], our 2014 estimates of the value of time spent collecting water 
are household-specific and distinguish between households with domestic servants and those 
without. For households without domestic servants, we assume a value of time equal to 50% of the 
average hourly wage of employed individuals in the household. For households with domestic 
servants, the value of time spent collecting water is assumed to be the average wage rate of the 
lowest paid individuals in the neighborhood where the household is located. For respondents that 
did not report an income (N = 57), the value of time spent collecting water is assumed to 50% of the 
median household mean hourly wage in the neighborhood. (Other missing variables were dealt 
with similarly.) The average hourly wage was estimated from self-reported monthly income 
assuming a six day work week and 10 h working day. The average hourly wage for households in 
the 2014 sample was 89 NPR (median 78 NPR), about US$0.93 (based on a 2014 exchange rate of 
95 NPR to US$1). 
We emphasize that these are assumptions about the value of time spent collecting water in 
Kathmandu and are not based on any empirical data from our household survey. To show the 
sensitivity of our coping cost estimates to these assumptions about the value of time spent 
collecting water, we also present estimates of household coping costs in both 2001 and 2014 
assuming that the value of time spent collecting water is zero (Table 4). These coping cost estimates 
that assume a zero value of time are best viewed as a lower bound of what households are willing to 
pay for improved services. Respondents reported the distance from their home to a water source in 
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either meters (m) or minutes (min). For those who report the distance in meters, we assumed a 
walking speed of 80 m/min to estimate the time spent walking to the source. For respondents that 
did not report time or distance to a source, the median distance to the same type of source of other 
households in the neighborhood was assumed. The total time spent for one trip from the home to a 
water source was the round-trip walking time plus the self-reported queuing time at the water 
source. 
2.4.2.2 Private Wells and Pumping 
The monthly household costs of private wells consist of capital and operation and 
maintenance expenses. The annual capital costs were estimated by multiplying the value of the 
capital asset (as estimated by the respondent to be the present day replacement value of the capital 
good) by a capital recovery factor based on the life of the asset and a real discount rate of 10% 
(private wells and electric pumps were both assumed to have a lifespan of 20). Operation and 
maintenance costs include self-reported, ongoing minor repairs and electricity use.  
Households without private wells also reported owning pumps. These were often used to extract 
water directly from the piped water system. Their capital and operation and maintenance expenses 
are also calculated. 
2.4.2.3 In-House Water Treatment Costs 
Households incur water treatment costs for both boiling and filtering. Filtering may entail 
additional household expenditures for equipment; boiling typically does not. We estimated the 
monthly capital costs for the water filters using the same approach as for private wells and 
rainwater collections systems. Annual operation and maintenance (O&M) costs are based on self-
reported monetary expenditures. 
The costs of boiling water are based on estimates from Tiwari [2000]. Households in our 
2001 and 2014 surveys were asked the frequency with which they boiled their drinking and 
cooking water (e.g. “almost always”, “occasionally”, “rarely or never”), and the monthly household 
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costs of boiling are adjusted depending on the respondent’s answer. Using the International 
Monetary Fund’s inflation index for average consumer prices in Nepal [International Monetary 
Fund, 2015], Tiwari’s 1998 estimate for the costs of boiling water (95 NPR/month) is equivalent to 
282 NPR in 2014. Households that answered “almost always” are assumed to incur boiling costs of 
282 NPR/month, and households that answered “occasionally” are assumed to incur boiling costs of 
141 NPR/month. There were no households in our sample that reported that they “rarely or never” 
boiled their drinking water. 
2.4.2.4 Household Storage and Rainwater Harvesting Systems 
Households can purchase overhead or underground storage tanks. Monthly capital costs of 
water storage assets are calculated based on reported replacement costs, a 20-year economic life of 
the facilities, and a 10% real interest rate. If a storage tank is shared amongst households, only a 
proportion of the total cost was assigned to the respondent’s household.  
Rainwater harvesting systems are centered around a water storage container, such as a barrel, 
bucket, or tank, and are therefore included in this section. The monthly capital costs of rainwater 
collection systems are again calculated assuming a 20-year economic life and a 10% real interest 
rate. 
2.4.2.5 Monetary Payments to Water Vendors and Other Suppliers 
To calculate total household coping costs, we added the monetary payments the household 
made to private water tankers, bottled water vendors, and public utility tankers, to the estimated 
monthly costs it incurred for the other four coping cost components described above. Monetary 
payments made to neighbors are also included, as well as any payments made to access water from 
stone taps. Payments households made to obtain water from public taps and wells are not included 
in the coping costs but are categorized as public costs paid by households, similar to household 
water bill payments. At some water sources outside the home, households made a monetary 
payment to obtain water. The latter are included in the coping cost component ‘‘monetary 
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payments to water vendors and informal suppliers’’ (not in the estimates of the coping costs 
associated with collection time). 
In Kathmandu households may pay for water from public taps in several ways. In some 
cases, KUKL provides a ‘‘public’’ tap that is shared by a designated group of households. KUKL 
provides these households a fixed monthly water bill regardless of the volume of water used. This 
water bill is then shared by these households. There are also situations where a community 
association constructs a storage tank and fills it with water from public taps owned by KUKL or 
with water from the ancient system of stone taps. In this case the community association may 
collect a fixed monthly fee from households to pay for management expenses. The community 
association may charge a minimal fee for maintenance and management of the storage facility. 
Other community associations work together to build a community storage tank, and purchase 
water from tanker truck vendors to fill the storage tank. In this case, households are typically 
charged for each bucket they collect. Again, we distinguish between payments households make to 
the public utility (KUKL) for both private connections and use of public taps, as well as payments to 
water vendors and informal sup- pliers. The former are not included in the estimates of coping 
costs, but instead are reported separately. 
2.4.3. Summary 
As described above, we include annualized capital costs for household investments in 
private wells and pumps, water storage, and in-house water treatment systems in our estimates of 
household coping costs. One common theoretical formulation of the coping cost model assumes 
that there are no significant adjustment costs associated with reducing the level of investment in 
defensive measures [Bartik, 1988] and that household coping behaviors do not include any large, 
discrete capital expenditures to avert damages. If coping strategies do not involve capital 
expenditures, they can be easily stopped, i.e., households have low adjustment costs. For example, a 
household purchasing water from vendors makes periodic, regular expenditures to cope with 
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unreliable, poor quality water services, but these expenditures can be quickly reversed if a new 
improved piped water service is installed. In this case the coping cost expenditures represent 
potential cost savings and will be a theoretically-defensible lower bound on the household’s 
willingness to pay for the improved piped water system. 
On the other hand, some authors incorporate capital expenditures in their estimates of 
coping costs [Abdalla, 1990; Cook et al., 2016b; Pattanayak et al., 2005]. In Kathmandu, many 
households incur capital costs to ameliorate the consequences of unreliable, poor quality public 
supplies. These capital costs are not quickly reversible (i.e., have higher adjustment costs), and they 
are best characterized as sunk costs in the short term. Once such capital investments have been 
made, the short-run marginal costs of using them may be low. Therefore, for a household that has 
already made such investments, the short-run cost savings of switching to a new improved public 
system with 24/7 potable water supply will be much less than, for example, a household relying 
largely on bottled water vendors.  
Because our calculations include annualized capital costs, it is not possible to confidently 
interpret them as lower bound estimates of households’ willingness to pay, at least in the short run. 
In particular, households with the complete suite of private capital investments (private well and 
pumping systems, storage, and in-house water treatment systems) would experience relatively 
modest financial cost savings in the short run from switching all their water use to an improved 
(24/7) potable private water connection. 
Because our estimates of coping costs may not reflect potential cost savings in the short run, 
they cannot be interpreted as lower bound estimates of household willingness to pay. However, we 
choose to include annualized capital costs in our estimates of coping costs for two reasons. First, by 
including capital costs, our coping costs estimates better illustrate long-run demand for improved 
public water supplies. Households’ capital investments in private wells and pumps, storage, and in-
house water treatment systems will not last indefinitely. Households will certainly achieve 
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substantial cost savings and better service from switching to an improved public system after the 
MWSP is complete rather than reinvesting capital in private coping solutions.  
Second, households with private wells may face the prospect of additional capital costs 
sooner than expected. Groundwater levels in Kathmandu have been falling and declines in well 
yields have become common [Pandey et al., 2012]. Some households with private wells may soon 
find that they can no longer reach the groundwater and will need to dig (drill) a deeper well, 
incurring additional capital costs. 
2.5 Description of Study Site, Fieldwork, Sample Households, Existing Water Collection 
Practices, and Perceptions 
2.5.1 Fieldwork 
The 2001 household survey was designed to obtain a representative sample of 1500 
households in the five municipalities of Kathmandu Valley: Kathmandu, Lalitpur, Bhaktapur, 
Kirtipur, and Madhyapur. Households were selected using a multistage cluster sampling procedure. 
In Nepal, the ward is the lowest level administrative unit. There are nine wards in a Village 
Development Committee (VDC) and more than nine wards in municipalities (the precise number 
depends on the size of the population). In the first stage of the multistage cluster sampling 
procedure, we followed the common practice among survey researchers in Nepal and considered 
the ward as the primary sampling unit (PSU). For example, the Nepal Demographic and Health 
Survey (DHS), Nepal Living Standard Measurement Survey (LSMS), and Nepal Labor Force Survey 
(NLFS) all used the ward as the PSU. We selected wards based on a population-proportionate-to-
size procedure, using the number of households in each ward. This ensured that in the first stage 
households had an equal probability of being included in the sample [Babbie, 1990]. 
In this first stage, wards were located using aerial maps provided by the Central Bureau of 
Statistics for the 1996/97 World Bank Living Standard Measurement Survey for Kathmandu. In 
three of the five municipalities in the Kathmandu Valley (Kathmandu, Lalitpur, and Bhaktapur), a 
previously conducted complete enumeration of all households was used to estimate the population 
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of the wards [SILT Consultants and Development Research and Training Center, 1999]. In Kirtipur 
and Madhyapur, the 1991 population census was used to approximate population size.  
In the second stage, we subdivided each ward selected in the first stage into groups of 25 
households (termed a “cluster”). Large wards thus had more clusters than smaller wards. Field 
supervisors, working with enumerators, created maps that identified these clusters of 25 
households in each selected ward. The required number of clusters to be selected in the second 
stage was determined by the total sample size, and clusters were selected randomly.  
In the third (final) stage, if a cluster was selected for inclusion in the sample, then 
respondents from all 25 households in that cluster were interviewed. The final sample consisted of 
60 clusters of 25 households each covering all five municipalities in the Kathmandu Valley (1500 
total households). 
In the 2014 resurvey of the 2001 households, if we were unable to locate the original 
household, a nearby household was selected for an interview. If the household head from a 2001 
sample household was missing, the present head or a responsible member of the house was 
interviewed instead. In total we were able to locate and reinterview 927 of the 1500 households 
from the 2001 survey. In the 2014 survey, there are thus 573 replacement households. Figure 1 
shows the location of the sample households in the 2014 survey in the Kathmandu Valley, both the 




Figure 2.1. Location of household clusters in Kathmandu Valley – 2014 Survey 
 
Although the 2001 households were a representative sample of the population in the five 
municipalities in Kathmandu Valley, the sample from the 2014 resurvey is not. Households that 
migrated to Kathmandu over the period from 2001 to 2014 are not part of our 2014 sample unless 
they happened to be included as a replacement household. For all the descriptive analyses 
presented in the paper, we compare the 2001 households with all of the 2014 households (i.e., 
including both the matched and replacement households). However, replacement households were 
excluded in the regression analysis in order to control for unobserved household taste parameters. 
Fieldwork was conducted over a three-month period from August to October 2014 (the 
rainy season in Kathmandu). Nineteen experienced enumerators were hired and trained. They 
conducted the interviews under the supervision of senior field supervisors from the Institute of 
Population and Development Studies, in Kathmandu, Nepal. 
2.5.2 Profile of Sample Households 
Table 1 presents the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the overall 2001 
and 2014 samples. Table 1 also presents a simple typology of four types of households based on 
their use of the two main water sources in Kathmandu (for 2014, percentage of sample noted in 
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parentheses): (1) no private water connection and no private well (5% of the sample households); 
(2) private water connection and no private well (40% of the sample households); (3) no private 
water connection and private well (6% of the sample households); and (4) private water 
connection and private well (49% of the sample households). As shown, household heads are 
naturally older in 2014, increasing from 46 to 57 years of age. Years of education have also 
increased, from 7 years of education for the head of household in 2001 to 8 years of education in 
2014. The percentage of male respondents decreased from 63% to 52%; the percentage of 
respondents who are married decreased from 85% to 78%. Household sizes are smaller in 2014, 
reflecting both children leaving home and the demographic transition to smaller families. In 2001, 
the average household size was eight; in 2014, it was five. The percentage of households with 
domestic servants decreased. In both 2001 and 2014 home ownership, electricity coverage, and 
phone coverage (both landlines and mobile phones) are very high. Sewer connections increased 












Household incomes are measured as the estimated total monthly cash income of all wage 
earners and self-employed individuals in the household and other possible sources: rental income, 
pension and/or government cash transfers, and other income from interest, dividends, capital 
gains, etc. We do not include subsistence agriculture production or barter transactions. Real 
incomes of sample households have increased by 35% over the 13-year period, from 42,000 NPR 
per month (adjusted to 2014 NPR) to 57,000 NPR; and the estimated average real market value of 
the households’ dwellings have nearly doubled—from 6.1 million NPR to 11 million NPR. 
2.5.3 Existing Water Collection Practices and Perceptions  
Focusing on our entire 2014 sample (i.e., with replacement), we find that households 
reported that they have access to an average of 4.1 water sources (median 4, range 1–8 sources). 
They actually used an average of 2.6 sources (median 3, range 1–6 sources), with 85% of 
households using two or more sources. The two water sources most used by households in 2014 
were private water connections (PWCs) and private wells. Overall, approximately 30% of 
household water supply volume used by sample households comes from private connections, 29% 
from private wells, 20% from tankers, 8% from public wells, 6% from public taps, and the rest (7%) 
from neighbors, bottled water (20 L jars), stone taps, and surface water. On average, sample 
households self-supplied or purchased 85 liters per capita per day (lpcd) in the rainy season and 69 
lpcd in the dry season. The median amount self-supplied or purchased in the rainy season was 48 
lpcd and 41 lpcd in the dry season. (Note that these water use figures are based on respondents’ 
recall of how much water they used per day from each source in both the rainy and dry seasons. We 
do not consider these to be precise estimates of household water use due to the difficulties many 
respondents are likely to have recalling the amounts of water collected, especially from private 
connections and private wells.) 
Compared to 2001, the number of households with neither a PWC nor a private well has 
decreased from 22% to 5% of the sample, while the percentage of households with both a PWC and 
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private well has increased from 19% to 49%. In 2014, households with neither a PWC nor a private 
well use the least amount of water (35 lpcd in the dry season). Households with only a PWC use less 
water (45 lpcd, dry season) than do households with only a private well (69 lpcd, dry season). 
Households with both a PWC and private well use the most water (94 lpcd, dry season). These 
amounts cannot be compared with 2001 data because estimates of the amounts of water from PWC 
and private wells were not collected in the 2001 survey. The World Health Organization suggests a 
minimum safe water requirement of 20 lpcd for basic needs (cooking and drinking) in emergency 
situations, and 70 lpcd for washing, cleaning, laundry, growing food, and sanitation [Reed and Reed, 
2013]. Even though the average water consumption levels in Kathmandu are above these WHO 
minimums, the quantity of water many households acquire is below these amounts and the 
quantity of water obtained is neither reliable nor of good quality. Additionally, the water use of 
16% of our sample falls below even the minimum safe water requirement during the dry season. 
Households that have both a PWC and a private well tend to be richer, with a monthly 
income that is nearly double that of the other groups. They also live in houses with much higher 
market values, have higher electricity and phone bills, and are more likely to have domestic 
servants. These patterns are similar to those in 2001, but the socioeconomic disparities were less 
extreme between the four types of households in 2014.  
Figure 2 shows the average amount of water used by household type and how much water 
comes from each source during the dry season. The proportions are calculated as a population 
average of households in each group. Households with neither a PWC nor a private well collect their 
water from a variety of sources, mainly tankers, public wells, and public taps. Those with a PWC but 
no private well obtain most of their water from PWCs, supplementing their water supply with 
water tankers and public wells. Households with a private well but no PWC obtain most of their 
household water from their private well. Households with both private wells and PWC often obtain 
additional water from tankers. Across all four types of households, the quantity of water purchased 
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from tankers is similar, ranging from 36 to 48 lpcd in 2014 and 7 to 61 lpcd in 2001 (see Table 2). 
Households with a private well (both those with and without a PWC) are using substantially more 
water than households without a private well. 
Figure 2.2. Quantity of water collected by source and household type in the dry season (2014) 
 
Households’ water supply situation and their responses to the growing water shortage have 
changed from 2001 to 2014. The number of households in the matched sample that had private 
connections and private wells grew significantly from 2001 to 2014. Over a third of the households 
that did not have connections in 2001 managed to get connected by 2014 (138 out of 338 
households). However, fourteen percent of households with connections in 2001 stopped using 
their private water connection in 2014 (84 out of 589 households). Twenty-three percent of 
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households). Twenty-four percent of households that did not have a private well in 2001 managed 
to obtain one by 2014 (163 out of 678 households). Reasons why households would stop using 






Table 2.2. Amount collected by type and year (L/capita/day, dry season) 
 
Table 2.3. Respondent’s perceptions of water quality from available sources, by year and season (percentages of respondents that have a 





We asked households to estimate how much water from each source was required for each 
household task (drinking, cooking, bathing, washing and cleaning). Sample respondents report that 
most water sources are used for more than one task. On average, households report 1.35 to 1.46 
sources used for each task. Piped water and public taps are used mostly for cooking and drinking; 
public wells are used mostly for bathing and washing. Water from neighbors is most commonly 
used for cooking; private wells and tanker water for bathing and washing. Ninety-nine percent of 
households that use 20 L jars report that it is used for drinking. A typical household with the 
median household income (42,000 NPR), median water consumption per capita (40 lpcd), and 
median number of water sources used (three), uses most of the water from their PWC for drinking 
and some for cooking. This household also uses vended water from tankers for bathing, washing, 
and other purposes. Finally, they also purchase 20 L jars for drinking.  
Table 3 presents households’ perceptions of the quality and reliability of water from 
different sources for the 2001 and 2014 household surveys. For the rainy season, households 
interviewed in 2014 report that quality (taste and dirtiness) and reliability of water from different 
sources have generally improved compared to 2001. However, more households report negative 
perceptions of health risks for PWCs, public wells, private wells, surface waters, and rainwater. On 
the other hand, the quality (taste, dirtiness, health risks) and reliability in the dry season have 
declined compared to 2001. However, fewer households report negative perceptions about the 
dirtiness of water from neighbors, private wells, and vendors. There are also decreases in the 
percentages of households reporting highly negative perceptions about the reliability of water from 
PWCs, public taps, neighbors, and vendors.  
We expected the quality and reliability of most water sources to decline from 2001 to 2014 
due to lack of public sector investment and increased population and economic pressure on existing 
supplies. The link between deteriorating quantity and quality of water from the piped distribution 
arises because of the negative pressure in the intermittent piped system, allowing contaminated 
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groundwater to enter the distribution systems. Of course, households interviewed in 2014 do not 
report that the quality (taste, dirtiness) and reliability of the main water sources (private 
connections, private wells, and vendors) are good, just that they are not as bad as in 2001. We do 
find increases in percentages of households reporting perceived health risks from private 
connections, private wells, and vendors.  
Another big change is that households are using much more water from tanker truck and 
bottled water vendors in 2014 than in 2001. In 2001, 53 sample households purchased water from 
tankers, compared to 505 households in 2014. There was also a large increase in the purchase of 
bottled water. In 2001, 30 sample households purchased bottled water compared to 529 
households in 2014. 
2.6 Household Coping Costs (2001 Versus 2014)  
In this section we describe our main findings. We first present our overall 2014 estimates of 
household coping costs for the entire sample. Then we discuss the 2014 coping costs and their 
components using our household typology described in the last section. With this baseline we then 
explore how coping costs have changed from 2001 to 2014. Next, we examine differences in coping 
costs between households with different income levels. Finally, we compare household coping costs 
to public costs paid by taxpayers/donors and to the costs paid by households for public water 
supplies (i.e., water bills and payments for water from other public sources). 
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Table 2.4. Coping costs, by types and year (2014 NPR) 
 
 
Table 4 presents our 2014 estimates of household coping costs and our recalculated 2001 
estimates. Estimates for 2001 were recalculated to allow for consistent comparison between 2001 
and 2014 as described in section 4. Table 4 breaks down the coping costs by coping method, type of 
household (regarding PWC and private well), and by year for the entire sample. For each average 
cost estimate, only the expenditures of households that use the coping method are included, which 
is why the sample size varies and the columns cannot be summed. The average household incurs 
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costs of 1206 NPR (US$12) per month coping with the poor quality, unreliable public water supply 
system. Most households incur costs associated with storing (384 NPR, N=1368), private wells and 
pumping (277 NPR, N=1214), treating (165 NPR, N=1065), and purchasing (547 NPR, N=958). 
Some households also incur time costs associated with collecting water (569 NPR, N=433).  
In 2014, households without a private water connection and without a private well spent 
1269 NPR on coping costs. Households with only a private water connection spent only 906 NPR 
per month. Households with only a private well spent the most—1687 NPR per month. Households 
with both a private water connection and a private well spent 1382 NPR per month. 
For the 68 households without either a PWC or a private well, almost all households (N=64) 
incur most of their coping costs from collection costs (averaging 902 NPR per month).  Forty-two 
households in this group purchase water and their purchasing costs are substantial (392 NPR). 
Pumping, treating, and storing costs are smaller, with less than half of the households using these 
coping methods.  
The 94 households without a PWC but with a private well incur the highest coping costs, 
with much of that coming from collection costs. The average household collection cost for the 52 
households in this group with positive collection costs was 1215 NPR. Many households in this 
group also incur pumping costs (456 NPR, N=76) and storing costs (422 NPR, N=63). These 
households spend a similar amount buying (475 NPR, N=60) and treating water (116 NPR, N=50). 
For the 600 households with a PWC but no private well, most incur costs storing (267 NPR, 
N=554), buying (493 NPR, N=412), and pumping (93 NPR, N=415). Over half also participate in 
treating (136 NPR, N=383) and collecting (404 NPR, N=252). Collecting costs are less than those of 
an average household without a PWC. 
The 738 households with both a PWC and private well incur large costs pumping (369 NPR, 
N=709) storing (488 NPR, N=704), and purchasing (623 NPR, N=444). The costs of treating are 
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smaller (191 NPR, N=599). Only a small portion of these households incurs costs collecting water 
(364 NPR, N=65). 
Figure 3 summarizes the composition of coping costs for households in each of the four 
groups. It shows the average cost for a household for each of the five coping strategies. Because not 
all households use all coping methods, the composition of coping costs for each of the four groups 
should not be interpreted as representative of an average household. We see that unconnected 
households incur higher coping costs than connected households, which is primarily due to greater 
time spent collecting water. Additionally, households with private wells incur higher coping costs 
because they spend more on building and operating pumps and wells. Storage costs are highest for 
households with both a PWC and a private well, slightly less for households with only a PWC or only 
a private well, and the least for households without either a private well or a private connection. 
Purchases from water vendors are similar across all four household types. Treatment costs for 









Table 4 also presents a comparison of the estimates of total household coping costs in 2001 
and 2014. Average household coping costs have more than doubled in real terms over the period 
from 2001 to 2014, from 524 NPR to 1206 NPR (both in 2014 NPR). Because real household 
incomes have increased about 36%, coping costs for the average household have increased as a 
proportion of total income (from about 2% to 3%). 
Table 4 also presents a summary of household-level changes in real coping costs by coping 
cost component and household type. Households have on average increased their coping costs by 
682 NPR per month. The only component of coping costs that decreased from 2001 to 2014 was the 
time spent collecting water (by an average of 121 NPR per month). Pumping costs increased by 233 
NPR; storage costs increased by 272 NPR; and expenditures on water vendors increased by 472 
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Households without PWCs in 2014 that chose to collect water in either 2001 or 2014 
experienced large increases in collection costs, while connected households experienced decreases 
in collection costs. Households with private wells had large increases in pumping costs. Some 
households without private wells in 2014 still incurred costs for pumping water from private 
connections to both overhead and in- ground storage tanks, but the increases in pumping costs 
were smaller than those for households with private wells. Households without either a PWC or a 
private well also experienced changes in coping costs similar to households in the other three 
groups—large increases in purchase costs and smaller increases in storing and treating. 
Households without a private water connection but with a private well experienced the largest 
increase in coping costs—1108 NPR per month. This was due to increases in collection costs (465 
NPR per month), pumping costs (348 NPR per month), and purchases from vendors (416 NPR per 
month). There was, however, a small decrease in treatment costs. Households with a private water 
connection and no private well experienced a smaller increase in coping costs of 488 NPR, due 
mostly to the large increase in purchases from vendors, offset by a decrease in collecting costs. 
Households with both a PWC and a private well also experienced an increase in coping costs of 762 
NPR per month. Despite a large decrease in collection costs for over half of these households, there 
were large increases in pumping and storing costs for nearly the entire subsample. There was also 
an increase in purchasing costs for over half of the households with both a PWC and a private well. 
Figure 4 shows the composition of coping costs by income decile for 2001 and 2014, 
respectively. Two major shifts occurred over the period. First, the costs of time spent collecting 
water declined across most income deciles (all except the third and fourth deciles) because fewer 
households were collecting water from sources outside their homes, particularly in the higher 
income deciles. The reduction in the coping costs associated with time spent collecting water is 
most dramatic for low- income households. In 2001, over 75% of the total coping costs of 
households in the poorest decile was the value of time spent collecting water; in 2014, this 
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percentage was only 20%. By 2014 households in the richest three income deciles effectively 
stopped spending time collecting water from outside the home. 
Figure 2.4. Composition of coping costs, by income decile (in 2001, 41 of 48 households who 
purchased from vendors bought from tankers, and expenditures were not recorded). 
 
Second, monetary payments to water vendors rose dramatically. These monetary expenditures 
were for water purchases from both tanker trucks and bottled water vendors. In 2014 both poor 
and rich households were spending much more on vended water than in 2001.  
To better understand the distribution of coping costs across income, Figure 5 presents the 
percentage of total coping costs on the vertical axis versus the percentage of households ranked 
from lowest to highest income on the horizontal axis in both 2001 and 2014. Figure 5 shows that 
the distribution of coping costs by household income has not changed much between 2001 and 
2014. Households’ coping costs were widely distributed throughout all income groups in the 
population in both 2001 and 2014. The coping costs per cubic meter average 198 NPR (US$2) in 






















Figure 4B. Composition of coping costs, 
by income decile (2014)




















Figure 4A. Composition of coping costs, 
by income decile (2001)
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Figure 2.5. Distribution of household coping costs by income, 2001 and 2014. 
 
 
In 2001, average water bills for households with private connections were 152 NPR (in 
2001 NPR) (387 NPR in 2014 NPR). By 2014, these had increased to only 218 NPR, a 44% decrease 
in real terms. In 2001, households with private connections paid about 133% more in monthly 
coping costs than their water bill. By 2014, monthly coping costs were approximately four times 
greater than their water bill. 
Figure 6 illustrates the total monthly water supply costs for each of the four types of 
households in our typology. Figure 6 displays the total monthly costs as the sum of three cost 
categories: (1) the costs of publicly supplied (KUKL) water that are not paid by households with 
private connections (effectively the subsidies provided by government and donors); (2) the portion 
of the costs of the public supply paid by households through their water bill; and (3) the private 
coping costs households pay in addition to the costs of the water supplied by the public system. The 
total cost of water provided by KUKL (capital plus operation and maintenance) is assumed to be 95 
NPR (US$1) per cubic meter. Figure 6 shows that private household coping costs make up the 
largest overall portion of the total costs of supplying water to households.   The total costs to 
households with both PWCs and private wells, including the subsidies these households receive 



































































2.7. Explaining Differences in Total Household Coping Costs (2001 Versus 2014) 
Table 5 presents the summary statistics for the variables used in the regression analysis. 
Table 6 presents the results for three different specifications of the model described in section 4, 
estimated using only the matched households. For each of the three specifications, we first run the 
regression with only the arguably exogenous variables (household characteristics) and then with 
the entire set of independent variables of interest. Models 1 and 2 use differences between 2001 
and 2014 for all variables and are our preferred specifications because they control for time 
invariant factors. We run the same model using only the 2001 data (Models 3 and 4) and then with 
the 2014 data (Models 5 and 6). We discuss the results from Models 1 and 2 here (results of Models 
3–6 are discussed in the Appendix). 
Additionally, the Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity is conducted for all the models. 
The null hypothesis of homoskedasticity is rejected for all models; therefore, White’s [1980] 
heteroskedastic-consistent covariance matrix estimator is used to correct the estimated standard 
errors for an unknown form of heteroskedasticity. 
Model 1 focuses on the effects of four arguably exogenous household characteristics—
respondent education, gender, household size, and income. Respondent education and gender are 
not significant. However, the coefficients on household size and income are positive and statistically 
significant, indicating that households with higher incomes and more members have higher coping 
costs. 
In Model 2, income and household size effects are robust to the addition of variables in the 
full model. The coefficient on gaining a private water connection is negative and significant at the 
1% level, indicating that obtaining a private water connection is associated with decreases in 
coping costs. The coefficient on having a private well is not statistically significant, nor is the 
coefficient on having both a private well and private water connection. The number of sources used 
has a positive and statistically significant association with household coping costs. 
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The magnitude of the effect of gaining a private water connection is the sum of the 
coefficients on Diff_PWC and Diff_PWCXGain_PWC, which is 287. To illustrate this effect, we can 
forecast the decrease in coping costs that households without either a private water connection or a 
private well would experience if they were to obtain a private connection. The predicted change in 
coping costs for a household that does not have a PWC in 2001 and is still unconnected in 2014 is 
estimated to be 732 NPR. The predicted change in coping costs for households that gain a private 
water connection is 445 NPR. This difference of 287 NPR is the decrease in coping costs 
attributable to obtaining a private water connection. 
Almost all perceptions about the quality of piped water (in terms of taste, color, health risks, 
and reliability) do not have robust, statistically significant associations with coping costs. Only poor 
reliability in the dry season is significantly associated with higher coping costs. This is surprising, 
given findings from other studies in the literature, which highlight the importance of perceptions 
about the desirable qualities of water supply [Um et al., 2002; Abrahams et al., 2000; Katuwal and 
Bohara, 2011]. We would expect, given our larger sample size, to have enough power to detect an 
effect if one existed. 
Based on the results of Model 2, we conclude that household income, having a private 
connection, household size, number of sources used, and perceived (un)reliability of piped water in 
the dry season have the strongest associations with coping costs. The positive association of 
household income and coping costs suggests that improved water service is a normal good, and 
demand increases with income. The negative association of having a private water connection and 
coping costs suggests that having a heavily subsidized water supply from the piped network is 
valuable to a household, even if the service is unreliable and the quality of the water provided is 
poor. Additionally, having a larger household, using more sources, and a PWC that is perceived to 




Table 2.6. Regression results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES diff_coping diff_coping coping2001 coping2001 coping_2014 coping_2014 
       
Respondent_edu 8.890 7.325 7.061 10.33 27.79*** 27.92*** 
 (6.249) (6.110) (6.307) (6.308) (7.460) (6.877) 
Respondent_male -104.5 -130.0* -20.28 -38.14 -38.77 35.11 
 (80.11) (78.50) (50.00) (49.79) (68.11) (64.58) 
Household_size 36.70*** 23.14** -3.019 -5.296 52.68*** 32.76** 
 (11.23) (10.72) (7.293) (7.084) (16.94) (16.43) 
Income 0.902* 1.213** 1.465** 1.729*** 0.833 1.141* 
 (0.508) (0.487) (0.596) (0.636) (0.587) (0.622) 
Uses_PWC    -252.1***  -110.3 
    (92.19)  (93.38) 
Diff_PWC  296.7**     
  (122.4)     
Diff_PWCXGain_PWC  -583.7***     
  (181.1)     
Uses_privatewell    -93.05  205.3 
    (107.3)  (149.5) 
Diff_well  20.48     
  (159.0)     
Diff_wellXGain_well  -106.1     
  (166.4)     
Uses_PWCX 
Uses_privatewell 
   -66.34  -25.32 
    (111.7)  (157.9) 
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Gain_both  906.4     
  (585.7)     
N_sources  288.9***  -59.62  287.6*** 
  (30.26)  (43.31)  (34.97) 
Service_hrs  7.315  19.91  58.82** 
  (13.41)  (43.49)  (26.13) 
Taste_wet  -33.01  -104.5*  46.24 
  (54.06)  (56.95)  (85.56) 
Taste_dry  69.37  -63.43  -58.40 
  (58.76)  (55.04)  (90.15) 
Color_wet  17.74  -33.51  66.63 
  (67.48)  (51.33)  (79.17) 
Color_dry  -24.53  -10.07  90.68 
  (76.11)  (47.76)  (85.91) 
Health_wet  52.02  17.56  -23.97 
  (61.35)  (53.28)  (90.38) 
Health_dry  14.76  75.97*  172.2* 
  (57.34)  (42.30)  (87.99) 
Reliab_wet  -69.24  -74.13  -75.95 
  (49.58)  (47.24)  (57.96) 
Reliab_dry  106.2**  77.33*  108.8** 
  (50.18)  (42.44)  (52.20) 
Concern_water    -72.27  -44.96 
    (47.95)  (74.27) 
Diff_water  83.94     
  (109.9)     
Diff_waterXBecome_water  -266.9*     
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  (138.3)     
Constant 1,008*** 712.8*** 446.1*** 513.7* 865.3*** -837.0*** 
 (103.7) (125.0) (103.2) (289.5) (134.6) (321.4) 
       
Observations 927 927 927 927 927 927 
R-squared 0.068 0.202 0.042 0.204 0.119 0.246 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




Our resurvey of 1500 households first interviewed in 2001 has enabled us to better 
understand how households in Kathmandu have managed to cope with an increasing water 
shortage and lack of investment in public water supply infrastructure. After 2001, private water 
vendors have stepped into the water economy of Kathmandu and have provided a significant 
portion of the increased investment and water supplies that the public desperately needed. In 2001, 
only 71 out of 1500 households in our sample purchased water from tanker truck vendors or from 
bottled water vendors. In 2014, every single household in our sample (except one) reported that 
they purchased water from vendors (either tanker truck or bottled water) at some time during the 
year. Additionally, households have made private investments in water storage and private wells. 
Only households with both a private connection and a private well (49% of sample households) 
managed to obtain an arguably sufficient quantity of water (94 lpcd). Households without either a 
private connection or a private well used only 35 lpcd. 
Real coping costs have more than doubled between 2001 and 2014, to an average of US$12 
per household per month. The burden of coping costs falls evenly throughout the income 
distribution. The coping costs per cubic meter are also not significantly different across income 
groups. Rising household incomes over the period from 2001 to 2014 allowed households to install 
more storage tanks, drill more private wells, and pay tanker truck and bottled vendors for water, 
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resulting in increased coping costs for dealing with the poor quality, unreliable supplies from the 
public system. These private investments have resulted in a decline in the time households spend 
collecting water from outside the home. Despite the increase in household incomes, households still 
experienced an increase in the percentage of their income spent coping with poor quality, 
unreliable public water supplies (from 2% to 3%).  
Households with private connections incurred coping costs of US$12.49 per month (1,187 
NPR), four times higher than their water bills (US$3.03 or 288 NPR per month). Even the poor 
quality services of the existing PWCs are more valuable to households than the water bills that they 
pay. Our regression analysis shows that gaining a PWC is associated with a decrease in coping costs. 
Currently, household perceptions about the taste, color, and health risks of the water from piped 
connections do not have significant relationships with coping costs. Only poor reliability has a 
significant association with higher coping costs, suggesting that this is the service attribute of piped 
water services that households care most about. 
As shown in the theoretical framework, our coping cost estimates are simply one 
component of a household’s willingness to pay for improved water quality and are only suggestive 
of the long-run demand for improved public water supplies. For example, our coping cost estimates 
will not capture the anxiety and stress households experience as they struggle with the uncertainty 
associated with accessing water from multiple sources, especially during the dry season. However, 
because coping costs are a significant portion of household expenditures, there is potential for large 
water supply improvement projects, such as the MWSP, to increase household welfare. The 
decreases in coping costs that would result from increased investments in public water 
infrastructure would be largest for households that obtain a new PWC, have less reliable PWCs 
now, and are able to decrease the number of sources used. These households are thus the most 
likely to experience increases in household welfare when the public water supply system in 
Kathmandu is improved. However, because our coping cost estimates cannot be interpreted as 
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lower bound estimates of household willingness to pay for improved piped services in the short 
run, we are unable to predict the magnitude of the welfare improvements that will accrue to 
households that have made substantial capital investments in private wells and pumps, storage 
tanks, and in-house water treatment systems. 
Our results have implications for the reform of water tariffs in Kathmandu. The completion 
of a large water supply improvement project, the MWSP, represents a unique opportunity to reform 
municipal water tariffs and put KUKL on a sounder financial footing. An increase in municipal water 
tariffs for households that experience an improvement in the quality and reliability of piped water 
services will allow the water utility to share the economic and financial benefits that will accrue to 
households. If there is not a substantial tariff increase when the MWSP is completed and municipal 
water services improve, households will grow accustomed to high quality services at very low 
prices, and it may be even harder to reset tariffs in the future. 
The redesign of water tariffs will remain challenging. On one hand, the significant increase 
in water supply after the completion of MWSP should allow the water utility to capture some of the 
savings in coping costs that some households will experience, especially potential cost savings 
resulting from reduced purchases of vended water. On the other hand, we emphasize that the 
design of the new tariffs will need to consider the competition from the private vending sector and 
from the fact that many households have already incurred the costs of installing private wells. 
Both vendors and private wells are alternative water sources for households and represent 
competition for the water supplied by public water utility from public taps and private connections. 
However, from the households’ perspective, the cost and quality attributes of water supplied by 
vendors and private wells are quite different. Water from tankers and “jar” vendors is of relatively 
high quality. Marginal costs are high, but investment costs are minimal. Households can easily stop 
purchases of water from vendors. 
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However, the use of water from a private well requires substantial upfront investment costs 
and marginal costs, once the well and pump are installed, are low (mainly electricity costs for 
running the pump and minor repairs). However, there is an additional dimension to the economics 
of private wells. As more and more households have drilled wells, the groundwater table in 
Kathmandu has been falling. This means that households with private wells may find that they can 
no longer easily reach the groundwater, i.e., their well needs to be deepened to reach the falling 
groundwater table, incurring additional capital costs. 
Finally, it is important to emphasize that although coping costs are related to the benefits of 
the MWSP, the objective of this paper has not been to reanalyze the costs and benefits of the MWSP, 
or to consider possible solutions to water scarcity in the Kathmandu Valley in addition to interbasin 
transfer.  For example, conceptually the recycling of wastewater is an alternative water “tap” that 
could be used instead of an interbasin transfer. Singapore provides a good example of how this can 
be done. However, the capital costs and technical capacity required to actually implement this 
solution are out of reach in Kathmandu. Indeed, to the best of our knowledge, recycling wastewater 
for potable use has not been accomplished in any low-income country, certainly not any country 
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CHAPTER 3: WATER AND TIME USE: EVIDENCE FROM KATHMANDU, NEPAL2 
3.1 Introduction  
Access to water is costly in many developing countries. Households in these countries spend 
time and effort on collecting water, often on a daily basis, resulting in productivity and welfare 
losses. On average, the persons responsible for water collection (usually women and girls) spend 36 
min per trip for water collection activities in rural Sub-Saharan Africa and approximately 23 min 
per trip in rural Asia (Cheung, 2010). In water-scarce regions in India, a woman could spend up to 3 
out of her 15 productive hours per day collecting water (Sijbesma et al., 2009).  
As a result, many developing countries have implemented large-scale programmes to 
provide tap water connections to households. The motivations underlying these programmes 
include the provision of safe and convenient water supply and consequently improve household 
welfare. However, rapid expansion of tap water connections can lead to inadequate supply if it is 
not accompanied by improvements to the supporting water infrastructure, thus undermining the 
effectiveness of providing tap water connections.  
In this paper, we study the effect of reliability of private tap water connections (PWCs) on 
household time allocation and household welfare measured as volume of water consumed in 
Kathmandu, Nepal.3 The importance of infrastructure on development and growth has been 
demonstrated in the existing literature. However, the importance of infrastructure quality has not 
 
2 This chapter previously appeared as an article in Water Policy. The original citation is as follows: Chen, Y. J., 
Chindarkar, N., & Zhao, J. (2019). Water and time use: evidence from Kathmandu, Nepal. Water Policy, 21(S1), 
76-100. 
3 For simplicity, private tap water connections are referred to as ‘tap water’ hereafter. 
 
67 
received adequate attention, due to the thinking that quality will eventually catch up. In reality, in 
many countries, it takes decades, if not longer, for the infrastructure to operate at optimal capacity. 
During this lengthy period of catching up, households usually rely on existing sources of water 
supply, such as public taps or wells and private water markets to manage their household water 
supply. An interesting question that arises is whether access to tap water, even though unreliable, is 
better than nothing? 
Tap water systems provide treated water from public sources to end users. The provision of 
tap water requires supporting infrastructure, such as water pipelines that link end users directly to 
the water source. However, as in many developing countries, the tap water system in Kathmandu 
suffers from intermittent service and poor reliability. Although over 70% of households had access 
to tap water in 2001, water pressure and running time varied significantly, owing mainly to weak 
supporting water infrastructure, such as aging and broken pipes, and depleting water sources 
(Whittington et al., 2002; Pattanayak et al., 2005). A majority of households get tap water only for a 
few hours every day. Under these conditions, it is unclear what effect improved reliability would 
have on water collection times. At the time of the writing of this article, we were unaware of any 
other study examining time use patterns under conditions of unreliable water supply.  
We use unique household data collected in the Kathmandu Valley for our analyses. 
Kathmandu Valley is the economic and political centre of Nepal. With its rapid urbanisation and 
growing population, Kathmandu Valley has experienced significant water shortages. Although in 
our sample, 87% of households had access to tap water, the connections can be highly unreliable. 
Data on household water usage collected by the authors from 2014 to 2015 indicate that, on 
average, households with tap water connectivity received water from their tap for only 9 days out 
of a month, and for the days when water was available, it only runs for less than 100 min. Tap water 
reliability contributes significantly to household time allocation decisions. During our survey, many 
 
68 
respondents suggested that they often needed to leave work early in order to turn on the tap when 
the water became available.  
We provide a simple theoretical model that illustrates the effect of increased productivity of 
household water production (that is, when tap water is more reliable) on households’ time use and 
water consumption. Our model shows that without imposing specific functional forms on 
households’ water production, the effects remain ambiguous. If a linear production function is 
imposed, households would be expected to consume more water but the amount of time they spend 
on collecting water still remains ambiguous.  
We use a subsample of 819 households connected to tap water for our empirical analyses. 
Using the detailed household survey and time diary, we first demonstrate that the time spent on 
water collection activities is negatively correlated with productive activities. For every one minute 
increase in time spent on water collection, there is about half a minute reduction in time spent on 
work. However, we find no evidence that time spent on water collection affects the probability of 
employment. We also demonstrate that the reliability of tap water was positively correlated with 
time spent on water collection. In particular, if a household had regular tap water, water collectors 
spend 17–23 min more on water collection per day (compared to a household with less regular tap 
water). Further analysis suggested that this increase was largely driven by the increase in time 
spent on collecting water from the private tap. In estimating the relationship between tap water 
reliability and water consumption, we find the reliability measure to be positively correlated with 
total water consumption and water consumed from the tap. In the meantime, households with 
reliable tap water consume less water from public sources (such as public wells and public taps) 
and water vendors. Note that the empirical findings we present in this paper can only be 
interpreted as correlations and not causal relationships owing to potential endogeneity in access to 
tap water as well as its reliability. We perform additional robustness checks to confirm if our 
estimates were sensitive to the choice of control variables or different fixed effects.  
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Our study adds to the current literature on reliable access to water and time use in a 
number of ways. First, this study contributes to the understanding of tap water reliability and time 
use in urban areas of a less developed country. As women are usually responsible for water 
collection in developing countries, most of the existing literature has tended to focus on the effects 
of improved access to water on female labour markets and domestic labour supply outcomes (Ilahi 
& Grimard, 2000; Koolwal & van de Walle, 2013). Little is known, empirically, about how access to 
tap water affects time spent on water collection and other daily activities.4 Second, we provide new 
evidence that can be added to the existing literature on infrastructure reliability and intermittent 
water supply. Past literature that evaluated the effect of infrastructure tended to focus on a 
categorical change, and less attention has been paid to its quality and reliability (Chen et al., 2019). 
Our results indicate that intermittent water supply could hurt labour productivity if water becomes 
available during working hours. It also suggests that there might be a welfare effect of improved 
reliability of tap water. Households with more reliable tap water spend less time outside the house 
collecting water and consume more from the tap. Therefore, although the total amount of time they 
spend on collecting water is more, they can probably accomplish other things alongside water 
collection at home, leading to a potential welfare gain. This study is also the first to use a detailed 
time diary to estimate the effect of reliable tap water on time use. It allows us to disaggregate time 
allocation across broad activity categories.  
3.2 Conceptual Framework  
In this section, we present a simple theoretical model that links the productivity of 
household water production with time use and water consumption. Suppose a household is set out 
to maximise 𝑈(𝑐1; 𝑐2; 𝑙), where 𝑐1 is the consumption of water, 𝑐2 is the consumption of other 
 
4 Studies on this topic in the existing literature have usually focused on rural households. For example, Gross 
et al. (2018) demonstrated that the installation of public water access points significantly reduced time spent 
on water collection in rural Benin. Meeks (2017) discovered that improved water access in rural Kyrgyzstan 
increased the time spent on market activities and leisure.  
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market goods and 𝑙 is leisure. Suppose water can be collected from a private tap or other sources 
(such as a private well or a public tap). The household’s problem can be written as follows:  
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑡1,𝑡2,𝑡𝑤𝑈(𝑐1, 𝑐2, 𝑙) 
s.t.:  𝑐1 = 𝑔(𝑡1; 𝜃1) + 𝑣(𝑡2; 𝜃2) 
𝑝𝑐2 = 𝑤𝑡𝑤 
𝑡1 + 𝑡2 + 𝑡𝑤 + 𝑙 = 𝑇 
(1) 
where 𝑔(𝑡1; 𝜃1)is the production function of water from a private tap and 𝑣(𝑡2; 𝜃2) is the 
production function of water from other sources. 𝜃1 and 𝜃2 are parameters in the production 
functions, which indicate the productivity of water production from various sources. 𝑝 is the price 
for market goods. Household is endowed with time 𝑇, which can be allocated to the production of 
water from the private tap (𝑡1) or other sources (𝑡2) to the labour market at wage rate w (𝑡𝑤) and 
leisure (𝑙).  
Note that Equation (1) is equivalent to maximising 𝑈(𝑔(𝑡1) +  𝑣(𝑡2), 𝑤𝑡𝑤 𝑝⁄ , 𝑇 − 𝑡1 − 𝑡2). 
The research question of interest is as follows: What is the effect of 𝜃1 on time allocation and water 
consumption? We can show that these effects are ambiguous, that is, the signs of the partial 
derivatives 𝜕𝑡1/ 𝜕𝜃1,  𝜕𝑡𝑤/ 𝜕𝜃1,  𝜕𝑐1/ 𝜕𝜃1 cannot be determined.5 Intuitively, this is because as the 
productivity of tap water production increases, there are two forces driving time 𝑡1 allocated to this 
activity. On the one hand, the substitution effect will lead to an increase in 𝑡1 compared to other 
activities, as the production of tap water becomes more efficient in terms of labour (hence per unit 
price becomes cheaper). However, this substitution effect can be bounded above as the quantity of 
water consumed in a household cannot increase infinitely. On the other hand, an increase in tap 
water productivity will have an income effect. This income effect will push demand for all 
consumption upwards, including demand for market goods and leisure. This income effect will 
 
5 The proofs are omitted here.  
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induce households to supply more labour to the labour market in exchange for market goods. In 
equilibrium which effect dominates is ambiguous.  
Koolwal & van de Walle (2013) discussed a special case of the model presented in Equation 
(1), where the tap water production function is assumed to be linear, that is, 𝑔(𝑡1) = 𝜌𝑡1. Under this 
assumption, if a household reallocates time spent on producing water from a private tap, 𝑡1, to the 
labour market, it can earn a wage income of 𝑤𝑡1. If the price of a market good is assumed to be 
numeraire, the reallocation of time results in 𝑤𝑡1 units of additional consumption of the market 
good, but now the household produces 𝑡1 units of water from its private tap. Therefore, the relative 
price of water produced from the private tap to market good is 𝑤/𝜌. Applying the Slutsky equation, 
it can be shown that 𝜕𝑐1/ 𝜕𝜌 is always negative. Therefore, the authors conclude that under the 
assumption of a linear production function, as 𝜌 increases, the consumption of home-produced 
water will always increase. Nonetheless, even under this restrictive assumption, the sign of 𝜕𝑡1/ 𝜕𝜌 
remains ambiguous.  
To summarise, when tap water becomes more reliable, it is unclear from the model whether 
time spent on water collection will increase or decrease. This lack of clarity is due to the fact that 
the substitution effect and income effect from such a change work in opposite directions. However, 
if stricter assumptions on the water production function are imposed, an increase in total water 
consumption should be expected while the effect on time allocation remains ambiguous.  
3.3 Data and Outcome Variables  
Data for the empirical analyses presented in this paper were drawn from a household 
survey of 1,500 households in five municipalities in the Kathmandu Valley in 2014 and 2015 
(Kathmandu, Lalitpur, Bhaktapur, Kirtipur and Madhyapur). This was a follow-up survey of the 
2001 wave in the same area. The two waves were merged to construct a panel. Details of the 
sampling strategy and data for the 2001 wave can be found in Whittington et al. (2002) and 
Pattanayak et al. (2005), and details of the 2014–2015 survey can be found in Yogendra et al. 
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(2017). In this paper, we only use data from the 2014–2015 wave. The survey was conducted using 
a multi-stage clustered sampling method, and the sample is representative of the population of 
Kathmandu in 2001 but not of the population in 2014–2015. The 2001 survey collected information 
on household characteristics and water usage as well as perceptions of tariffs and willingness-to-
pay. In 2014–2015, an attempt was made to re-survey all the households in the 2001 sample to 
construct a panel. If a household could not be located in the 2014–2015 survey, the current resident 
or the immediate neighbour was interviewed. In total, 61.8% of households were successfully re-
surveyed. We only use households that were surveyed in both rounds for our analyses.  
The 2014–2015 survey included a time diary module. The time diary was distributed at the 
time of survey, and in it, household members were asked to reflect on the activities that they 
performed in a typical day over a 24-hour period, using 30 min as the smallest block (see Figure 1). 
Following the standards of the established literature, we provided 26 types of activities for 
respondents to choose from Devoto et al. (2012). The respondent of the main survey, spouse of the 
respondent, and the person most responsible for water collection (if different from respondent or 
spouse) filled out the time diary. We grouped the 26 activities into seven broad categories: work, 
leisure, household chores, social activities, rest, water collection and meal times.  
Literature on survey methods and cognitive psychology has highlighted potential bias that 
might be introduced in time use data arising from recall and salience of activities (Menon, 1993; 
Beegle et al., 2012; Arthi et al., 2018). In particular, the concern is that respondents are likely to 
over(under)-report time spent on different activities depending on the recall period and whether 
the activities are salient and regular. For instance, if time spent on collecting water is less salient 
but regular, such as ‘every afternoon’, then respondents may not respond with precise recall-and-
count strategy but instead just recall the periodicity (Menon, 1993).  
We designed the time use module acknowledging these limitations. First, we did not impose 
a specific recall period; instead, we asked the respondents about a ‘typical day’. Second, we did not 
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explicitly highlight certain activities, such as ‘how much time do you spend on collecting water’. 
Instead, we let the respondents recall their daily activities chronologically over a 24-hour period, 
and then we post-coded those activities. It is possible that our survey data collection method may 
have introduced bias such as respondents sub-consciously reporting more time spent on collecting 
water since they were informed a priori that the survey was about water supply. However, taking 
into consideration the resource and time constraints of implementing the survey, this was the best 
way forward. 
Figure 3.1. Time use survey (time diary) for the 2014–2015 survey 
 
 
Similarly, the data we constructed for the quantity of water consumed from various sources are 
subject to measurement errors. Existing literature has usually relied on self-reported water usage 
or imputed data from recalled water expenditure to infer household water consumption volumes 
(Fuente et al., 2016; Apoorva et al., 2018). The difficulties in accurately estimating the quantity of 
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water consumed are twofold. First, confidentiality concerns prevent disclosure of socioeconomic 
status in water bills. As a result, researchers are not able to link metered water usage to household 
characteristics in many countries. In addition, households in developing countries usually gather 
water from various sources, many of which are not metered. Water consumption from these 
sources can only be estimated based on recall data. In our survey, we also relied on the recall 
method to gather information on the amount of water consumed. We asked households about their 
water consumption from 11 sources. For consumption from sources other than private taps, we 
follow the standard practices of the existing literature and asked respondents to report the size of 
their containers and the number of containers they retrieved per trip (Apoorva et al., 2018).  
The two sets of outcome variables of interest are time spent on collecting water and total 
water consumption from various sources. We discuss the main variables used in the empirical 
analyses in the following paragraphs.  
3.3.1 Time Spent on Water Collection  
We constructed two variables to measure time spent on water collection. The first variable 
is ‘activity_water’. This variable was constructed from the time diary module. Respondents only 
reported the amount of time they spent on collecting water (if at all) during the day and did not 
differentiate it by source. Therefore, we could not disaggregate time spent on collecting water from 
a private tap or from other sources. To supplement this, we constructed a second variable 
‘activity_water_outside’ using information from the household survey. This variable measures the 
time (minutes per day on average) spent on collecting water from a public tap, public well or a 
stone tap. Time spent on collecting water from outside the household was computed by adding up 
round trip time plus waiting time for collection from these sources. This number was reported by 
the main survey respondent, and he or she could be different from the person who was most 
responsible for water collection activities in the household. Our data indicated that out of the 1,500 
respondents for the main household survey, 412 filled out the time diary module (out of a total of 
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819 time diaries). Hence, the variable activity_water_outside is subject to measurement errors, and 
the results need to be interpreted with caution. 
3.3.2 Water Consumption from Various Sources  
We collected data for water consumption from the following sources: a private tap, any 
public sources (including public tap, public well and stone tap), a private well, water vendors and 
total water consumption from all sources. These variables were constructed from the main 
household survey conducted in the 2014–2015 period. In particular, in the main household survey, 
each respondent (usually the head of the household who may not be the person most responsible 
for water collection) was questioned about the availability of various water sources. We 
constructed the water consumption variables by adding up consumption in the corresponding 
categories.  
3.3.3 Measures of Productivity of Home Water Production 
We constructed two measures of reliability for tap water connection. The first measure is a 
qualitative, ordinal measure of reliability. The respondent of the household survey was asked to 
judge the reliability of tap water on a scale of 1–4, with 1 being ‘very regular’ and 4 being 
‘unreliable’, for both the dry and rainy seasons. We generated a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if 
the respondent reports that the tap water connection is ‘very regular’ or ‘regular’. We used the 
responses for reliability of tap water in the dry season in our main results.  
The second reliability measure uses Hashimoto et al. (1982)’s definition of a system in 
water resources planning: the frequency or probability that a system is in a satisfactory state. We 
calculated the probability of getting tap water in the next hour. Specifically, we computed the 
following measure:  
𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒_ℎ𝑟𝑠 =  
𝑡𝑎𝑝_𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑠/60
24 × (1 + 𝑡𝑎𝑝_𝑔𝑎𝑝)
 (2) 
tap_minutes are the number of minutes of tap water a household expects to receive every time they 
receive water from the tap. tap_gap is the number of days between the time tap water is received. 
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Therefore, the measure reliable_hrs computes the probability that a household receives tap water in 
the next hour. For example, if a household receives uninterrupted tap water supply 24 hours a day, 
7 days a week, the household’s probability of getting tap water in the next hour would be ((24 * 
60)/60)/(24 * (1 + 0)) = 100%.  
Summary statistics for the sample used in the analysis are presented in Table 1. Since only 
the person most responsible for water collection answered the time diary, there were some missing 
observations if this person were absent or unavailable at the time of the survey. Out of the time 
diaries distributed to 1,500 households in the original sample, 819 of them were collected. We 
compared household income and household size of the 819 households against those that were 
missing from the original sample. Our t-test indicated that although the logarithm of household 
income was not statistically different between the two groups (P-value = 0.82 for two-sided test), 
households that answered the time diary survey had a slightly smaller household size (difference = 
0.2, P-value = 0.037). We attempted to address the sample selection issue by including household 
controls and individual characteristics. We also performed additional robustness checks which are 
discussed in Section 5.  
Table 3.1. Summary statistics 
Variable Description Observed Mean SD Min Max 
Key variables 
 
     
 
Time spent on water collection      
  
Activity water  
Time spent on collecting water per 
day (minutes) 




Time spent on collecting water 
outside household per day (minutes) 
819 8.7 34.1 0 540 
 
Water consumption – dry season      
  
Water total dry 
Total water consumption per day in 
the dry season (litre) 
819 301 362 6.7 2775 
  
Water pipe dry 
Total water consumption per day 
from pipe in the dry season (litre) 
819 78.6 136 0 2,000 
  
Water public dry 
Total water consumption per day 
from public well, tap or stone tap in 
the dry season (litre) 




Total water consumption per day 
from private well (priwell) in the dry 
season (litre) 






Total water consumption per day 
from vendors in the dry season (litre) 
819 55 139 0 1,667 
 
Water consumption - rainy season      
  
Water total rain 
Total water consumption per day 
from pipe in the rainy season (litre) 
819 361 413 5 2,917 
  
Water pipe rain 
Total water consumption per day 
from pipe in the rainy season (litre) 




Total water consumption per day 
from public well, tap or stone tap in 
the rainy season (litre) 




Total water consumption per day 
from private well (priwell) in the 
rainy season (litre) 




Total water consumption per day 
from vendors in the rainy season 
(litre) 




     
  
Reliable dry 
Self-reported reliability of tap water 
connection in the dry season 
819 0.24 0.43 0 1 
  
Reliable rain 
Self-reported reliability of tap water 
connection in the rainy season 
819 0.75 0.44 0 1 
  
Reliable hours 
Probability of getting tap water in the 
next 24 h 
575 1.56 1.89 0.06 20.8 
Control variables 
 
     
 
hhsize Household size 819 4.96 2.05 1 15 
 
Age Age of the respondent 819 46.3 14 13 90 
 
Gender Gender of the respondent 819 1.77 0.42 1 2 
 
Education 
Whether respondent has received 
middle school education 
818 0.65 0.48 0 1 
 
Inschool 
Whether respondent is currently 
enrolled in school 
819 1.97 0.18 1 2 
 
Married Whether the respondent is married 819 0.81 0.39 0 1 
 
Lnincome 
Logarithm of monthly household 
income (Rs) 
795 10.4 1.28 6.21 16.1 
 
Other time use variables (minutes per day)      
  
Work Time spent at work 819 131 198 0 750 
  
School/training Time spent at school 819 7.22 50 0 570 
  
Bathing/dressing 
Time spent on taking a bath or 
dressing 
819 36.7 19.3 0 150 
  
Meals Time spent on eating meals 819 136 44.8 0 270 
  
Commute Time spent on commuting 819 10.5 31.4 0 600 
  
Sleep Time spent on sleeping 819 441 50.4 270 630 
  
Chores 
Time spent on running household 
chores other than water-related 
activities 
819 313 183 0 810 




As shown in Table 1, although all households are connected to a private tap in our sample, 
on average, the probability for a household to receive tap water in the next hour is extremely low at 
only 2%. Households waited an average of 5 days for tap water to become available; these periods 
of availability on average lasted for approximately 100 min. A typical respondent still spent about 
40 min on water collection activities every day. This included all water-related activities, including 
fetching water from the tap and from other resources within and outside the household. This 
number suggests that although households were ‘connected’ to a private tap, they still spent a great 
deal of time on collecting water. Figure 2 plots the histogram of time spent on water collection 
among the 819 households. The figure suggests that there was significant variation in time spent on 
collecting water among these households, and one possible explanation for this is the reliability of 
tap water connections across these households.  
Figure 3.2. Distribution of time spent on water collection. Note: This figure shows the histogram of 
water collection activities (minutes/day) among the 819 respondents that completed the time diary 






3.4 Descriptive Analyses of Tap Water Reliability, Time Use and Water Consumption  
In this section, we present descriptive analyses of tap water reliability and time use. In 
particular, we examine the time use patterns across different household activities for households 
with good and poor connections.  
3.4.1 Water Collectors 
We paired the time diary records of the person most responsible for collecting water for the 
household with information in the household roster in the main household survey. Therefore, we 
had detailed data about who these water collectors were. Table 2 demonstrates that 43.8% of main 
water collectors were spouses and 28.9% were heads of households. It can be seen that 76.8% of 
water collectors were female. Daughters-in-law were also frequently tasked with collecting water. 
We also observed that sons, daughters, parents and other family members participated in collecting 
water. While the majority of water collectors were female, male water collectors made up 23% of 
the sample. Figure 3 shows the distribution of the age of water collectors. They had a mean (and 
median) age of 46. Only 11 households (out of 819) reported water collectors under the age of 18. 
We saw no significant participation of children in the collection of water. Our results, therefore, 
differed from much of the trend observed in the literature, as we have a significant portion of male 
collectors and few collectors who were children. 




Table 3.2. Water collector’s household role 
  Male Female Total 
Spouse 1 358 359 
Head 143 94 237 
Son/daughter-in-law 1 121 122 
Son/daughter 39 34 73 
Father/mother 0 6 6 
Other non-relative 2 4 6 
Brother/sister-in-law 0 5 5 
Grandchild 2 2 4 
Brother/sister 0 3 3 
Other relative 1 1 2 
Nephew/niece 1 0 1 
Father/mother-in-law 0 1 1 
Total 190 629 819 
 
Additionally, households often included more than one member responsible for collecting 
water. The results revealed that 82% of households had one main water collector, 18% had two 
collectors and 0.4% had three. Of the main collectors, one-third (33%, N = 276) reported working in 
a typical day.  
3.4.2 Water Collection and Work  
Next, we examined the water collection time patterns throughout the day. Figure 4 
demonstrates the water collection patterns for the entire sample and contrasts it with working 
hours. Each bar represents the number of households reporting water collection during that half 
hour. It can be observed that a large portion of the water collection (in blue) occurs in the morning 
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before 10:00 am. There is also a significant portion of water collection that occurs during work 
hours (illustrated using orange bars) and in the evening. Two smaller peaks can be observed at 
2:00 pm and 5:00 pm.  
Figure 3.4. Water collection time. Note: This figure displays frequencies of time intervals for water 





Because much of the literature has tended to focus on labour supply outcomes, we 
examined the relationship between water collection and work. First, we examined the observable 
socioeconomic differences between water collectors who work more and those who work less. We 
run regressions of the number of hours worked in a typical day on socioeconomic variables and on 
hours spent on collecting water and water reliability. In Table 3, it can be observed that in 
regressions (1) and (2), which controls only for socioeconomic characteristics, females, older 










hours. Marital status and education had no significant impact on hours worked. Fixed effects for 
municipality or ward or both were included in all models. Regressions (3)–(8) build upon models 
(1) and (2) by including variables related to tap water reliability and hours spent on collecting 
water. There was a significant negative coefficient on time spent on collecting water – more time 
spent on collecting water was associated with less time spent working. Reliability did not have a 
significant effect on hours worked. Table 4 presents the effect of time spent on water collection on 
the probability of employment. The coefficients on activity_water were significant when 
municipality fixed effects were controlled for but became insignificant when ward fixed effects 
were controlled for instead. This trend suggests that the observed correlation between water 














Table 3.4. Regression of time spent on water collection on the probability of employment 
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We investigated the time trade-off between work and water collection more closely by 
looking at the subset of participants who both worked and collected water in a typical day. Figure 5 
shows the patterns of work and water collection only for the subset of those who both worked and 
collected water (N = 167).  
Figure 3.5. Water collection time for workers. Note: This figure displays frequencies of time 
intervals for water collection and work for 167 (out of all 819) respondents that both worked and 




Of these 167 water collectors, 26 worked right before water collection, four worked right 
after water collection and seven worked both before and after water collection. It is for these 37 
water collectors (22% of this subsample) that time spent on collecting water was likely to directly 
affect the amount of time spent working. These were people who collected water in the afternoon, 
as shown in Figure 4 as the areas where water collection and work overlap. Of those who both 
worked and collected water, 41% worked in retail, 17% in other industries, 14% in government 
positions and 11% in wage labour. Out of 167 water collectors, 93% (N 1⁄4 155) were employed 
(which meant that they were not in school or retired). In addition, almost none of these people (less 













819 water collectors, two-thirds reported not having a full-time job (no occupation code was 
identified), while the proportion was only one-third of the entire sample. Hence, estimates 
presented in Tables 3 and 4 might be subject to selection bias as people who self-select themselves 
for water collection duties might have differed from the general population.  
An ideal analysis would have estimated the correlation between time spent on water 
collection and the productive time of all household members. However, due to the restrictions of 
the survey, we were unable to perform this analysis. Alternatively, in Table 5, we estimate the 
correlation between time spent on water collection and the fraction of household members that 
were employed. We discovered no correlation between the two. In summary, our results suggest 
that for those water collectors that do work, the time they spent on productive activities were 
negatively correlated with time spent on water collection. However, there is limited evidence that 
time spent on water collection affects employment decisions.  
Figure 3.6. Chores and water collection. Note: This figure displays frequencies of time intervals for 

















Table 3.5. Regression of time spent on water collection on the percentages of household members employment 
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3.4.3 Water Collection and Other Activities  
In our time diaries, we not only asked respondents to recall the time they spent on water 
and work but also collected information on other activities performed throughout the day. 
Therefore, we had the opportunity to examine the relationship between tap water reliability and a 
wide range of activities, including non-water collection chores, leisure, eating meals, having tea, 
bathing and sleeping. 
First, we examined the distribution of time spent on non-water collection chores and water 
collection (Figure 6). Water collection tended to occur in the morning before all other chores. Most 
of the chores occurred in the morning, between breakfast and lunch, when water collection 
activities were also low. Some water collection took place in the afternoon and increased at 
approximately noon, 2:00 pm and the late afternoon. Thereafter, another large portion of the 
chores was completed, from late afternoon through the evening. Trade-offs between water 
collection and other chores did not seem likely. 
Figure 7 shows the time distributions for leisure and water collection. We observed 
significant overlaps between peak water collection times and peak leisure times, which make direct 
trade-offs between leisure and water collection more likely. 
3.4.4 Aggregate Daily Time Use Patterns  
This section of the analysis separates the households into four categories based on 
combinations of: if they have a private well, a PWC, and if the PWC is reliable or not. Figure 8 
illustrates the proportions of the subsample that participate in each activity type during each half 





Figure 3.7. Leisure and water collection. Note: This figure displays frequencies of time intervals for 
water collection and leisure for all 819 respondents that completed the time diary in the 2014–
2015 survey.  
 
 
Figure 8 shows that daily time use patterns are broadly similar across the four types of 
households. It can be observed that water collection usually occurs in the morning or in the late 
afternoon. If the person most responsible for water collection was not collecting water in the 
morning, she or he spent time sleeping, bathing, eating meals and doing leisure activities. If water 
collection did not happen in the afternoon, then the person most responsible for water collection 
spent time reaching the end of their work day, working on other chores or engaging in leisure 
activities. Right before and after water collection in the evening, many households ate meals, 













Figure 3.8. Time diary. Note: These figures display aggregate daily time use patterns for households 
with an unreliable PWC and no private well (a), a reliable tap water connection and no private well 
(b), an unreliable private water connection and a private well (c) and a reliable private water 








According to these results, it appears that water collectors in households with reliable 
connections spend more time on collecting water and less time working than do water collectors in 
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households with unreliable connections. This is confirmed with average hours spent (Table 6). It 
shows that, interestingly, water collectors in households with unreliable connections work more 
than water collectors from the other subsamples (148.6 and 121.34 min per day vs. 122.14 and 115 
min per day). They also spent less time on chores (315.32 and 295.17 min per day vs. 357.32 and 
304.64 min per day). Households with unreliable water connections also slept more (450.13 and 
439.83 min per day vs. 429.38 and 423.14 min per day). At the same time, we observed more water 
collectors who attend school or other training in the reliable subsamples than in the unreliable 
subsamples. Households with both a tap water connection and a private well spent the most 
amount of time on collecting water (59 min per day). Water collectors from these households also 
worked the least and spent more time eating meals. Water collectors from households without 
either a reliable tap water connection or a private well spent the least time on water collection and 
school/training and spent the most time sleeping and commuting compared to other household 
types.  
Theories outlined in Section 2 provide explanation for these seemingly counterintuitive 
results. Regression analyses in Section 5 also confirm the descriptive findings presented here. 
3.4.5 Summary of Findings  
From the results, we draw three conclusions. First, households’ daily time use patterns are 
very similar. Second, while water collection time patterns closely reflect leisure and chore time 
patterns, the overlap with work time in the afternoons is concerning from a policy perspective. 
Finally, while households with unreliable tap water connections spend the least time on collecting 
water, these households also purchase much more water from private vendors (tankers and jar 
water), suggesting that households substitute tap water with vended water.   
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3.5 Regression Analyses of Tap Water Reliability, Time Use and Water Consumption  
3.5.1 Empirical Specification  
In this section, we use ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions to estimate the correlation 
between time spent on water collection, water consumption and reliability of tap water in more 
detail. The baseline OLS regression is as follows: 
𝑦𝑖𝑤𝑚 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑤𝑚 + 𝛼2𝑋𝑖𝑤𝑚 + 𝛼3𝜏𝑚 + 𝛼4𝜎𝑤 + 𝑢𝑖𝑤𝑚 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑤𝑚 are the two sets of outcomes on time allocation and water consumption as described in 
Section 3. 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑤𝑚 is the self-reported tap water reliability measure, which takes value 1 if it 
is regular and 0 otherwise, or the probability of getting tap water in the next hour. For household 𝑖, 
in ward 𝑤, and municipality 𝑚, 𝑋𝑖𝑤𝑚 is a set of individual and household characteristics as 
observed in 2014–2015, which includes gender, education, age, age-squared, log of household 
income and its quadratic form and household size. We also include municipality or ward fixed 
effects (or both) to capture any municipality-specific or ward-specific characteristics that would 
affect time spent on water collection.  
3.5.2 Results 
Table 7 presents the OLS results of tap water reliability on time spent on collecting water 
and time spent on collecting water outside the household. Recall that while activity_water is 
reported by the person most responsible for water collection, activity_water_outside is reported by 
the main survey respondent. In panels A, B and C, we report the effect of three reliability measures, 
that is, the reliability of tap water in the dry season, in the rainy season and the probability of 
getting tap water in the next hour. Results in panel A indicate that greater reliability of tap water in 
the dry season is significantly correlated with more time spent on water collection and less time 
spent on water collection activities outside the household. Results in panel B demonstrate that 
greater reliability of tap water in the rainy season increases total time spent on water collection but 
is uncorrelated with time spent on water collection outside the household. Results in panel C 
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suggest that an increase in the probability of getting tap water in the next hour is positively 
correlated with time spent on water collection activities and negatively correlated with water 
collection outside the household. 
In summary, results in Table 7 suggest that more reliable tap water is positively correlated 
with time spent on water collection. There is also some evidence that this increase is mainly driven 
by time spent on collecting water from a private tap within the household. 




Table 8 shows the effect of tap water reliability on water consumption. Similar to the 
previous table, we group results into four panels with respect to the three reliability measures. 
Panels A and B report the effect of reliability in the dry season and the rainy season on water 
consumption in dry and rainy seasons, respectively. Panels C and D report the effect of ‘reliable_hrs’ 
on water consumption in dry and rainy seasons, respectively. Column (1) shows a positive and 
significant correlation between reliability and total water consumption for three out of the four 
reliability measures when municipality fixed effects are included. In column (2), the probability of 
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getting water in the next hour was still positively correlated with total water consumption when 
ward fixed effects are controlled for. The magnitude of coefficients in panel C suggests that a 1 
percentage point increase in the likelihood of receiving water in the next hour leads to 47.5 more 
litres of total water consumption per day. Columns (3)–(10) present the results for each water 
source. As columns (3) and (4) indicate, unsurprisingly, reliability of tap water is associated with 
more water consumption from the private tap. These results are significant with or without the 
ward fixed effects. Results in columns (5)–(10) suggest substitution of consumption between water 
received from the tap and that from other sources. Furthermore, tap water reliability is negatively 























Table 3.10. Robustness checks – drop observations surveyed in August 
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3.6 Robustness Checks  
We conducted two robustness checks to confirm whether our results were sensitive to the 
choice of control variables and sample selection. Results are presented in Tables 9 and 10.  
Table 9 presents our results after we re-run our OLS regressions by adding more household 
control variables, including age square, survey month and gender of the household head. Each cell 
in the table is a separate regression, and we report coefficients for reliable_dry, reliable_rain and 
reliable_hrs in panels A, B, C and D. Columns (1)–(4) of panel D are intentionally left blank as these 
coefficients are the same as columns (1)–(4) in panel C. Columns (5)–(8) in panel C estimate the 
effect of ‘reliable_hrs’ on water consumption in the dry season. Columns (5)–(8) in panel D estimate 
its effect on water consumption in the rainy season. We reported both results with municipal fixed 
effects or ward fixed effects. As observed, with these additional controls, our main results were 
largely consistent other than the effect of reliable_rain on total water consumption in column (6). 
When ward fixed effect was controlled for, the effect was negative and statistically significant. A 
possible explanation is that households without reliable tap water might store extra water or over-
consume during the rainy season when water is relatively cheap, while consumption decisions are 
less affected for households with reliable tap water.  
Table 10 presents the results when households surveyed in August are excluded. We 
performed this analysis in August as it is typically the last month of the rainy season in the 
Kathmandu Valley. By retaining results for dry season water consumption and dry season 
reliability, we sought to reduce potential recall errors due to the timing of survey. We ran the 
regressions again using the main specification, and the results were similar.  
3.7 Conclusion  
In this paper, we analysed the relationship between household time allocation, reliability of 
tap water and water consumption patterns under conditions of intermittent supply. We discover 
that time spent on productive activities is negatively correlated with time spent on water collection 
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for the person most responsible for water collection in the household. We also demonstrate that 
when tap water connections become more reliable, households spend more time on collecting 
water. As a consequence of this time investment, households consume more water both from their 
private tap and overall.  
From a policy perspective, because an increase in reliability leads to an increase in 
collection time inside the home, it is important to arrange water supply schedules in a way that 
minimises disruptions that can affect work, leisure and other activities. For cities with intermittent 
supply, more research is needed to understand how individuals and households prioritise different 
activities in order to identify which times of day would be the most conducive to water collection. 
Additionally, since we were unable to record simultaneous activities within the same time block, it 
may be relevant to determine what other activities occur while the tap is turned on and the water 
collector is waiting for the storage containers to be filled. Finally, with households with unreliable 
water connections shifting away from collecting water outside the home to vended water, there is 
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CHAPTER 4: HOUSEHOLDS’ PREFERENCES FOR WATER TARIFF STRUCTURES IN 
KATHMANDU, NEPAL6  
4.1 Introduction  
Water utility managers, their tariff consultants, and regulators rarely consult a utility’s 
customers about the form of tariff structure households would prefer. Both citizens and water 
utility managers pay a great deal of attention to changes in fixed charges and volumetric prices 
charged to customers, but much less attention to customers’ preferences for the tariff structure 
itself. Water tariff design is typically assumed to be best left to experts who can most appropriately 
balance the utility’s objectives of cost recovery and revenue stability with their customers’ 
objectives of equity, fairness, affordability, and economic efficiency. 
Because in most locations water utilities operate as monopoly suppliers of piped water and 
sewer services, their tariff structures are effectively administered prices, and utility customers have 
few opportunities to reveal their preferences for alternative pricing structures.7 As a result, there 
can be a serious mismatch between the water tariff structure used and household preferences for 
the tariff structure. Unpopular tariff structures can have a long life because customers have no easy 
way to drive them out of the market. This is quite different, for example, from the 
telecommunications sector where competition can be intense. Mobile phone companies are 
consistently offering customers a variety of different rate plans from which they can choose, and 
unpopular rate plans quickly disappear from the market.  
 
6 This chapter previously appeared as an article in Water Policy. The orginial citation is as follows: Suwal, B. 
R., Zhao, J., Raina, A., Wu, X., Chindarkar, N., Bal Kumar, K. C., & Whittington, D. (2019). Households' 
preferences for water tariff structures in Kathmandu, Nepal. Water Policy, 21(S1), 9-28. 
7 In Scotland, some households are now able to choose their bulk water supplier, but globally this is very rare. 
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There is a sizeable consulting business in the preparation of tariff studies for water utilities, 
and there is near global consensus among water utility managers and international donors that 
increasing block tariffs (IBTs) are the tariff structure best suited to balancing the multiple 
objectives of tariff design, and ensuring that poor households have access to sufficient quantities of 
water at affordable prices. Consultants specializing in advising water utilities on water tariff 
structures and price levels typically assume that an IBT should be used, and then discuss with 
utility management the pros and cons of such issues as the number and size of blocks, the size of 
any positive fixed charges, minimum monthly water bills, and seasonal pricing.  
Numerous scholars, however, have challenged this global consensus on IBTs, arguing that 
IBTs neither target subsidies to poor households effectively nor send the correct signals about the 
economic value of water (Boland & Whittington, 2000; Foster & Araujo, 2004; Komives et al., 2007; 
Diakité et al., 2009; Angel-Urdinola & Wodon, 2012; Whittington et al., 2015; Fuente et al., 2016; 
Nauges & Whittington, 2017). Given this debate between scholars and practitioners over the 
efficiency and effectiveness of IBTs, it is timely to ask what households themselves think. In fact, 
utilities rarely elicit input from households on tariff design issues. In some countries, public 
hearings might be held to gauge citizens’ reactions to specific proposals from tariff consultants, but 
such input is often sought after the main tariff design issues have already been decided. 
There are several reasons that household preferences should be considered in the selection 
of a water tariff structure. First, households may have a preference for a specific water tariff 
structure, and the utility’s choice of tariff structure may affect their well-being. From a cost–benefit 
perspective, ignoring household preferences will miss an opportunity to increase welfare. Second, 
households are probably more likely to pay water bills and to support a water utility that uses a 
tariff structure that they believe is fair and efficient. Perceptions of fairness are important for the 
cooperation of households with an institution (Pokharel, 2015). Third, many households likely 
believe that they have a right to have their voices heard in matters of pricing such basic services as 
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water. Ignoring household preferences on the tariff structure deployed may expose water utilities 
and policy-makers to greater political risks (Crase et al., 2008).  
Water tariff structures are often designed based on certain assumptions about household 
behaviors and how such behaviors may be altered by price mechanisms. Such assumptions should 
be based on a careful investigation of households’ preferences. For example, IBTs are often 
proposed based on the assumption that they will provide the right ‘price signal’ to consumers. In 
fact, this marginal price signal can only be provided to households in one of the blocks of the IBT 
(most likely the highest price block). 
In this paper we report the results from a survey conducted in 2014 of 1,500 households in 
Kathmandu, Nepal, in which we asked respondents for their opinions about different water tariff 
structures. Specifically, we asked households about their preferences regarding three attributes of a 
water tariff: (1) its structure (IBT vs uniform volumetric pricing); (2) positive fixed charges; and (3) 
household flexibility in selecting rate plans. We collected information on households’ knowledge, 
attitudes, and perceptions about the water services in Kathmandu; and households’ urban 
environmental and infra structure priorities. We also asked respondents what they thought a ‘fair 
water bill’ would be for a randomly assigned fixed quantity of water. We analyzed these answers to 
determine whether respondents had a preference for increasing nonlinear tariff structures. We find 
that respondents support monthly water bills that increase linearly as the quantity of water use 
increases. 
In the next section of the paper, we summarize the prevalence of different tariff structures 
being used globally and then present the tariff structure currently used in Kathmandu. The third 
section describes our fieldwork in Kathmandu and provides a socioeconomic profile of our sample 
respondents. The fourth section describes our analytical strategy. In the fifth section we present the 
results. We first describe households’ knowledge, attitudes, and perceptions about the water supply 
in Kathmandu, and the priority they place on reducing water shortages compared to other urban 
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problems. We then present our results regarding households’ preferences for different attributes of 
water tariff structures, as well as regression analyses that examine the types of households that 
prefer different tariff structures. The sixth section summarizes our results and offers concluding 
remarks.  
4.2 Background  
Most water utilities globally now use IBTs to calculate customers’ water bills. The Global 
Water Intelligence (GWI) database reported 122 out of 165 selected utilities from around the world 
were using IBTs in 2013. China had been one of the last refuges of uniform volumetric tariffs, but in 
2013, the Chinese government mandated that all cities in China must adopt IBTs by the end of 2015 
(National Development and Reform Commission, 2013). The predominance of IBTs globally can be 
expected to grow as Chinese cities make the shift to IBTs over the next few years.  
Although there is a clear preference for the basic IBT structure, there is no consensus on the 
details. IBTs have four main features: (1) number of blocks; (2) size of the blocks, especially the first 
(‘lifeline’) block; (3) presence and size of a positive fixed charge; and (4) the volumetric prices 
charged in each block. Tariff consultants and utility managers argue over these features, and there 
is wide variation across all four globally.  
For example, the number of blocks in the IBTs in the GWI database varies widely. Of the 122 
IBTs, the most common number of blocks was three (28%), followed by four blocks (21%). 
However, 6% had two blocks, 11% had five blocks, 10% had six blocks, 7% had seven blocks, and 
18% had eight blocks.  
The GWI database also reports sizes of the first (lifeline) block for the IBTs. The median size 
is 10 m3 in East Asia, South Asia, and Latin America, and somewhat lower in North and sub-Saharan 
Africa (8 and 7 m3 per month, respectively), but the standard deviation is large. With such large 
lifeline blocks, it is not usual for some utilities to have a large proportion, even a majority, of their 
residential consumers falling into the lifeline block. 
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Positive fixed charges raise the average price paid by small volume-using households more 
than that of large volume-using households and thus penalize the same households that the IBT’s 
lifeline block is designed to help. Nevertheless, most water utilities in the GWI database that use 
IBTs (70%) add a positive fixed charge to the volumetric component of their customers’ water bills. 
The mean positive fixed charge was US$4.35 per month. Only 30% of utilities with uniform 
volumetric tariffs add a fixed charge, and their average fixed charge is lower (US$3.20 per month),8 
which suggests that more of these uniform tariff-setting utilities may be aware of the adverse effect 
of fixed charges on poor households.  
One would expect volumetric prices in different blocks to vary across utilities due to 
differences in the costs of water and wastewater services, and the differences are indeed 
substantial. However, across all of the IBT structures, volumetric prices are very low in all of the 
blocks (not just the lifeline block). Considering only the 34 IBTs with three blocks (the most 
common IBT in the GWI database), the median volumetric price was US$0.35 per cubic meter in the 
first block, US$0.57 per cubic meter in the second block, and US$0.75 per cubic meter in the third 
block.  
Most water utilities subsidize water use, and the average cost of water supply is more than 
the price in the highest-price block. Thus, the more water a household uses, the higher the subsidy 
it receives (Nauges & Whittington, 2017).  
4.3 Kathmandu Case Study  
The Kathmandu water utility (Kathmandu Upatyaka Khanepani Limited, KUKL) uses an IBT 
with a minimum bill. KUKL currently has about 190,000 residential customers (KUKL, 2015). The 
water bills of households with both metered and unmetered connections to the pipe network are 
calculated based on the pipe size of their connection. Most connected households have a half-inch 
 
8 The median positive fixed charges in East Asia (US$5) and Latin America (US$4 per month) are much higher 
than those in sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia (all about US$1 per month). 
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pipe connection. Households with a metered one-half inch pipe connection are charged 100 NPR 
(US$0.96) for the first 10 cubic meters. For additional water use above the minimum 10 cubic 
meters, a household is charged 32 NPR (US$0.31) per cubic meter. For example, a household with a 
metered half-inch pipe connection that used 18 cubic meters a month would receive a water bill of 
356 NPR (100 NPR for the first 10 cubic meters plus 32 NPR per cubic meter for the subsequent 8 
cubic meters). Households with half-inch, unmetered connections are charged 785 NPR (US$7.50) 
per month.  
This tariff structure has the appearance of an IBT because, if the household uses all 10 cubic 
meters, its average price is just 10 NPR (≈US$0.10) per cubic meter, and for additional water use 
the price is 32 NPR per cubic meter. However, the minimum bill of 100 NPR means that the 
marginal price for additional water use within the ‘lifeline’ block of 10 cubic meters is effectively 
zero because households must pay this minimum charge regardless of how much water they use 
(e.g., they are charged the same 100 NPR whether they use 5, 7, or 10 cubic meters).  
The implementation of an infrastructure investment program (the Melamchi Water Supply 
Project) is now underway. When completed, it will provide a new raw water supply for the 
Kathmandu Valley, and improvements in both the water and wastewater networks, as well as 
wastewater treatment facilities. Donor support for this project had been conditional upon tariff 
reform, and originally consultants had estimated that a 13-fold increase of the water tariff would be 
required between 1999 and 2009 to meet operating costs of the water network (Domènech et al., 
2013). The revised 2009 tariff increased the tariff set in 2004 by 10–30%, depending on the 
amount consumed (Himalayan Times, 2009; ADB, 2013). It included a lifeline block, but NGOs 
deemed this insufficient to assist poor households and demanded targeted subsidies for the poor 
(Gutierrez et al., 2003; Domènech et al., 2013). A new tariff structure was introduced in 2013, 
which increased the average tariff by 82%. This price increase, however, was still not enough to 
cover operating and maintenance costs, service charges, and debt (ADB, 2015). Further changes in 
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the current tariff structure are thus a possibility, and our questions about tariff preferences were 
highly salient to sample respondents.  
4.4 Fieldwork and Socioeconomic Profile of Sample Respondents  
Our survey of 1,500 households was conducted in five municipalities in the Kathmandu 
Valley (Kathmandu, Lalitpur, Bhaktapur, Kirtipur, and Madhyapur) from August to October 2014. 
Households in this 2014 survey were selected based on a 2001 sample that was drawn to be 
representative of the population of Kathmandu at the time (Gurung et al., 2017). We chose to re-
interview the households from 2001 in order to construct a panel dataset. The sample is thus not 
representative of the 2014 population of households (differences are reported in the Appendix, 
Table B.1). In 2001, households were selected using a multi-stage clustered sampling procedure 
(see Whittington et al. (2002) and Pattanayak et al. (2005) for more details). In the 2014 re-survey 
of the 2001 households, if we were unable to locate the original household, a nearby household in 
the same cluster was selected for an interview.9 In total, we were able to locate and re-interview 
927 of the 1,500 households in the 2001 survey. In the 2014 survey, there are thus 573 
replacement households.10   
 
9If the household head from the 2001 sample household was missing, the next most senior member of the 
house was interviewed.  
10Although the 2001 households were a representative sample of the population in the five municipalities 
in Kathmandu Valley, the sample from the 2014 re-survey is not because many households migrated to 
Kathmandu over the period from 2001 to 2014. These households are not part of our 2014 sample unless 
they happened to be included as a replacement household. Appendix Table B.1 shows that the survey 
households are more likely to be homeowners, to use LP gas as the cooking fuel, to have a flush toilet 
connected to the sewer systems, to own more durable goods, and are more likely to be literate in 
Kathmandu and Lalitpur.  
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Table 4.1. Socioeconomic profile of sample households 
Variable N Median Mean SD 
Monthly household income 1,500 57,500 70,441 74,299 
Household size 1,500 5 5.05 2.12 
Head of household age 1,500 56 56.52 12.86 
Electricity 1,500 1 1.00 0.05 
Landline 1,500 1 0.64 0.48 
Number of cellphones 1,495 3 3.20 1.64 
Electricity bill 1,476 700 897 749 
Phone bill 1,500 1,000 1,288 1,178 
 
Table 1 presents a socioeconomic profile of the sample households. As shown, monthly 
mean household income was 70,441 NPR (about US$700). The average household size was five 
members. The average age of the head of household was 57 years (reflecting the sampling strategy 
of re-surveying the 2001 sample). Table 1 also reports summary statistics on infrastructure 
services and housing. Virtually every household in the sample had electricity (99.7%) and some 
sort of access to the telecommunications network (98%), either via a landline (64%) or a cellphone. 
Households had, on average, three cellphones. Mean monthly phone bills were 1,288 NPR (US$13), 
about 2% of monthly income. Average monthly electricity bills were 897 NPR (US$9), about 1% of 
monthly income.  
Table 4.2. Piped water summary statistics 
 N Median Mean SD 
Private water connection (1 = yes, 0 = no) 1,500 1 0.70 0.46 
Water use – rainy season (L/day) 1,046 143 240 329 
Water use – dry season (L/day) 988 75 126 183 
Days between service 1,051 5 4.99 2.93 
Length of service each time water comes (min) 1,050 60 98.6 84.2 
Hours of service per month 1,050 7.5 11.5 14.2 
Water meter (1 = yes, 0 = no) 1,500 1 0.63 0.48 
Working water meter (1 = yes, 0 = no) 1,500 1 0.59 0.49 
Received water bill (1 = yes, 0 = no) 1,500 1 0.67 0.47 
Monthly water bill 1,051 150 218 229 
Average price paid for water from the piped 
connection (NPR/m3) 




Table 2 presents some quantitative characteristics of the piped water system, as reported 
by our respondents. Seventy per cent of the sample households had a private water connection. 
Households with private connections reported that they received very little water from their 
connection during the dry season (median and mean are 75 and 126 L/household/day, 
respectively), and about twice that during the rainy season (median and mean of 143 and 240 
L/household/day, respectively). Households received water from their private connections for only 
about an hour to an hour and a half, on average, once every 5 days. Most households (59%) 
reported having a working water meter, and 67% received a water bill (a large majority reporting 
receiving their bill monthly). The median monthly bill of a household was 150 NPR (US$1.55), with 
a mean water bill of 218 NPR (US$2.25), 0.5% of monthly household income. The average price 
paid for the water from a private connection was 170 NPR per m3 (US$1.75 per m3); the median 
price was 71 NPR per m3 (US$0.73 per m3). 
4.5 Analytical Strategy for Investigating Households’ Preferences for Water Tariff Structures  
We examine households’ preferences for different tariff structures in two ways. First, we 
asked respondents a series of direct questions. Enumerators explained to each of the households in 
the 2014 survey how water bills are calculated when a water utility uses either a uniform 
volumetric tariff or an IBT. Respondents were not given specific volumetric prices for the two tariff 
structures, or other details about the IBT structure, such as the number and size of blocks. 
Respondents were then asked which tariff structure they would prefer the water utility to 
adopt and the reasons why they selected their preferred tariff structure. Enumerators next asked 
respondents whether their choice of tariff structure was based on whether it was best for their 
household or all the households in Kathmandu. 
Enumerators also explained that many water utilities used a two-part tariff that added a 
positive fixed charge to the volumetric component to calculate customers’ water bills. Respondents 
were asked if they thought the use of a positive fixed charge was a good idea. Next, enumerators 
 
111 
reminded respondents that mobile phone customers could choose the rate plan (tariff structure) 
that best suited their household. Enumerators asked respondents if they would like to be able to 
choose their tariff structure for piped water and wastewater services (even if the respondent’s 
household did not have a piped connection).  
We checked respondents’ understanding of the IBT concept. Those who did not pass the 
check question (e.g., ‘IBT means that the price per unit of water will increase in stages as a 
household’s total water use increases. True or False?’) are not included in all parts of the analysis 
(N = 271 from 1,500 households). Understanding of the IBT concept is most critical for the choice 
between an IBT and uniform volumetric tariff structure; it is not as important for respondents’ 
choice of a fixed charge.11  
The propensity to select an IBT and the propensity to select a fixed charge are both 
dichotomous variables. Therefore, a latent variable model is used to examine their relationships 
with each other and socioeconomic factors, water use, and other preferences. Because these 
decision variables could be connected, unobservable variables may affect both the propensity to 
choose an IBT and a fixed charge. The seemingly unrelated probit model jointly estimates these two 
propensities with their disturbances (Greene, 2011). We test for exogeneity using maximum-
likelihood simultaneous estimation of the two probit equations, i.e., recursive bivariate probit 
(Maddala, 1983; Costa-Font & Gil, 2005). This model allows us to correct for some of the 
unobserved heterogeneity that can contribute to omitted variable bias and is also expected to 
increase the efficiency of the estimation (Costa-Font & Gil, 2005; Greene, 2011). 
The specification for our two-equation model is as follows: 
 
11 Appendix Table B.2 shows the differences between these two sub-samples. Respondents who responded 
‘not sure’ or ‘do not know’ are also excluded (N ¼ 22). A selection model was considered but the likelihood 
ratio test of independent equations failed to be rejected, suggesting there is no selection bias due to a 




∗ =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐸1𝑖 + 1𝑖 , 𝐼𝐵𝑇𝑖 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝐼𝐵𝑇𝑖
∗ > 0, 0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒,  (1) 
𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑𝑖
∗ =  𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝑆𝐸2𝑖 + 2𝑖, 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑𝑖 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑𝑖











where 𝐼𝐵𝑇𝑖 = binary indicator for household 𝑖’s stated preference for a uniform volumetric or IBT, 
𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑𝑖 = binary indicator for household 𝑖’s stated preference for a fixed charge, 𝑆𝐸1𝑖, 𝑆𝐸2𝑖 = vector 




 are latent variables observed as dummy variables 𝐼𝐵𝑇𝑖 , 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑𝑖, respectively. 
𝑆𝐸1𝑖 , 𝑆𝐸2𝑖 are exogenous variables, and 𝛽0, 𝛽1, 𝛿0, 𝛿1 are parameters of the preference functions. The 
error terms of the two equations are modeled to be dependent and distributed as a bivariate 
normal. The Wald test for 𝜌 = 0 provides evidence about the correlation between the error terms of 
the equations and if the models should therefore be jointly estimated. 
Second, in a different section of the questionnaire, households were also asked the following 
question:  
After the Melamchi water supply project is completed, households with piped water 
connections will have better service. What do you think a fair12 monthly water bill would be for 
a household that uses [5000, 10000, 15,000, 20,000, 25,000, 30,000] liters per month?  
 
The different quantities of monthly water use (5,000, 10,000, 15,000, 20,000, 25,000, 30,000 liters 
per month; or 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30 m3 per month) were randomly assigned to sample respondents. 
Each respondent answered this question only once for the single randomly assigned quantity that 
they received. We estimated the relationship between the respondent’s reported ‘fair monthly 
 
12 We note that there is no direct translation for the word ‘fair’ in Nepali. There are two closely related words 
in Nepali that reflect two closely related concepts – fairness in process and fairness in outcome (Pokharel, 
2015). However, these concepts do not apply precisely to the task of expressing a single estimate for a ‘fair’ 
water bill associated with a specified quantity of water. However, we believe that respondents’ answers to 
the question posed reflect an understanding of the English meaning of ‘fair water bill’. 
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water bill,’ the exogenously assigned quantity and socioeconomic covariates of the respondent’s 
household socioeconomic characteristics using the following equation:  
WaterBilli = β0 + β1Qi + β2(Qij)2 + β3SEi + ε       (3) 
where WaterBilli = self-reported fair water bill of household i, Qi,j = quantity of water j randomly 
assigned to household i (j = 5,000, 10,000, 15,000, 20,000, 25,000, 30,000 liters per month), SEi = 
vector of socioeconomic characteristics of household i. 
We expect that respondents, in aggregate, believe it would be fair for a household that uses 
more water to pay a higher water bill, so β1 > 0. We are agnostic about the sign and significance of 
β2. If respondents, in aggregate, believe that a household that uses more water should pay an 
increasingly higher water bill, then β2 > 0. For example, if households favor an IBT or other form of 
increasing non linear tariff structure, then we expect β2 > 0. Similarly, if households favor a 
decreasing block or other decreasing nonlinear tariff structure, β2 < 0. If households favor a uniform 
volumetric tariff, we expect β1 to be positive, but for β2 not to be statistically significant.  
This model describes aggregated household preferences. Households were not asked to 
state fair monthly water bills for multiple hypothetical quantities, so we cannot use these data to 
test whether the respondent understood how the household’s water bill would be calculated if an 
IBT were used. Even if all households preferred and understood an IBT, they may still disagree on 
sizes and prices of blocks, and thus β1 and βs might not necessarily be significant and/or positive.  
For all three models, fixed effects at the municipality level are included. Standard errors are 
clustered at the neighborhood level.  
4.6 Results  
4.6.1 Salience of the Water Supply Situation in Kathmandu  
We first demonstrate that the water shortage in Kathmandu was highly salient to sample 
respondents. Table 3 reports respondents’ answers to a question that asked their first, second, and 
third priorities from a predetermined list of environmental and infrastructure problems. 
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Respondents were most concerned about three urban infrastructure problems: (1) water shortage, 
(2) electricity outages, and (3) poor garbage collection and solid waste management. Of these three, 
addressing the water shortage was overwhelmingly respondents’ top priority.  
Table 4.3. Urban environmental and infrastructure priorities* 
 First Second Third 
Water shortage 57% 21% 9% 
Electricity outage 14% 39% 23% 
Air pollution 9% 5% 10% 
Poor garbage collection and solid waste 8% 15% 27% 
Contamination of drinking water 6% 7% 9% 
Poor sewerage 5% 8% 9% 
Improper disposal of hazardous wastes 1% 1% 2% 
Water pollution in rivers 1% 2% 5% 
Poor drainage/flooding 0% 2% 2% 
Too much noise 0% 1% 2% 
*Survey question: Which one of these environmental problems is the [first/second/third] most 
important that the government should solve in this city? 
 
 
This conclusion is reinforced by respondents’ answers to another question in the survey. 
We told respondents in households with and without private connections to: 
‘… Suppose that you are able to have potable water from a private connection and the water 
service is available several hours per day, seven days per week, and that your monthly water 
bill will be equal to or less than what you are currently paying for water from all sources. In 
which of the following areas would you like to adjust your water use: drinking, cooking, 
bathing, cleaning house, outdoor gardening?’  
 
The closed-end answers were, ‘increased a little,’ ‘increased substantially’ and ‘no change.’ Table 4 
shows that the majority of respondents expect that their household’s water use would increase a 
little or substantially for three large components of household water uses: bathing, cleaning house, 
and outdoor gardening.   
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Table 4.4. Anticipated changes in water use after completion of Melamchi Project (number of 
respondents) 
 Increase a little Increase substantially No change 
1. Drinking 234 31 1,235 
2. Cooking 409 55 1,036 
3. Bathing 808 309 383 
4. Cleaning house 820 318 362 
5. Outdoor gardening 765 290 445 
6. Washing clothes 53 32 1,415 
 
4.6.2 Preferences for IBT vs Uniform Volumetric, Fixed Charges, Tariff Flexibility at the 
Household Level  
We next examine reported preferences for tariff structures, fixed charges, and tariff 
flexibility at the household level. We also examine water infrastructure and socioeconomic 
characteristics of households that are associated with their tariff preferences. We first report the 
descriptive statistics and then the results of our probit models.  
Table 5 compares the characteristics of households who prefer the IBT to a uniform 
volumetric rate. Fifty-eight percent of households (705 households) expressed a preference for the 
IBT compared to the uniform volumetric tariff (505 households). Twenty-five per cent of those who 
preferred the IBT also preferred a positive fixed charge. Most of those who prefer a uniform 
volumetric tariff (59%) also prefer a positive fixed charge. Additionally, 70% of all households 
preferred to have some choice of their water tariff structure.   
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Tariff choice (number of 
households) 
705 505 1,210 
Preferred positive fixed 
charge 
25% 59% 39% 
Tariff flexibility 70% 70% 70% 
Considered other 
households in 
Kathmandu in tariff 
choice 
84% 70% 78% 
Current water use from 
tap (m3/month) 
1.67 2.82 2.15 
Reasons for tariff choice My household gets a discount 
if we use less water (42%) 
Same price rate for all 
customers (42%) 
 
 People who consume more 
water should pay higher 





 Encourages water 
conservation (18%) 
Cost of supplying water is 
the same so price should 
be the same (20%) 
 
 Helps poor households (10%) Easy to calculate expenses 
on piped water (13%) 
 
What do you like least 
about the service from 
the piped water 
connection? 
Less than 24-hour service 
(39%) 
Less than 24-hour service 
(59%) 
 
 Unfair distribution (31%) Poor water quality (19%)  
 Poor water quality (21%) Unfair distribution (16%)  
 
Most respondents (78%) said that their choice of tariff structure was based on what they 
thought would be best for everyone in Kathmandu, not just themselves; 22% said that they were 
thinking about their own household. Those who preferred the IBT were more likely to report that 
they based their decision on what was good for everyone in Kathmandu (84%) compared to those 
who preferred the uniform tariff (70% said they based their decision on what was good for 
everyone in Kathmandu).  
We then asked the reasons for preferring one tariff structure over the other. Those who 
chose the IBT said that they like the fact that they could ‘get [a] discount if [they] use less water’ 
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(42%), suggesting that the price of water in the higher-priced blocks may have been perceived as 
the default price. They also believe that ‘people who consume more water should pay [a] higher 
price for the extra water they consume’ (30%). Those who chose the uniform tariff said that they 
liked the fact that it is the ‘same price for all customers’ (42%), that it ‘[encourages] water 
conservation’ (21%), and that because ‘the cost of supplying water is the same, the price should 
also be the same’ (20%).  
For those who answered that they were thinking mostly about their own family, we asked if 
their tariff structure preference would change if they thought about all households instead of just 
about themselves. Twenty-three per cent of those who initially chose the IBT stated they would 
change their answer. Similarly, 21% of those who initially chose the uniform tariff also said that 
they would change their answer. In contrast, only about 2% of those who said they based their 
decision on what was good for everyone in Kathmandu stated they would change their answer if 
they were thinking only about their own family.  
Finally, we asked respondents if those with a connection to the piped water network should 
be able to choose the tariff plan that they want, just as cell phone users are. A majority of 
respondents (68%) responded yes, households should be able to choose, while 18% said 
households should not be allowed to, and 14% of respondents were unsure.  
Table 6 presents the summary statistics for the dependent variables used in Equations (1)–
(3), the key socioeconomic characteristics of the household (income, household size, respondent’s 
education, head of the household responding), variables related to water usage (monthly 
expenditures, quantity of water collected from the tap), water shortage being the most important 
environmental problem, and other independent variables of interest. The literature on 
determinants of household preferences for IBTs is limited and provides little guidance on 
appropriate model specifications and covariates. Crase et al. (2007) find that households that 
supported an IBT are more likely to report a larger number of activities that use water. They also 
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include socioeconomic variables as co-variates but find no significant association between 
household support for an IBT and age, household size, household income, or the size of the last 
water bill.  
Table 4.6. Summary statistics 
Variable Variable description N Mean SD Min Max 
ibt Increasing block is best for 
KUKL to adopt (1 = yes, 0 = 
no) 
1,210 0.58 0.49 0 1 
fixed Favors fixed charge in water 
bill (1 = yes, 0 = no) 
1,439 0.40 0.49 0 1 
fair_bill Fair water bill post-
Melamchi (NPR/month) 
1,283 528 637 100 10,000 
hyp_usage Exogenously assigned 
hypothetical household 
usage (L) 
1,500 16,150 8,118 5,000 30,000 
hyp_usage_sq Hypothetical household 
usage squared 








ln_income ln(Total household 
reported income) 
1,450 10.92 0.76 6.21 13.92 
nhh Household size 1,500 5.05 2.12 1 15 
resp_edu Years of education of 
respondent, with missing 
values coded as zero 
1,500 8.38 6.22 0 18 
resp_edu_missing Education is missing (1 = 
yes, 0 = no) 
1,500 0.219 0.413 0 1 
resp_hhhead Respondent is household 
head (1 = yes, 0 = no) 
1,500 0.529 0.499 0 1 
ln_monthlywaterexp ln(Perceived monthly 
expenditures on water 
(NPR)) 
1,500 725 921 0 9,130 
pwc_m3 Estimated quantity of water 
collected from piped water 
connection (m3/month, dry 
season) 
1,500 2.49 4.81 0 90 
priority_water Water shortage is first most 
important environmental 
problem (1 = yes, 0 = no) 
1,500 0.57 0.50 0 1 
consider_ktm When choosing preferred 
tariff, thinking about what is 
best for everyone in 
Kathmandu (1 = yes, 0 = no) 
1,500 0.76 0.42 0 1 
change_mind Answer would change if 
thinking about other group 
(either own hh or everyone) 
(1 = yes, 0 = no) 
1,500 0.07 0.25 0 1 
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Table 4.7. Stated preferences for IBTs and fixed charges 
 No fixed charge Fixed charge Total 
Uniform 201 297 498 
IBT 494 175 669 
Total 695 472 1,167 
 
 
Table 7 shows the relationship between the stated preferences for an IBT and a fixed 
charge. Forty-two per cent of the sample (N = 1,167) prefer an IBT but not a fixed charge; 25% 
prefer a fixed charge and a uniform tariff instead of an IBT. Seventeen per cent do not want a fixed 
charge and do not prefer an IBT; 15% prefer both a fixed charge and an IBT. The tetrachoric 
correlation coefficient is estimated at −0.509, with an asymptotic standard error of 0.038, showing 
that those who prefer an IBT are less likely to prefer a fixed charge. 
Table 8 reports the results of the bivariate probit model of preferences for IBTs and fixed 
charges. The first specification for both models looks only at socioeconomic controls: income, 
household size, respondent education, and if the respondent is the head of the household. Models 
(1) and (2) are estimated simultaneously. Model (1) shows that for household preferences for IBTs, 
income and household size do not have significant coefficients. More educated respondents are 
more likely to choose an IBT, and respondents that are household heads are less likely to choose an 
IBT. There are also municipality effects; households living in Kirtipur and Madyapur Thimi are 
more likely to choose an IBT compared to households living in Kathmandu (municipality). Model 
(2) shows that for household preferences for fixed charges, household income, and head of 
household have statistically significant coefficients at the 1% and 10% levels, respectively. The 
higher the household income, the less likely the household is to prefer a fixed charge. Heads of 
households are more likely to prefer a fixed charge. Household preferences for fixed charges do not 




The second set of specifications in Table 8 adds covariates related to water usage: monthly 
water expenditures (ln_monthlywaterexp), quantity of water collected from the private tap 
(pwc_m3), and if water shortage is the most important environmental problem (priority_water). 
Models (3) and (4) are estimated simultaneously. In model (3), the coefficient on quantity of water 
collected from the private tap (pwc_m3) is significant at the 1% level and is negative. The more 
water the respondent’s household obtains from the private water connection, the less likely they 
were to choose an IBT. The addition of these water usage variables does not change the sign or 
significance of other variables, except for size of household (nhh), which becomes significant at the 
10% level. In model (4), the coefficients on the water usage variables are not statistically 
significant. 
The third set of specifications includes two additional variables: (1) whether the 
respondent was thinking about her own household or all of Kathmandu (consider_ktm) and (2) if 
they would change their mind (change_mind) when considering the other group instead (either 
own household or all of Kathmandu). Models (5) and (6) are estimated simultaneously. In model 
(5), the coefficient on whether the respondent considers all of Kathmandu when selecting the 
preferred tariff structure (consider_ktm) is positive and significant at the 1% level. When the 
respondent considers the larger community, they are more likely to select an IBT over a uniform 
volumetric tariff. In model (6), we find that neither considering all of Kathmandu nor changing their 
mind have statistically significant effects on household preferences for a fixed charge.   
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Table 4.8 Biprobit regressions of preferences for IBTs and fixed charges 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables ibt fixed ibt fixed ibt fixed 
ln_income 0.0710 −0.158*** 0.0800 −0.156** 0.0859 −0.156*** 
 (0.0582) (0.0583) (0.0589) (0.0620) (0.0575) (0.0604) 
nhh −0.0327 0.0139 −0.0365* 0.0155 −0.0395* 0.0178 
 (0.0213) (0.0176) (0.0210) (0.0174) (0.0224) (0.0174) 
resp_edu 0.0227*** 0.00384 0.0237*** 0.00371 0.0221*** 0.00407 
 (0.00723) (0.00966) (0.00693) (0.0100) (0.00719) (0.0100) 
resp_edu_missing 0.252** −0.00805 0.263** −0.0148 0.234* −0.00697 
 (0.119) (0.127) (0.115) (0.126) (0.121) (0.126) 
resp_hhhead −0.175** 0.159* −0.189** 0.166** −0.204** 0.176** 
 (0.0744) (0.0861) (0.0776) (0.0845) (0.0797) (0.0860) 
ln_monthlywaterexp   0.0394 −0.0329 0.0480 −0.0360 
   (0.0340) (0.0228) (0.0331) (0.0224) 
pwc_m3   −0.0445*** 0.00811 −0.0498*** 0.00984 
   (0.0136) (0.0108) (0.0134) (0.0113) 
priority_water   −0.0693 −0.0901 −0.0378 −0.105 
   (0.102) (0.110) (0.0983) (0.109) 
consider_ktm     0.590*** −0.243 
     (0.142) (0.175) 
change_mind     0.203 0.136 
     (0.160) (0.207) 
Municipality – Lalitpur 0.270* −0.0353 0.254 −0.0490 0.205 −0.0173 
 (0.158) (0.150) (0.165) (0.146) (0.160) (0.155) 
Municipality – Bhaktapur 0.210 0.183 0.318 0.105 0.277 0.101 
 (0.160) (0.136) (0.225) (0.141) (0.243) (0.137) 
Municipality – Kirtipur 0.768*** −0.139 0.895*** −0.251 0.886*** −0.222 
 (0.137) (0.165) (0.195) (0.167) (0.199) (0.171) 
Municipality – 
Madhyapur Thimi 
0.629*** 0.0934 0.613*** 0.111 0.588*** 0.147 
 (0.205) (0.162) (0.211) (0.176) (0.217) (0.180) 
Constant -0.724 1.292** -0.895 1.480** −1.423** 1.654*** 
 (0.640) (0.600) (0.665) (0.648) (0.631) (0.641) 
Observations 1,135 1,135 1,135 
Rho −0.518*** −0.514*** −0.506*** 
Wald test of rho = 0 (p-
value) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
AIC 2,916 2,905 2,873 
Wald Chi-square 170.1 225.7 403.8 
Correct classification (%) 43.6% 45.2% 45.3% 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
 
 
Across all specifications, the value of the correlation between the error terms of the IBT and 
fixed charge equations (rho) and its significance level are reported. All specifications show rho 
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values that are significant at the 1% level, rejecting the null hypothesis that rho = 0 and that the 
error terms are uncorrelated. Comparing the specifications, we look at the Akaike information 
criteria (AIC). The last specification reports the lowest AIC of 2,873 and is therefore the preferred 
specification. The Wald Chi-square test statistics are sufficiently high for all models to reject the null 
hypothesis that all coefficients in the model are zero. However, the ability for the three 
specifications to correctly classify both outcomes is low, ranging from 43.6% to 45.3%. 
The models describing household preferences for IBTs and fixed charges are relatively 
weak, with low predictive abilities. However, we do find that households that are more likely to be 
large users (larger household and higher monthly water consumption) are less likely to favor IBTs. 
This is not surprising if households are rational economic actors and are cost-minimizing. 
Additionally, considering what is good for Kathmandu as a whole has a large and significant 
coefficient, suggesting that households’ intuition and opinions agree with common pro-IBT 
arguments (Boland & Whittington, 2000). Paired with the qualitative questions about reasons for 
preferring one tariff structure over another, these findings make sense. It would seem that ideas 
about fairness or social justice (i.e., ‘good for everyone in Kathmandu’), cost-minimization, and 
water conservation drive household preferences, and are not easily approximated using household 
socioeconomic and water use characteristics. 
4.6.3 Preferences for Nonlinear Tariff Structures: Fair Water Bills 
Figure 1 presents the frequency distributions of respondents’ reported fair water bills at 
each of the exogenously assigned monthly quantities of water use. These frequency distributions 
show that reported fair water bills gradually shift higher as the quantity of water increases, but 
many respondents reported very low ‘fair water bills’ at all quantities. There was also a great deal 
of heterogeneity in reported fair water bills at each exogenously assigned monthly quantity of 
water use.  
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Figure 4.1. Distribution of responses for fair monthly water bill by exogenously assigned 






Table 9 describes respondents’ reported fair water bills and implicit average water prices at 
different hypothetical monthly quantities of water, with references to what the water bill and 
average water price would be under the current KUKL water tariff structure. For the overall 
sample, the fair water bill is monotonically increasing as a function of hypothetical water use. The 
mean fair water bill is higher than what the household would pay under the current tariff for all 
hypothetical water use levels. The correlation coefficient between fair water bill and the 
hypothetical monthly water quantity is positive but low (Pearson’s is 0.27 and Spearman’s is 0.38). 
Many respondents report a very low ‘fair water bill’ at all quantities. The implicit average water 
price is monotonically decreasing in volume of water use (except for the mean price at 30 
m3/month). Again, the mean implicit average water price is also much higher than what the 
household would pay under the current tariff – more than double for 5, 10, and 15 m3.  




  Fair water bill 
(NPR/month) 
 Implicit average water price 
(USD/m3) 
 N Current 
tariff 
Median Mean SD  Current 
tariff 
Median Mean SD 
5 246 100 200 272 270  0.21 0.41 0.56 0.56 
10 244 100 288 423 438  0.11 0.30 0.44 0.45 
15 247 260 400 546 542  0.18 0.27 0.38 0.37 
20 224 420 400 580 518  0.22 0.21 0.30 0.27 
25 168 580 450 680 979  0.24 0.19 0.28 0.40 
30 154 740 500 835 909  0.26 0.17 0.29 0.31 
Prefer increasing block tariff 
5 120 100 200 269 287  0.21 0.41 0.55 0.59 
10 115 100 300 427 432  0.11 0.31 0.44 0.45 
15 114 260 325 489 382  0.18 0.22 0.34 0.26 
20 105 420 400 520 433  0.22 0.21 0.27 0.22 
25 81 580 400 610 779  0.24 0.16 0.25 0.32 
30 65 740 500 686 862  0.26 0.17 0.24 0.30 
           
Prefer uniform volumetric tariff 
5 88 100 200 303 282  0.21 0.41 0.62 0.58 
10 84 100 300 486 513  0.11 0.31 0.50 0.53 
15 86 260 500 673 600  0.18 0.34 0.46 0.41 
20 76 420 500 752 669  0.22 0.26 0.39 0.34 
25 51 580 500 728 629  0.24 0.21 0.30 0.26 
30 49 740 1000 1144 891  0.26 0.34 0.39 0.31 
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Comparing the frequency distributions of reported fair water bills for those who preferred 
an IBT with those who prefer a uniform volumetric tariff, we see lower fair water bills and implicit 
average water prices reported at each hypothetical water use level for respondents who preferred 
an IBT (Table 9 and Figure 2). However, the mean implicit average prices are still mostly higher 
than that under the current tariff. The fair water bill stated by those who prefer the uniform 
volumetric tariff for the largest quantity (30 m3/month) is nearly double that of the fair water bill 
stated by those who prefer an IBT (median of 500 NPR vs 1,000 NPR). 




The implicit average water price for households that stated they preferred an IBT decreases 
as a function of hypothetical water use at the aggregate level. This reflects an inconsistency 
between the household and aggregated levels. While individual households may state that they 
support increasing average water prices as a function of water use, when these households’ 
responses are aggregated, the opposite is true – average water prices decrease as a function of 


















aggregate, report a ‘fair water bill’ that implies the implicit price should decrease as volume 
increases (which is not consistent with an IBT structure). 
Table 10 reports the regression results for Equation (3), with four different model 
specifications. As expected, β1 is positive and robustly statistically significant across all 
specifications, confirming that respondents perceive that it is fair for households who use more 
water to pay more in total. However, β2 is negative but not statistically significant, suggesting that 
respondents do not prefer increasing non-linear tariff structures such as IBTs. The last model 
specification includes preferences for IBTs and the interaction between ibt and hyp_usage_sq. The 
coefficient on ibt is not statistically significant, but the coefficient on the interaction term is. This 
implies that a preference for IBTs modifies β2 negatively, which is the opposite of what we would 
expect. For those who believe households that use more water should pay increasingly higher 
water bills, β2 should be positive. Household income is positively associated with higher reported 
fair water bills, as are higher monthly water expenditures. The R2 values for the model 
specifications range from 0.12 to 0.18.13   
 
13Appendix Table B.3 presents results for the same set of specifications, but separately for those who 
prefer an IBT and for those who prefer a uniform volumetric tariff. We find that the relationship between 
quantity and price (β1) holds for those who prefer a uniform volumetric tariff, but find no significant 
relationship (β1 and β2) for those who prefer an IBT. Our results are not sensitive to the exclusion of 
respondents who did not pass the check question on understanding of the IBT concept. Appendix Table 
B.4 presents the results for the entire sample. The sign and significance of key coefficients β1 and β2 
remain robust. The magnitude of β1 remains stable at 0.02 across all specifications. Appendix Table B.5 
modifies the model by including a dummy variable for the initial failure of the check question 
(check_understanding). While the coefficient on the response to the check question is statistically 
significant, the sign and significance of β1 and β2 remain the same. 
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Table 4.10 Regressions of fair bill on hypothetical monthly usage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables fair_bill fair_bill fair_bill fair_bill 
hyp_usage 0.0256** 0.0225** 0.0238** 0.0242** 
 (0.0105) (0.0106) (0.0109) (0.0108) 
hyp_usage_sq −1.44 × 10−7 −6.45 × 10−8 −1.04 × 10−7 7.93 × 10−8 
 (3.33 × 10−7) (3.37 × 10−7) (3.50 × 10−7) (3.19 × 10−7) 
ln_income  121.0*** 101.0*** 106.5*** 
  (38.71) (36.27) (35.57) 
nhh  −6.776 −9.864 −12.51 
  (9.062) (9.389) (9.036) 
resp_edu  1.547 1.088 1.935 
  (4.296) (4.235) (4.468) 
resp_edu_missing  31.25 35.81 47.61 
  (52.18) (53.39) (53.62) 
resp_hhhead  97.02*** 86.27*** 73.97** 
  (31.74) (30.93) (30.21) 
ln_monthlywaterexp   32.21*** 35.00*** 
   (10.71) (9.053) 
pwc_m3   6.425 3.045 
   (4.389) (3.761) 
priority_water   −57.20 −57.43 
   (35.86) (34.45) 
ibt    −55.45 
    (55.15) 
ibtXhyp_usage_sq    −3.21 × 10−7* 
    (1.68 × 10−7) 
Municipality – Lalitpur −112.3 −86.07 −66.31 −49.13 
 (67.76) (65.44) (64.42) (58.90) 
Municipality – Bhaktapur −288.1*** −215.1*** −121.2 −96.27 
 (62.37) (67.57) (98.56) (93.22) 
Municipality – Kirtipur −346.9*** −296.8*** −213.1*** −161.8*** 
 (58.04) (50.92) (58.88) (46.51) 
Municipality – Madhyapur Thimi −154.1** −91.77 −88.40 −53.98 
 (75.91) (76.43) (76.41) (69.96) 
Constant 251.9*** −1,102*** −1,041*** −1,079*** 
 (73.83) (372.8) (362.4) (349.4) 
Observations 1,040 1,011 1,011 1,005 
R2 0.116 0.140 0.157 0.177 
F-statistic 18.17 12.81 12.00 13.28 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. 





Our analysis suggests that respondents do not have strong preferences for IBTs or other 
increasing nonlinear tariff structures. Even though a small majority of respondents (58%) said that 
they prefer IBTs to uniform volumetric prices in response to a direct question, after controlling for 
household characteristics and neighborhood unobservables, we find little evidence that households 
prefer increasing nonlinear tariffs. We believe that many respondents simply wanted cheap, 
affordable piped water services, and that water bills should be calculated fairly for everyone in 
Kathmandu, which they do not necessarily associate with an IBT or other increasing nonlinear tariff 
structure.  
Water shortage was clearly a salient problem, with strong, explicitly stated dissatisfaction 
regarding the level of service and the fairness of distribution. Increases in household water use 
would occur in bathing, cleaning, and gardening. Household preferences also reflect a strong desire 
for more affordable water. Households are currently receiving little water from their taps and 
paying an average of US$1.75/m3 (SD 3.47). Implicit average water prices from stated fair bills are 
significantly lower (see Table 9).  
We found that preferences for tariff structure are difficult to associate with socioeconomic 
variables. Instead, it seems that preferences are driven by desires for cost-minimization and 
fairness. When it comes to IBTs, the variable with the strongest explanatory power is consideration 
of what is best for other households. It also seems that households who use less water understand 
that they will pay less under an IBT. Overall fairness is a large concern, but the interpretation of 
fairness varies. Those who prefer an IBT believe that people who use less can get a discount and 
those who consume more should pay higher prices for the extra water they consume. Those who 
prefer a uniform tariff believe that all customers should pay the same price. 
From Figure 2 and Tables 9 and 10, there is evidence for a positive relationship between 
price and quantity of water. Fair water bills generally increase monotonically as a function of water 
use. However, subsample analysis (see Appendix Table B.3) shows that the significant relationship 
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between quantity and price is driven by those who prefer a uniform volumetric tariff. For those 
who prefer an IBT, neither β1 nor β2 are significant. While there is an overall positive relationship 
between water use and water price, there is little evidence in support of IBTs.  
4.7 Conclusions 
We find that households are primarily concerned with the perceived fairness of the water 
tariff structure. Based on their responses about ‘fair water bills’ for exogenously assigned 
quantities, households appear to support a water tariff that is a function of the quantity of water 
used. Importantly, the notion of fairness varies across the population. For those who prefer an IBT, 
fairness means that people who use less should get a greater discount per unit of water used than 
those who consume more. In contrast with this position, fairness among those who prefer a 
uniform tariff means that all customers should pay the same price regardless of the quantity of 
water they use. 
Perhaps surprisingly, there is little evidence that households prefer that water tariffs be 
structured in a way that ensures poor households have access to sufficient quantities of water at 
affordable prices. While this is an important objective of consultants, water utility managers, and 
international donors, our sample households seem more concerned about the price level generally 
instead of the affordability of piped water services for poor households.  
Our multivariate analysis illustrates how household preference for tariff structure can be 
analyzed and results interpreted. The simple descriptive statistics show that a small majority of 
respondents (58%) said that they prefer IBTs to uniform volumetric prices in response to a direct 
question, might lead to a ‘naive’ conclusion that IBTs are preferred by the most households. But 
after controlling for household characteristics and neighborhood unobservables, we find little 
evidence that households have strong preferences for increasing nonlinear tariffs.  
Our findings have important implications for the choices over different water tariff 
structures. One reason IBTs are popular with water utility managers may be that they believe 
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citizens consider IBTs to be fair. Water utility managers may be unaware that their customers may 
have alternative notions of fairness, and that many may not, in fact, favor IBTs. In most cities in low- 
and middle-income countries, the volumetric prices in all the blocks of an IBT are below the 
average costs of service. Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that this may be due in 
part to the fact that there may be little customer support for high volumetric prices in the upper 
blocks.  
Water utility managers should take household preferences into account when choosing a 
tariff structure. However, because household preferences for water tariff structures in Kathmandu 
are heterogeneous, utility managers may have considerable latitude in choosing a tariff structure 
that best achieves the utility’s objectives of cost recovery and revenue stability. As long as the utility 
managers focus on and communicate the affordability and fairness of the water tariff, they should 
be able to garner public support for tariff reforms. 
Finally, we suggest that there is a need for further empirical research on households’ 
notions of fair ness and social justice and how households assess the consequences of changes in 
both tariff structures and price levels in terms of these criteria. Additionally, as this study did not 
examine household preferences about sizes and prices of blocks in an IBT, future work is needed to 
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CHAPTER 5: THE STRUCTURE OF WATER VENDING MARKETS IN KATHMANDU, NEPAL14 
5.1 Introduction  
Despite decades of effort by governments and donor agencies to expand piped water 
connections, water vending continues to play a major role in water supply for urban residents in 
many parts of Africa (Whittington et al., 1991; Collignon & Vézina, 2000; Zuin et al., 2014), South 
America (Casey et al., 2006; Wutich et al., 2016), and Asia (Crane, 1994; Conan & Paniagua, 2003). 
Because of the unreliability and poor service of piped water systems in many countries, even 
households connected to a piped network often rely heavily upon private vendors as a major source 
of water supply (Keener et al., 2009; Ahlers et al., 2013). In fact, inviting water vendors into public–
private partnerships in the urban water supply and sanitation sector has emerged as a policy 
option (Opryszko et al., 2009).  
While there is no doubt that water vending has greatly improved access to potable water for 
millions of people, especially the poor, in developing countries, the social, economic, and 
environmental consequences of reliance on informal water markets need careful examination. 
Water supplied by informal water markets may pose serious human health risks (Zaroff & Okun, 
1984; Kjellén & McGranahan, 2006; Appiah Obeng et al., 2010) and undermine policies to improve 
social equity (Wutich et al., 2016).  
It is often assumed that the presence of many private water vendors, coupled with relatively 
few entry barriers, would keep such markets competitive (Ahlers et al., 2013). Yet, the high prices 
 
14 This chapter previously appeared as an article in Water Policy. The original citation is as follows: Raina, A., 
Zhao, J., Wu, X., Kunwar, L., & Whittington, D. (2019). The structure of water vending markets in Kathmandu, 
Nepal. Water Policy, 21(S1), 50-75. 
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charged by private water vendors, ranging from 400 to 100 times the amounts charged under 
municipal water tariffs (Zaroff & Okun, 1984; Bhatia & Falkenmark, 1993; Crane, 1994; Snell, 1998; 
Solo, 1999), raise concerns about the presence of ‘monopoly rent’ in such markets (Whittington et 
al., 1991). The competitiveness of informal water markets may also be undermined by collusion 
among providers and by price fixing by water vendors’ business associations (Whittington et al., 
1991; Crane, 1994; Snell, 1998; Collignon & Vézina, 2000; Ahlers et al., 2013).  
There has been limited empirical research on the structure and competitiveness of informal 
water markets (Ahlers et al., 2013). Researchers face several methodological challenges. First, 
record keeping and reporting among vendors operating in informal markets are generally poor. 
Second, it is often difficult to collect business information from water vendors regarding their 
operations, especially data regarding financial particulars such as sales, costs, and profits, as 
vendors may guard such information as proprietary. Third, systematic sampling is rare, due to a 
lack of knowledge about the appropriate sampling frame for informal markets, and, as a result, the 
representativeness of findings is often in question. Most of the existing empirical work has been 
based on surveys of tanker truck operators and of distributing vendors (e.g., individuals selling 
water door-to-door in pushcarts) and rarely includes surveys of owners of private water vending 
businesses.  
Kathmandu, Nepal was chosen for a case study because its booming water vending industry 
arose from two conditions common to many cities: a municipal utility that fails to deliver adequate 
water to its population over a significant period of time and a rapidly growing population that is 
partly dependent on alternative sources of water. As we document below, because private water 
sales comprise a significant proportion of the water supplied to end users in Kathmandu, the city 
provides an opportunity for in-depth research into the structure of a large urban water market. 
Many cities in the developing world exhibit similar features and issues. Lessons learned from the 
analysis presented here may assist policymakers in other cities in developing countries.  
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Drawing upon data collected in 2014 from in-person interviews with 120 water vendors 
and from respondents in 1,500 households, as well as from key informant interviews, this analysis 
presents an in-depth portrait of the structure of the informal water market in Kathmandu. We 
document the presence of five main types of water vending (commercial water source abstraction, 
tanker truck delivery, bottled water production, household delivery by distributing vendors, and 
sale of both bulk and bottled water by retail outlets such as neighborhood kiosks and private shops) 
and show that these functions may be consolidated in various ways. Financial analysis of the 
revenues and costs of commercial water source vendors and tanker truck vendors reveals that 
these businesses do not appear to be earning monopoly rents. That is, these components of the 
water vending supply chain appear reasonably competitive.  
5.2 Background and Study Area  
Although Nepal is one of the least urbanized countries in the world (only 17% of its 
population lives in urban areas), it is urbanizing rapidly. The urban population has increased 6% 
annually since the 1970s. This growth has occurred within a context of political instability. The first 
local elections in more than two decades were held in May 2017. During the lengthy preceding 
interval, Kathmandu, the nation’s capital city had not had an elected local government but was run 
by officials of the central national government. That government was unable to cope with extreme 
unplanned urban development that had been exacerbated by an influx of migrants from rural areas, 
due in part to the decade-long Maoist insurgency (1996–2006). Kathmandu became a sprawling 
urban metropolis, with high levels of pollution, inadequate water and sanitation systems, increasing 
traffic congestion, and a growing energy crisis.  
The Kathmandu Valley lies upstream of the Bagmati River Basin, which is regarded as one of 
the most water-stressed basins in the country (Pandey et al., 2010a, 2010b). Groundwater has long 
been and continues to be an important source of water supply in the area. Significant groundwater 
abstraction started in the mid-1980s, when the Nepal Water Supply Corporation (NWSC) 
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introduced groundwater into the municipal water supply system, and it became the most reliable 
source of water for the increasing urban population (Pandey et al., 2009). Since 1986, the 
abstraction rate has exceeded the recharge rate, which has resulted in falling groundwater levels.  
The municipal water supply system in Kathmandu is comprised of four distinct 
components:  
1. the traditional water system, consisting of stone spouts, dug wells, tanks, and ponds 
that were built over several centuries;  
2. the piped network system;  
3. private water extraction by households and industries; and  
4. various types of water vending.  
The traditional stone spout system is a unique aspect of the water supply system in the valley. 
Historically, the spouts were connected to a network of canals that delivered water from upland 
sources to storage ponds. These ponds, in turn, recharged shallow groundwater aquifers that 
maintained a flow to the stone spouts or dug wells. A study conducted in 2007 revealed that of the 
400 original stone spouts in the valley, only about half were still functional (UN-HABITAT, 2007).  
The first piped water distribution network was introduced in 1891. At the time, its main 
purpose was to serve the families of the rulers and elites in Kathmandu. In 1928, the system was 
expanded to supply the general public. In 1972, the World Bank made a loan to the Nepalese 
Government to improve urban water supply and wastewater services. The Water Supply and 
Sewerage Board, formed in 1974, was renamed the Nepal Water Supply Corporation (NWSC) in 
1989. In 2006, the Kathmandu Valley Water Supply Management Board Act was passed, which 
divided the NWSC into three separate organizations. Since then, the Kathmandu Upatyaka 
Khanepani Limited (KUKL) has been designated as the sole service operator and responsible for 
providing water and sewerage services to the people of the entire valley.  
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Between 2001 and 2011, the population of Kathmandu increased from 1.1 to 1.7 million 
(CBS, 2012), but very little corresponding investment has been made in the piped water system, 
which led to a substantial gap between the supply and demand. In 2014, water demand in the valley 
was estimated to be 360 million liters per day (MLD). The public water utility’s current production 
reaches only about 76 MLD in the dry season and 123 MLD in the wet season (KUKL, 2014). In 
addition, annual losses from the municipal piped water supply system have been estimated to be 
over 70% (Dixit & Upadhya, 2005).  
The result of this state of affairs is that as of 2014, less than 20% of the population was 
receiving a reliable supply of piped drinking water (ADB, 2010). To overcome the shortages, a long-
term investment program is in progress to divert water from the Melamchi River outside the valley 
and deliver it to Kathmandu via a long (26 km) tunnel (Dixit & Upadhya, 2005). This project has 
experienced protracted delays. The current gap between demand and supply in Kathmandu is being 
met primarily through private groundwater extraction by households and vendors and through 
sales of water from a variety of private water vendors.  
5.3 Research Design and Fieldwork  
For our research in Kathmandu Valley, we used a mixed-methods research approach that 
incorporated data from structured household and vendor surveys as well as from in-depth key 
informant interviews. This combined strategy made it possible to triangulate our findings from 
multiple sources and extrapolate these findings to the city as a whole. A mixed-methods approach 
seemed especially appropriate because only limited and dispersed knowledge was available about 
the various unregulated water vendors. All data collection activities were conducted in Kathmandu 
in 2014.  
Adopting protocols for data collection from a similar study (Whittington et al., 1989), we 
conducted a survey of 120 water vendors engaged in various combinations of three activities along 
the water vending supply chain: (1) commercial abstraction of bulk water from natural sources or 
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bore holes (i.e., not from the piped system), (2) tanker truck delivery of bulk water to end users, 
and (3) bottled water production. In our sample, “vendors with commercial water sources” thus 
refer to vending businesses that owned water sources and sold bulk water in large or small 
quantities from supplies other than the piped water system. Our descriptor “vendors with tanker 
trucks” refers to businesses that used tanker trucks to deliver bulk water to households and 
businesses. Our third category, “vendors with bottled water facilities,” are operations that produce 
bottled water, that is, treated drinking water packaged in 20-L plastic “jars” or 1-L bottles. For 
purposes of analysis, “integrated vendors” involved in more than one of these operations were 








For the water vendor survey, lists of commercial water source vendors, tanker truck 
vendors, and bottled water vendors were collected from the central offices of the vendors’ 
respective business associations: the Valley Drinking Water Source and Tanker Entrepreneurs 
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Association (VDWTEA) and the Nepal Bottled Water Industries Association (NBWIA). The 
commercial water source list was verified by field visits and consultations with the owners of 
different boreholes and raw water sources, such as springs.15 From in-depth interviews with KUKL 
and the heads of the business associations, we determined that the associations’ membership lists 
were the best sampling frame for the water business population, representing the majority of 
vendors operating in the Kathmandu Valley. According to these two lists, there are approximately 
67 commercial sources of water, 700 tanker trucks supplying the city with water through 210 
vendors, and 200 bottled water vendors selling drinking water through 20-L jars and 1-L bottles. 
From the lists, we drew three random samples: (1) 40 from the list of commercial water source 
vendors; (2) 40 from the list of vendors with tanker trucks; and (3) 40 from the list of bottled water 
vendors. Figure 1 shows the location of the vendors we interviewed.  
For all three types of vendors, we specifically wanted responses from the business owners. 
If an owner was unavailable, we instead solicited responses from the manager. Overall, of the 120 
vendors we surveyed, 84% of the respondents were owners. Of the vendors with a commercial 
water source (along with any level of integration with other water business activities), 82% were 
owners. All of the vendors with only tanker trucks had owners as respondents. For vendors with 
only bottled water facilities, 70% of respondents were owners.  
The water vending survey instrument presented questions that were common for all types 
of vendors, such as growth of their operations, customer numbers and types, relationship with the 
association (if a member), service details, operational and capital costs, and major challenges faced. 
The survey instrument also included three separate sections containing questions specific to the 
 
15 This list only included commercial water source vendors who sold to independent tanker truck vendors 
and did not have their own tanker trucks. Vendors with commercial water sources who had their own tanker 
trucks were included on the tanker truck association list. Some tanker truck vendors had their own sources as 
well, but they were not categorized as ‘commercial water source vendors’ if they only supplied water to their 
own tanker trucks. 
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type of water vending (e.g., whether the vendor produced bulk water at a commercial water source, 
delivered bulk water with tanker trucks, and/or produced bottled water). The survey instrument 
was designed to allow for varying kinds and levels of consolidation among these three activities. We 
did not examine the distribution of bottled water or the sale of bulk water at retail outlets.  
We also conducted a large household survey (n = 1,500), which included questions about 
the quantities of water a household purchased from different types of vendors and the prices paid 
(Gurung et al., 2017). In addition, nine in-depth key informant interviews were conducted with 
government officials from KUKL and Kathmandu Valley Water Supply Management (KVWSM), the 
most recently elected mayor of Kathmandu, a retired university scholar, development practitioners, 
and the presidents of the two business associations (VDWTEA and NBWIA).16 
The household survey covered respondents from 1,500 households across the five 
municipalities of Kathmandu Valley—Kathmandu itself, and Lalitpur, Madhyapur, Kirtipur, and 
Bhaktapur. These sample households had been previously surveyed in 2001 (Pattanayak et al., 
2005). In 2001 these household clusters were located using aerial maps provided by the Central 
Bureau of Statistics for the 1996/1997 World Bank Living Standard Measurement Survey for 
Kathmandu. In three of the five municipalities in the Kathmandu Valley (Kathmandu, Lalitpur, and 
Bhaktapur), a previously conducted complete enumeration of all households was used as the 
sample frame (SILT Consultants and Development Research and Training Center, 1999). For 
Kirtipur and Madhayapur, the 1991 population census was used as the sampling frame. Wards were 
then selected from the sampling frame on the basis of a probability-proportional-to-size sampling 
approach that ensured households had an equal opportunity of being included in the sample 
(Babbie, 1990). After a ward was selected for inclusion in the sample, sub-wards were drawn 
randomly. The final sample consisted of 60 clusters of 25 households each, covering all five 
 
16 Approval for the two surveys and for the informant questionnaire, and for their implementation protocols, 
was obtained from the National University of Singapore’s Institutional Review Board.  
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municipalities in the Kathmandu Valley. In each cluster selected for inclusion in the sample, 
respondents from all 25 households were interviewed for the study. Because probability-
proportional-to-size sampling depends on the size of population, some wards had more than one 
cluster in the final sample. 
For the 2014 survey, if a household included in the 2001 survey could not be located, a 
nearby household in the same cluster was selected as a replacement. When a household head from 
the 2001 survey was unavailable, the present head or another responsible member of the 
household was chosen instead. In total, we were able to locate and re-interview a respondent in 
927 of the 1,500 households visited in 2001. Thus, the 2014 survey included 573 replacement 
households. 
The nine key informant interviews were audio-recorded with prior written permission 
obtained from the interviewees. In addition, written notes were taken during the interviews. 
Government officials and scholars were asked about the major milestones in the history of water 
infrastructure investment in Kathmandu Valley, major challenges faced in the development of 
urban water and sanitation services, institutional roles and responsibilities, and the growth of the 
private water market. We also discussed with key informants their interactions with the private 
water vendor market,17 access of vulnerable and poor populations to water and sanitation services, 
and impediments to expanding the piped network to all residents. Chairpersons of the two vendor 
associations were asked questions regarding the history and organizational structure of their 
respective organizations, their relationship and interaction with the government, and their main 
activities, including lobbying, as well as the factors that influenced whether water vendors joined 
their association.  
 
17 For example, the public water utility had its own tanker trucks for distributing bulk water, thus competing 
with the private water tanker vendors. KVWSM decided key regulations, such as permits for commercial 
water sources. Ultimately, the associations were formed, organizing the various types of water vendors. 
 
 143 
The information obtained from the household and water vendor surveys was used to 
estimate the city-wide scale of quantities of water sold and of money paid and received at different 
points in the water vending supply chain. These estimates were cross-checked against information 
we had received from the informant interviews. In addition, we estimated the total water supplied 
by the public water distribution network, using water use data from our household survey and 
estimates of the total number of connections in the city (≈195,000).  
Detailed financial data were collected from commercial water source vendors and the 
tanker truck vendors. These data enabled us to construct monthly accounts of revenues and costs 
using standard financial accounting methods. By constructing a basic financial statement for each 
vendor, we were able to assess the company’s profitability.  
5.4 Results  
5.4.1 Overview of Water Vending in the Kathmandu Valley  
As the population of the Kathmandu Valley has increased, the water vending market has 
expanded rapidly. According to the president of the commercial source and tanking business 
association (VDWTEA), in the early 1990s, only 60–70 tanker trucks delivered bulk water in the 
valley, and no commercial water sources existed to supply tanker trucks or the bottled water 
vendors. The tanker truck vendors obtained water primarily from natural sources (springs and 
rivers). In 1994, the first commercial water source (a borehole) for use by tanker trucks was 
constructed in Jorpati, in Kathmandu Municipality, which was quickly followed by several 
additional similar enterprises. The rest of the bulk water sold by tanker truck vendors was still 
obtained from natural sources. The years 1996– 2000 witnessed the peak of the Maoist insurgency 
and the great migration from rural areas to Kathmandu, and over that short interval the water 
vending industry in Kathmandu boomed. The number of tanker trucks increased from 160 to 500, 
and many more commercial water sources (boreholes) were constructed, because many natural 
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water sources had become depleted and contaminated. The president of the bottled water business 
association (NBWIA) reported much the same history.  
By the time our fieldwork began in 2014, about 700 tanker trucks supplied the city with 
water obtained from 210 commercial water sources. Approximately 200 bottled water vendors 
were selling 20-L plastic jars and 1-L bottles to shops and families. A majority of the water vendors 
included in our vendor survey had started business after 2010. The oldest business included in the 
survey was established in 1992.  
A great majority (88%) of the water vendors in our sample were members of one or the 
other of the two business associations. At time of the survey, the main role of the associations was 
to represent the interests and needs of the vendors to the government. There were no legal or 
institutional mechanisms that specify the price of vended water, quantities sold, or quality 
standards (Moench, 2001; Janakarajan & Moench, 2006). The business associations had issued 
pricing guidelines for their members, but these guidelines were not enforced. Private vendors were 
required to pay some taxes (such as the road and vehicle tax for tanker trucks, value-added tax 
(VAT) for bottled water producers, and income taxes). In addition, commercial water source 
vendors must obtain licenses to extract water from boreholes. Licensure abides by a national legal 
standard but often depends on the approval of the local community where a borehole is located 
(Shrestha et al., 2012). There have been ad hoc instances of government testing of the quality of 
water sold by different types of vendors, but as yet no systematic public sector efforts have emerged 
to ensure that vended water meets recognized quality standards. As a result, individual vendors 
have created their own water quality standards to ensure that they retain the trust of their 
customers and to distinguish their product from those of competitors.  
Until recently, and during the time of our survey, the national law requiring licensure for 
commercial water vendors was not enforced. Thus, apart from costs of extraction, commercial 
water source vendors did not pay a price for their raw water supply, either for surface or spring 
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water or for groundwater. In 2018, growing concerns over groundwater depletion caused the 
national government to consider the introduction of a licensing framework for the use of 
commercial water sources. As the new framework was not yet enacted, the drilling of new 
boreholes was put on hold, resulting in a barrier to entry into the vending market. Aware of the 
vital role played by the vendors in providing water to underserved Kathmandu residents, 
authorities remained lenient with unlicensed water extraction from the existing commercial water 
sources. 
5.4.2 How Water and Money Flow Through the Water Vending Supply Chain  
Figure 2 illustrates the water vending system in Kathmandu and how water and money 
flow along some of the links in the supply chain.18 Our calculations show that during the dry season 
of 2014, households and businesses purchased approximately 370,000 to 500,000 m3/month19 
from the private water market, generating total revenues for commercial water source vendors, 
tanker truck vendors, and bottled water vendors of about US$1 million/month. This represents 
about 20% of the water used by households in Kathmandu in that dry season. Commercial water 
source vendors sold 269,000 m3 of water each month and received US$103,000/month from 
households, businesses, and tanker truck vendors. Tanker truck vendors delivered and sold 
371,000 m3 of water and received US$806,000/month, of which 31,000 m3 was sold to retail 
outlets.20 The average price of bulk water sold by tanker truck vendors was US$2.17/m3 at the time 
of our study.  
 
18 Whittington et al. (1991) presented the first such water-money flow diagram for an urban area (Onitsha, 
Nigeria), and Whittington et al. (1993) extended such analysis to sanitation-money flows in Kumasi, Ghana. 
The Sustainable Sanitation Alliance has promoted the use of similar flow diagrams (but without the money 
flows) to describe sanitation conditions in both urban and rural areas, and these ‘shit flow diagrams’ are now 
widely used by sanitation professionals in the Global South.  
19 Estimates of the quantities of vended water vary depending on whether one extrapolates using the vending 
sample or the household sample. If we use data from the vending surveys, the total estimate is about 370,000 
m3/month. If we use data from the household survey, the total is about 500,000 m3/month. 
20 There is a discrepancy in our estimates of the amount sold by commercial water source vendors (268,701 
m3) and tanker truck vendors (370,860 m3), as we would expect the amount sold by tanker truck vendors to 
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Figure 5.2. Money and water flows in Kathmandu Valley, 2014 (dry season). 
  
 
From our household survey, we found that the public piped water network accounted for 
about a quarter of total household water use (693,000 m3/month).21 For our sample of 1,500 
 
be larger than that sold by commercial water source vendors. We speculate that this difference may be due to 
(1) tanker truck vendors drawing upon their own, noncommercial sources or (2) an underestimation of the 
number of commercial water source vendors.  
21 Calculated using the number of private water connections in Kathmandu Valley (194,718), as reported by 
KUKL. Our survey included 1,051 households using private water connections, and we calculated the average 
estimated volume of water collected from each connection based on household estimates. 
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households, private wells provided 45% of the total water respondents collected and used. The 
piped water network supplied 26% and vendors supplied 20%. The rest (about 10%) came from 
other sources, such as public wells, public taps, neighbors, rainwater, ancient stone taps, and 
surface water.  
5.4.3 Structure of the Water Vending Industry in Kathmandu Valley 
5.4.3.1 Commercial Water Source Vendors 
Commercial water source vendors are at the beginning of the supply chain in the water 
vending industry (Figure 3). These vendors abstract water from natural sources or from boreholes. 
They sell water to tanker truck vendors, but most also give some water gratis to households. Most 
commercial water source vendors (87% of our sample) also treat this water before it is loaded into 








Commercial water source vendors do not pay for their raw water supply but do incur 
capital costs for boreholes, pumps, and other facilities for delivering water to customers.  Those 
who treat their raw water before selling to customers incur treatment costs as well. Other costs 
include electric, diesel, or petrol fuel for running pumps and other equipment, and labor costs for 
managing the facilities and sales. 
In our sample, commercial water source vendors were clustered in nine areas in the 
Kathmandu Valley: Jorpati, Matatirtha, Swayambhu, Balaju/Bus-Park, Sundarijal, Chovar 
Chalnakhel, Jhaukhel, and Satdobato (Figure 1). Most (87%) offer free water to the communities 
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within which their source is located. These vendors reported that they do so mostly to help their 
communities. However, our key informant interviews with government officials revealed that this 
policy was primarily pursued because over time, community resentment tended to grow regarding 
the private sale of a common resource. This rationale was corroborated in the interview with the 
president of the commercial vendors’ business association (VDWTEA), who said that it had become 
extremely difficult to dig new boreholes as local people were no longer willing to give permission 
(as required by licensing authorities). Communities began to feel that the water source was no 
longer administered for the people but rather for the source vendor. Thus the provision of free 
water to the local community had become the norm, and families came freely to the source with 
their own buckets and collected water for household use. Another common practice was for the 
commercial water source vendor to provide the police force with one free tanker load of water per 
week. 
Commercial water source vendors have two main options for consolidating their operations 
with other components of the supply chain. First, they can purchase their own tanker trucks and 
use those trucks to expand into the delivery of bulk water directly to households and businesses. 
Or, second, they can take up bottled water vending, using their commercial sources as the raw 
water input into more sophisticated water treatment facilities. This treated “drinking water” is then 
bottled into the common 20-L plastic jars and 1-L bottles for distribution to households and 
businesses. These two consolidation options are not mutually exclusive. Some vendors have 
consolidated all of these operations, covering the entire process from commercial water source 
extraction, to tanker truck distribution, to treatment, and bottling of drinking water. 
Almost all the water from commercial water source vendors received by households in our 
study was delivered through tanker trucks. Only 15 of the 39 commercial water source vendors 
(38%) ran a source-water-only operation, selling water to other, privately-owned tanker trucks and 
to households. Another 46% of the commercial water source vendors in our sample had their own 
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tanker truck operations. A few (3%) had their own bottled water operations, and 13% had both 
their own tanker trucks and bottled water facilities.  
5.4.3.2 Tanker Truck Vendors 
Vendors with tanker trucks collect water from commercial water source vendors and 
deliver it to both households and businesses (Figure 3). Households use bulk water for a variety of 
purposes. It may be used for drinking, but usually only after additional treatment (either boiling or 
filtering) by the households themselves. Two-thirds of the bulk water sales for tanker truck 
vendors in our sample were to households. Another 17% of sales were to businesses. Sales to 
neighborhood kiosks and to construction sites accounted for 7% each, and 2% went to hospitals.  
The tanker trucks in businesses included in the survey were of varied capacities (5–15 m3, 
predominantly 7 m3). During the rainy season each vendor sold about three to four tank loads per 
day, thus making three to four trips back to the commercial water source to refill. During the dry 
season, each sold approximately twice that amount, requiring seven to eight trips per day for 
refilling. During the rainy season, most tanker truck vendors were able to fulfill demand within 
about 4 h. The same process took much longer in the dry season, with customers waiting an 
average of 1–2 days for their order. A large majority of tanker truck vendors (79%) reported that in 
the dry season they had more orders than they could fulfill. 
The main operating costs for a tanker truck were fuel for the truck, and labor costs for the 
driver and an assistant, who helps with filling the tank at the source and discharging the tank at 
points of sale. A majority of tanker businesses (62%) had only one truck and employed only one 
driver and one driver’s assistant. Owners of two trucks comprised most of the rest of the total 
(31%), and only a few (7%) had three trucks. A vendor who only deploys tanker trucks also incurs 
costs of purchasing water from a commercial water source vendor. Tanker truck vendors are also 
subject to taxes, fees, and regular maintenance and repairs on their trucks. Their only capital costs 
are expenditures to purchase their tanker trucks, and for major repairs. 
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A tanker truck vendor has two main options for further integration with the water vending 
supply chain. The first is to integrate backward along the supply chain and drill (or purchase) a 
commercial water source, thus both selling bulk water and self-supplying tanker(s). In our sample, 
30% of the vendors with tanker trucks had their own source of water (not necessarily a commercial 
water source), about half from groundwater and half from surface water sources. Second, the 
vendor can integrate forward in the chain and begin selling bottled water (Figure 4(b)). This 
combined strategy enables the tanker vendor to supply bulk water to households and other 
businesses via tanker trucks and also to deliver higher-quality bottled drinking water directly to 
households and businesses (using different delivery vehicles).  
5.4.3.3 Bottled Water Vendors 
Vendors that produce high-quality bottled drinking water necessarily have a proprietary 
source for their water. Some may use natural water sources (e.g., springs), and others may use 
groundwater (their own boreholes).22 Bottled water vendors often sell 20-L plastic jars of drinking 
water to mobile distributing vendors who, in turn, deliver them to households and businesses.  
The main capital costs for a bottled water vendor are the water treatment and bottling facilities and 
the land and building needed for these operations. They primarily use reverse osmosis technology 
to treat their raw water. Many in our survey used automated bottling and packaging machines (see 
photographs in Appendix D). Bottled water facilities also have labor costs for running and 
maintaining their equipment and handling sales of their product.  
A bottled water vendor can expand by establishing its own retail distribution network, 
delivering water directly to households, often with motorized delivery vehicles and with its own 
employees. Alternatively, it can expand by supplying bulk water and operating its own fleet of 
tanker trucks, and/or acquire and sell bulk water from its source. 
 
22 It is possible that some use the public piped water distribution system. 
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5.4.3.4 Mobile Distributing Vendors 
Our study did not include interviews with mobile distributing vendors that sell bottled 
water. We did learn from our household respondents and bottled water vendors that mobile 
distributing vendors purchase 20-L jars of water from bottled water facilities and transport these to 
households. In 2014, the price of a 20-L jar water was most commonly US$3.15. This price included 
a refundable deposit for the jar upon return. These 20-L jars can be refilled, at a price ranging from 
US$0.10 to US$0.74, the most common amount being US$0.32. If the household owned its jar, the 












5.4.3.5 Retail Outlets: Kiosks and Stores 
Both bulk water and bottled water are also sold to households through retail outlets. Tanker 
trucks may deliver water to neighborhood kiosks, which then sell water to households in smaller 
quantities. The tanker truck vendor fills the kiosk’s large storage containers, and from these, the 
kiosk vendor fills smaller containers for customers. Bottled water vendors likewise sell water to 
retail outlets, usually to small neighborhood stores, where households can walk to purchase 20-L 
jars and 1-L bottles and carry them home, or can request home delivery. 
5.4.4 Entry into the Market 
The oldest vending business in the sample (a tanker truck vendor) began operations in 
1992. Others began to enter the market in the early 2000s. The number of vendors entering the 
business was greatest in 2009 and 2010, then declined up until 2014, the year of the survey. Half of 
the source water and bottled water vending enterprises were owned by one person. Most (79%) of 
the tanker truck vending businesses in our sample also were owned by one person. 
Average start-up costs for a commercial water source vendor were US$76,000 (median of 
US$49,000 and adjusted for inflation). For a tanker truck vendor, average start-up costs were 
US$27,500 (median of US$20,600). For a vendor with both a commercial source and tanker trucks, 
average start-up costs were US$87,000 (median US$69,000). Most vendors (74%) needed to 
borrow money to start their businesses. Most such start-up loans came from banks (59%) or 
cooperatives (18%), both of which charged a median interest rate of 5% for both banks and 
cooperatives (range 2–10%). Friends and families also provided loans, commonly with 5% interest 
as well.  
5.4.5 Markets Along the Supply Chain  
The two main products delivered through the water vending supply chain – bulk water 
from natural sources or boreholes, and drinking water produced by bottled water facilities – were 
sold in four main markets.  
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Table 5.1. Description of four markets for vended water (prices in dry season) 





Upstream market Consumer market 





















Mean 0.38 2.25    
SD 0.08 0.57    
10th percentile 0.29 1.75    
Median 0.38 2.19    
90th percentile 0.50 2.74   
a Our numbers are calculated using tanker truck sales to consumers. Very few source owners sell directly 
to households. Large businesses often will have their own water tanker trucks, which would purchase 
water directly from the source. 
 
 
The first of these (market 1) was the sale of bulk water from commercial water source 
vendors to tanker truck vendors (vendor–vendor) (Figure 3). In 2014, commercial water source 
vendors charged tanker trucks US$2.15 on average to fill for a 5,000 L tanker truck and US$4.86 for 
a 14,000 L truck. Averaging over different size tanker trucks, commercial water vendors charged 
tanker truck vendors an average of US$0.38/m3 (Table 1).  
Market 2 was the sale of bulk water from tanker trucks to households and businesses 
(vendor–end user sale). Tanker truck vendors charged households and businesses an overall 
average of US$2.25/ m3, about six times the price they paid the commercial water source vendors. 
Charges were, on average, US$13.78 for a 5,000 L tank to US$24.73 for a 14,000 L tank. Although 
demand for tanker truck water was much higher in the dry season than in the rainy season, tanker 
truck vendors charged the same price in both seasons. It is not clear to us why they did not to raise 
their prices in the dry season. 
Market 3 was the sale of drinking water produced by bottled water facilities to mobile 
distributing vendors for subsequent purchase by households and businesses (vendor–vendor). Our 
research protocol did not collect information permitting an estimate for the price at which bottled 
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water vendors sold water to mobile distributing vendors. From interviews, we learned that some 
bottled water vendors delivered to distributing vendors for a delivery charge of between US$13 
and US$16 for a minimum order of 150 20-L jars. 
Market 4 was the sale of 20-L jars delivered by mobile distributing vendors and bottled 
water vendors directly to households and businesses (distributing vendor–end user). In 2014, the 
price for household delivery and exchange of a 20-L refill jar were US$0.47–US$0.63, depending on 
water quality and company policy. Additional market transactions occurred at kiosks for bulk 
tanker truck water and at neighborhood retail outlets for 20-L jars. 
From the households’ perspective, the water vending supply chain offered two products 
and six main purchase options: (1) A household member could walk to a commercial water source 
vendor and collect bulk water for free. (2) The household could pay a tanker truck to deliver the 
same-quality bulk water directly to the home, again purchasing in large quantities. (3) In some 
neighborhoods, households could purchase this same quality of water from kiosks in smaller 
quantities. (4) A household (or business) could travel to a bottled water vendor and collect 20-L 
jars of drinking water (with a minimum purchase). (5) A household could pay either the bottled 
water vendor or an independent mobile distributing vendor to deliver 20-L jars of water to the 
home. (6) A household could purchase 20-L jar(s) or 1-L bottles from neighborhood retail outlets 
and carry the water home themselves.  
Figure 4 summarizes the four main ways that water vending entrepreneurs could integrate 
activities to serve more than one of these markets:  
1. Commercial water source vendors could purchase their own tanker trucks in order to deliver 
water straight from the source directly to households, selling in both Markets 1 and 2. We found 
that this was a common integration strategy.  
2. Commercial water source vendors could expand their product line by integrating bottled water 
vending, thus selling in Markets 1, 3, and 4.  
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3. A tanker truck vendor could integrate operations with a bottled water vendor, thus selling in 
Markets 2, 3, and 4. In 2014, this option was uncommon in the Kathmandu Valley. Only two of the 
vendors in our sample had adopted this integration strategy.  
4. A bottled water vendor could integrate a retail distribution of 20-L bottled water into its 
operations, thus eliminating sales in Market 3, selling its product only in Market 4.  
Additional options might have included even more aggressive integration strategies, but to 
the best of our knowledge, these have not yet materialized in Kathmandu.  
Most of the commercial water source vendors (100%), tanker truck vendors (78%), and 
bottled water vendors (56%) in our sample stated that they adhered to the prices set by their 
business associations. However, when questioned further, the tanker truck vendors admitted they 
often reduced prices to fight off competition. When tanker truck vendors were asked how they 
priced the water they sold, 82% stated that their business association rules did not factor into their 
pricing decisions. In contrast, it seems that bottled water vendors used water quality instead of 
price to differentiate their product from that of competitors.  
5.4.6 Financial Accounts for Commercial Water Source Vendors and Tanker Truck Vendors 
Our data allowed us to take a more detailed look at the revenues, costs, and profits by 
constructing income statements for three types of vendors in the supply chain (Markets 1–3). We 
could then assess performance of the three types of vendors involved: (1) commercial water source 
vendors selling water to tanker trucks (Market 1); (2) tanker truck vendors without other vending 
activities (Market 2); and (3) vendors that owned both a water source and tanker trucks (Markets 1 
and 2). (We did not create income statements for participants in Market 4, bottlers and mobile 
distributors.)  To construct the income statements for sellers in Markets 1, 2, and 3 we calculated 
the monthly revenues, financial costs, asset productivity, and three different measures of 
profitability for each enterprise, in both the dry and wet seasons (Tables 3, 4, and 5). Table C.1, C.2, 
and C.3 present the full set of vendor-specific results. 
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From these income statements, we could assess the profitability of each business and 
compare businesses with each other. Profitability is arguably the most important criterion for 
evaluating the performance of a firm (Smith et al., 1998). Profitability metrics, which measure the 
return that the firm’s owners receive from their investments, have been widely used in research on 
information systems, strategic management, and finance (Smith et al., 1998). There are four key 
metrics: return on assets (EBITDA/average assets), gross margin (direct product costs/revenue), 
operating margins (EBITDA/ revenue and EBIT/revenue), and net profit margin (net 
income/revenue) (Smith et al., 1998; Agrawal & Hall, 2014). Return on assets (ROA) is a commonly 
used metric for overall company performance (see Hunton et al., 2003; Andres, 2008; Adams et al., 
2009). Our calculations for each vendor’s income statement began with an estimate of total 
monthly revenue. From this we estimated four different measures of profit: (1) gross margin; (2) 
earned income before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA); (3) earned income 
before interest and taxes (EBIT); and (4) net income.  
The first, gross margin, shows the profit made from making and selling a product, without 
taking into account overhead and other fixed costs. Gross margin is a reflection of how much value 
to the basic inputs is added by the company utilization of capital and technology. In competitive 
markets gross margins should be similar across firms, because companies with larger gross 
margins can lower their prices to outcompete companies with smaller gross margins. Gross margin 
is calculated by subtracting the cost of goods sold from monthly revenue. The cost of goods sold 
include only direct costs attributable to the product, including material input costs (or product 
costs), transportation costs (or supply chain costs), and direct labor costs. These are all variable 
costs; in other words, they are a function of the quantity of the product sold. For example, for tanker 
truck vendors, the cost of purchasing bulk water from a commercial source counts as a product 
cost; the fuel cost of transporting water from the source to the consumer is one component of the 
supply chain costs; salaries of truck drivers and truck driver assistants are direct labor costs. Our 
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survey did not allow for direct attribution of cost of goods sold for source vendors and bottled 
water vendors because we did not ask these vendors how much was spent per unit produced (e.g., 
variable pumping costs and costs of each bottle for bottling). While we inquired about the cost of 
diesel, petrol, and electricity, we were unable to separate out the proportion of those costs used to 
pump water from the source (what would be attributed to product costs). Additionally, we did not 
inquire about direct labor costs for the source and bottled water vendors. 
The second measure of profit, earned income before interest, taxes, depreciation, and 
amortization (EBITDA), provides a measure of the amount of money a company makes before 
accounting for the costs of capital assets and debt. It provides an idea of a company’s profits 
independent of decisions about location (which determines taxes) and investment (in capital 
equipment), and it disregards sunk costs (i.e., costs already incurred that are difficult to reverse, 
such as drilling a borehole). EBITDA is calculated by subtracting from the gross margin the costs of 
selling the product, and general and administrative costs. These costs include overhead and 
management, maintenance and repairs, rent and utilities, and marketing and other sales costs. In 
our calculations, for the vendors with tanker trucks, we included, in the overhead and management 
category, any labor costs of staff not associated with the direct operation of tanker trucks. For 
source vendors, we were unable to separate direct labor from indirect labor costs and deducted all 
labor costs from the gross margin. For maintenance and repairs, we used estimates of monthly 
spending on equipment breakdowns, replacement of parts, and maintenance of trucks, equipment, 
pumps, and other equipment. For rent and utilities, we included the costs of renting the business 
premises and any other related buildings, and utility costs (electricity). We did not impute any costs 
for land and buildings that a business already owned. The costs of any permits, association 




The third measure, earned income before interest and taxes (EBIT), deducts from gross 
margin the costs of the company’s capital assets. This is the operating income – that is, profits from 
operations, independent of debt or taxes. Debt structure can change depending upon how owners 
decide to raise money, access to loans, etc., and has little to do with the day-to-day operations of the 
business. EBIT is calculated by subtracting depreciation and amortization from EBITDA. To 
calculate depreciation costs, we used straight-line depreciation based on typical useful lives of 
different assets (see Table 2). We did not amortize intangibles such as software, etc. (Stickney et al., 
2010). 
Table 5.2. Useful life estimates of capital assets 
 
Asset Useful life 
Buildings 20 
Water Storage Tank/Reservoir 15 
Bottling and Packaging 15 




Pumps and Piping 10 
Delivery Van 10 
Others: CCTV Camera 5 
Tanker Truck 20 
 
 
The fourth measure, “net income,” shows the amount of money a company makes after 
deducting from revenues all costs (variable, fixed (or overhead), and sunk (difficult to reverse)), as 
well as taxes and interest on debt. This estimate is obtained by subtracting interest and taxes from 
EBIT. The interest included in our calculations was the interest on company start-up loans that 
were still being paid off during the time of the survey. Our survey did not ask about loans taken out 
after the inception of a company, so our reported interest paid constitutes a lower bound. Taxes 





Table 5.3. Profits of vendors with only commercial water sources (dry and rainy seasons, 
US$/month) 





 Revenue 942 673 404 771 2,053 
 Cost of goods sold      
  Product costs 16 19    
  Supply chain costs 228 278    
  Labor costs (direct) 0 0    
 Gross margin 699 692 -173 614 1,723 
 Selling, general, and administrative costs     
  Overhead and management 95 113    
  Maintenance and repairs 47 58    
  Occupancy and real estate 151 106    
  Marketing and other selling costs 7 10    
 EBITDA 398 603 -307 296 1,254 
  Depreciation 415 483    
 EBIT   -17 864 -1,198 75 1,058 
  Interest 104 252    
  Taxes 6 9    
 Net income -127 852 -1,213 -195 1,048 
Wet season           
 Revenue 554 336 177 556 1,067 
 Cost of goods sold      
  Product costs 16 19    
  Supply chain costs 228 278    
  Labor costs (direct) 0 0    
 Gross margin 310 430 -271 359 883 
 Selling, general, and administrative costs     
  Overhead and management 95 113    
  Maintenance and repairs 47 58    
  Occupancy and real estate 151 106    
  Marketing and other selling costs 7 10    
 EBITDA 9 411 -473 -10 612 
  Depreciation 415 483    
 EBIT   405 574 -1,169 -393 371 
  Interest 104 252    
  Taxes 6 9    
  Net income -516 521 -1,184 -574 290 
 
 
Table 3 shows that water source vendors without their own tanker trucks had small mean 
(US$699) and median (US$614) monthly gross margins in the dry season and reduced mean 
(US$310) and median (US$359) monthly gross margins in the rainy season. Estimates of mean and 
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median monthly net income proved negative for both the dry (–US$127, –US$195) and rainy (–
US$516, –US$574) seasons. Figure 5(a) presents a distribution of monthly net incomes of vendors 
with only commercial water sources. More than half were losing money. These results suggest that 
commercial water source vendors without their own tanker trucks are not earning monopoly rents 
and appear to be operating in a very competitive market. 
Table 5.4. Profits of vendors with only tanker trucks (dry and rainy seasons, US$/month) 











0 1,971 3,057 6,859 
 Cost of goods sold      
  Product costs 693 459    




4    
  Labor costs (direct) 641 575    
 Gross margin 
846 
1,26
8 -325 749 2,426 
 Selling, general, and administrative 
costs 
  
   
  Overhead and management 99 90    
  Maintenance and repairs 266 115    
  Occupancy and real estate 9 36    
  Marketing and other selling 




6 -683 338 2,131 
  Depreciation 189 156    
 EBIT   
238 
1,26
3 -991 193 1,762 
  Interest 58 86    
  Taxes 32 37    
 Net income 
148 
1,25
6 -1,073 83 1,541 





5 1,061 1,629 4,093 
 Cost of goods sold      
  Product costs 373 244    
  Supply chain costs 
1,05
1 969    
  Labor costs (direct) 434 345    
 Gross margin 176 809 -814 228 769 
 Selling, general, and administrative 
costs 
 
    
  Overhead and management 91 91    
  Maintenance and repairs 266 115    
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  Occupancy and real estate 9 36    
  Marketing and other selling 
costs 45 23    
 EBITDA -235 837 -1,352 -90 493 
  Depreciation 189 156    
 EBIT   -424 844 -1,552 -241 375 
  Interest 58 86    
  Taxes 32 37    
  Net income -515 845 -1,564 -373 301 
 
 
Table 4 presents estimates of the same measures for tanker truck vendors that were not 
integrated with a commercial water source. Tanker truck vendors had somewhat higher mean and 
median monthly gross margins in both the dry season (US$846, US$749) and the rainy season 
(US$176, US$228). However, our estimates of mean and median monthly net income approached 
zero in the dry season (US$148, US$83) and were negative in the rainy season (–US$515, –US$373). 
Table 4 also presents 90th percentile statistics for each variable. The measures for 90th percentile 
monthly gross margin (US$2,426 in the dry season) and 90th percentile monthly net income 
(US$1,541 in the dry season) are positive, suggesting that some tanker truck vendors were 
profitable. Vendors with more trucks had higher mean and median net incomes. Figure 5(b) shows 
the distribution of monthly net incomes for tanker truck vendors, which is centered slightly above 
zero. Together, these results suggest that tanker truck vendors as a whole were not earning 
monopoly rents and, like the commercial water source vendors, appear to have been operating in a 
competitive market.  
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 Revenue 5,504 2,640 2,451 5,507 8,046 
 Cost of goods sold      
  Product costs 144 231    
  Supply chain costs 1,410 872    
  Labor costs (direct) 686 283    
 Gross margin 3,264 2,465 823 2,984 5,418 
 Selling, general, and administrative costs    
  Overhead and management 216 247    
  Maintenance and repairs 499 1,000    
  Occupancy and real estate 301 294    
  Marketing and other selling costs 49 38    
 EBITDA 2,200 2,619 -1,637 2,116 4,895 
  Depreciation 604 465    
 EBIT   1,596 2,457 -1,885 1,412 4,331 
  Interest 126 168    
  Taxes 39 34    
 Net income 1,430 2,486 -2,187 1,271 4,300 
Wet season           
 Revenue 3,093 1,704 1,364 2,665 5,457 
 Cost of goods sold      
  Product costs 97 139    
  Supply chain costs 991 497    
  Labor costs (direct) 484 207    
 Gross margin 1,521 1,579 -39 773 4,108 
 Selling, general, and administrative costs     
  Overhead and management 212 248    
  Maintenance and repairs 499 1,000    
  Occupancy and real estate 301 294    
  Marketing and other selling costs 49 38    
 EBITDA 460 2,115 -1,787 298 3,308 
  Depreciation 604 465    
 EBIT   -145 2,004 -2,035 -147 2,862 
  Interest 126 168    
  Taxes 39 34    
  Net income -310 2,012 -2,336 -373 2,783 
 
 
Table 5 presents estimates of the same financial measures for commercial water source 
vendors with their own tanker trucks. The average monthly dry season revenues of these vendors 
(US$5,504) are higher than monthly revenues of tanker truck vendors (US$3,836) or commercial 
water source vendors without tanker trucks (US$942). These vendors also had higher mean and 
median monthly gross margins in both the dry season (US$3,264, US$2,984) and the rainy season 
(US$1,521, US$773). However, although estimates of mean and median monthly net incomes are 
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positive in the dry season (US$1,430, US$1,271), they become negative in the rainy season 
("US$310, "US$373 per month). Table 5 also presents 90th percentile statistics. The 90th percentile 
measures for both monthly gross margin (US$5,4180) and monthly net income (US$4,300) in the 
dry season are positive and substantial. As with stand-alone tanker truck vendors, these results 
suggest that some commercial water source vendors with their own tanker trucks were profitable. 
These findings further suggest that integrating commercial water source vending with tanker truck 
vending does result in increased market power. Figure 5(c) shows that most of the vendors with 
commercial water sources and tanker trucks were earning net profits, with only two vendors losing 
significant amounts of money. Of the three types of firms, the integrated commercial water source 
and tanker truck vendors appear from our estimates to have been the most profitable as a whole.  




Gross margin/revenue EBITDA/revenue EBIT/revenue 
 Dry  Rainy  Dry  Rainy  Dry  Rainy  
Commercial source vendor 
Mean 0.93% 0.64 0.37 0.26 -0.37 -0.49 -1.23 
SD 2.57% 0.55 0.74 0.55 1.03 1.31 1.27 
10th percentile -0.82% -0.33 -0.83 -0.61 -1.77 -2.35 -2.34 
Median 0.23% 0.85 0.67 0.46 0.06 0.05 -2.00 
90th percentile 4.70% 0.96 0.95 0.76 0.67 0.73 0.55 
        
Tanker truck vendor 
Mean 0.71% 0.23 0.10 0.10 -0.14 0.05 -0.24 
SD 10.87% 0.33 0.44 0.35 0.48 0.35 0.49 
10th percentile -3.22% -0.05 -0.25 -0.21 -0.41 -0.31 -0.56 
Median 0.96% 0.25 0.14 0.10 -0.07 0.06 -0.17 
90th percentile 8.47% 0.59 0.54 0.42 0.26 0.39 0.17 
 
Vendor with commercial source and tanker truck(s) 
Mean 3.43% 0.53 0.38 0.32 -0.06 0.21 -0.28 
SD 6.83% 0.22 0.28 0.38 0.82 0.39 0.86 
10th percentile -5.78% 0.31 -0.03 -0.45 -0.71 -0.52 -1.03 
Median 2.07% 0.51 0.41 0.36 0.12 0.25 -0.08 





Table 6 summarizes vendor productivity and profitability. The average return on assets 
(EBITDA/assets) was less than 1% for both commercial source vendors and tanker truck vendors. 
However, results for vendors with both commercial sources and tanker trucks showed greater 
mean (3.4%) and median (2.1%) return on assets. Results for gross margins show that tanker truck 
vendors (Market 2) had the highest production costs, due to labor (drivers and assistants) and fuel 
costs, as their gross margins were the lowest (a mean of 0.23 in the dry season). Vendors with both 
commercial sources and tanker trucks had larger gross margins that were also more consistently 
positive. The standard deviation is low (0.22 compared to a mean of 0.53), indicating that the 
integrated vendors appear to have been operating in a competitive market. Operating margin 
without depreciation (EBITDA/revenue) illustrates the firm’s profitability at its current level of 
assets. Integrated vendors with both commercial sources and tanker trucks are shown once again 
to be the most profitable of the three market types (0.32, compared to 0.10 for tanker truck 
vendors and 0.26 for commercial source vendors). Operating margin with depreciation takes into 
account the firm’s capital investment decisions, such as the purchase of additional trucks and 
pumps) and reveals that many commercial source vendors were losing money, and tanker truck 
vendors were not profitable (with a mean operating margin of 0.05), whereas integrated vendors 
with commercial sources and tanker trucks remained profitable with a mean operating margin of 
0.21. We did not include net profit margins in these calculations because of incomplete collection of 
data for interest on loans. 
In summary, while there are some regulatory barriers to entry into Markets 1 and 2, such as 
restrictions on issuance of licenses for source vendors, these two markets appear to be quite 
competitive. Our estimates of net income are not excessive. There are no constraints on commercial 
water source vendors or tanker truck vendors regarding how much water can be extracted and 
sold, where their products can be sold, to whom their products can be sold, or the prices at which 
water can be sold. There seem to be many independent tanker truck vendors present in the market, 
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and households purchasing from tanker trucks report that they are not dependent on any one 
vendor.  





5.5 Concluding Remarks  
Our research shows that at the time of our study (2014), water vendors in the Kathmandu 
Valley operated a diverse, heterogeneous group of businesses. There was a supply chain with two 
main products: bulk water and bottled drinking water. Transactions occurred in four main markets: 
two upstream markets (between water source owners and tanker trucks, and between bottled 
water vendors and distributing vendors) and two consumer markets (between tanker truck 
vendors and consumers and between distributing vendors and consumers).  
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Each type of water vending business faced its own unique operational challenges and 
competitive pressures.  Revenues, costs, and profits varied along the supply chain depending on the 
type, size, and integration of business operations. The characteristics of buyers and sellers also 
varied. Some water vendors were both buyers and sellers of water. Some water vendors were 
vertically integrated in the sense that they were involved in different phases in the supply chain, 
while others focused on only a single activity.  
The portions of the water vending supply chain that we examined were all quite 
competitive.  Yet the fact that tanker truck prices for water did not respond to substantial changes 
in demand between the dry and wet seasons remains puzzling. Our research also discovered two 
active professional associations representing different types of water vending businesses in 
Kathmandu. But the influence of these associations on the behavior of different types of water 
vendors seems to have been modest; many water vendors reported that they did not follow the 
pricing guidelines promoted by the associations. It appears that competitive pressures are too 
strong for the associations to exert price control. 
Understanding the structure and complexity of the water vending supply chain is a 
necessary first step in developing appropriate policy responses to improve the performance of 
informal water markets in any area and economy where they play a part. Policy interventions such 
as designing governance structures and regulatory frameworks may be needed in the future to 
address potential negative welfare consequences resulting from water vending (Collignon & Vézina, 
2000; Conan & Paniagua, 2003; Kjellén & McGranahan, 2006; Banerjee, et al., 2011). Such 
interventions can be targeted toward parts of the water vending supply chain where efficiency 
gains are most feasible and competition is most vulnerable. However, our research has not 
uncovered problems that would appear to require urgent attention. 
Indeed, water vendors in the Kathmandu Valley have played a crucial role in filling the 
water supply and demand gap that arose first historically, then critically in recent years, from 
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inadequate public water supply. Approximately 20% of the water for households and business use 
in the Kathmandu Valley is delivered by this water vending supply chain. However, these water 
vending services have not been cheap. In the dry season, end users of vended water (both tanker 
truck water and bottled water) pay approximately 3.4 times as much for vended water as they pay 
for water from the public piped water distribution system. 
These large amounts of money flowing through the water vending supply chain illustrate 
the revenue potential associated with improved services offered by the public piped distribution 
system. In Kathmandu, at the time of our writing (2018), the Melamchi Water Supply Project is 
nearing completion. There is the possibility that KUKL will be able to improve the quantity and 
quality of the water supplied through the piped water system. The results of our research suggest 
that most households are already paying much more to water vendors than to KUKL, and that the 
completion of the Melamchi Water Supply Project offers KUKL a rare opportunity to raise water 
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CHAPTER 6: A META-ANALYSIS OF HEDONIC PROPERTY VALUE MODEL ESTIMATES OF PIPED 
WATER SUPPLY SERVICES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
6.1 Introduction 
Extending access to improved water services continues to be a development priority for 
international policymakers and local governments, as demonstrated by high-profile target setting 
through the Millennium Development Goals and the more recent Sustainable Development Goals. 
Piped supply is an important improved water service, providing water to 4.7 billion people (64% of 
the global population) in 2015 (WHO and UNICEF, 2017). To understand the benefits of extending 
access to piped water, household demand for piped water supply needs to be estimated.  
The hedonic property value model (HPVM) is frequently used to estimate the economic 
value of a wide range of environmental amenities, especially when designing and analyzing policies. 
Much work has been done in high income countries, where the large data requirements are more 
easily fulfilled and housing markets are competitive.  For example, it has been used to value clean 
air (Chay & Greenstone, 2005; Smith & Huang, 1995), freshwater lake protection (Boyle, Poor, & 
Taylor, 1999), the impact of global warming on US agriculture (Mendelsohn, Nordhaus, & Shaw, 
1994; Schlenker, Hanemann, & Fisher, 2005; Deschênes & Greenstone, 2007), and more. 
Hedonic literature in low and middle income countries is less developed and remains not 
systematically well understood. The HPVM is used to estimate household (marginal) willingness to 
pay for piped water in developing countries but reports a wide range of estimated market 
premiums for piped water. As housing markets can be very different in low and middle income 
countries, we cannot expect the HPVM to perform as it does in high income countries. The accuracy, 
validity, and reliability of the HPVM as a non-market valuation tool for piped water supply calls for 
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not only the careful application of the method but also a nuanced understanding of the complexities 
of piped water supply. 
While comprehensive reviews have been conducted for stated preference (SP) studies on 
household demand for improved water services (see Van Houtven et al. (2017) for a meta-analysis), 
there has not been one conducted for revealed preference (RP) studies. RP methods in general have 
not faced the same level of “aggressive scrutiny” applied to SP methods (Bishop and Boyle, 2019), 
leading to a need for increased assessments around the validity and reliability of RP methods. As a 
result, our study fills this gap and focuses specifically on its application in the developing country 
context. We conduct the first meta-analysis of estimates of household water demand derived from 
the hedonic property value model,23 allowing us to identify the common challenges and solutions 
for improving the accuracy of the hedonic method when used to value piped water supply in low 
and middle income countries.  
Our meta-analysis makes two important contributions. First, through the meta-analysis, we 
comprehensively review and synthesize the results from HPVM studies. We examine the 
significance and magnitude of market premiums estimated by HPVM studies in relation to study 
characteristics. There does not exist a general consensus around research methods and design, and 
the choice of research procedures affects both the significance and magnitude of market premiums 
for piped water supply. We find that existing hedonic estimates of the value of piped water supply 
in low and middle income countries are broadly unreliable and vary widely, with monthly market 
premiums ranging from –$1.2624 per month to $938 per month, with an average value of $66 
(median, $3.12). There are many implausibly large market premiums, right skewing the 
 
23 Komives (2003) comprehensively surveys the literature on the role of infrastructure in the hedonic price 
schedule in her unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. Although the study provides a strong basis for synthesizing 
the results, it does not focus on water specifically and does not investigate the robustness of results using 
regression models. 
24 All dollar values in paper are 2017 PPP USD. 
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distribution of estimates. We also find that 37% of estimated hedonic coefficients on piped water 
services are not significant.  
Second, we compare the results to those from SP and coping cost studies to assess validity. 
We find that while the median values elicited from HPVM are expectedly larger than those found in 
SP studies, the median values are double those found in a few coping cost studies and mean hedonic 
premiums are implausibly large and not consistent with expectations. However, there are still many 
hedonic studies that estimate market premiums that are reasonable and well-designed. We follow 
this assessment with suggestions for best practices for future work. 
In the next section, we present an overview of the hedonic method as applied in low and 
middle income countries and the expected challenges when estimating household values of piped 
water supply. In Section 3, we present the methods used in this paper – an explanation of the meta-
analysis and data collection procedures. In Section 4, we present the meta-regression model. 
Section 5 presents the results from the meta-analysis and explains the heterogeneity of market 
premiums for water services found in the literature. We provide a discussion of the results in 
Section 6, assessing the reliability and validity of the hedonic method. We conclude with Section 7 
by identifying common challenges and best practices for future work. 
6.2 Using the Hedonic Property Value Model to Value Piped Water Supply 
Theories of the HPVM and water demand guide the identification of drivers of differences in 
hedonic market premium estimates for piped water. Figure 1 provides a theoretical framework for 
our meta-analysis. It illustrates how drivers first affect the true household WTP for piped water 
services and the subsequent hedonic WTP estimate. These drivers can then be functionalized as 




Figure 6.1. Determinants of hedonic willingness to pay for water supply services estimates 
 
In our framework, we first turn to the true WTP for piped water services. Two basic factors 
determine a household’s demand for piped water services: (1) household preferences that can be 
shaped by household characteristics (e.g., household size, income) and (2) attributes of the piped 
water services (e.g., access, reliability, water quality, and costs and benefits) and other types of 
water supply available that may be substitutes or complements (e.g., private wells, vended water) 
(Nauges and Whittington, 2009). For instance, we understand that income elasticity is positive, but 
low (Nauges and Whittington, 2009). The characteristics of the water supply are also important. We 
would expect unreliable water supply of poor quality to elicit a lower marginal WTP than a piped 
network supplying 24/7 available, potable water. The presence of alternative water supply, such as 
from private wells, water vendors, and public taps, will also affect marginal WTP for piped water. 
How the household’s true WTP for piped water services is then capitalized into the home 
price depends on the local housing market characteristics. For example, when the housing market is 
not in equilibrium (e.g., due to an economic downturn or large swings in housing prices), home 
prices are not likely to represent market prices (Coulson and Zabel, 2012; Riddel, 2004; Leamer, 
































Williams, 2007) and air pollution (Smith and Huang, 1995) can be attributed to these 
disequilibrium effects (Coulson and Zabel, 2012). 
Finally, the measurement of the hedonic premium that is capitalized in home price can also 
affect the resultant hedonic WTP estimate. The choice of research design and methods used, such as 
the functional form of the hedonic price function or adjustments for spatial effects can have 
important and significant effects on the final hedonic estimate measured by researchers (Taylor, 
2003). 
With this framework in mind, we review the HPVM as applied in the high-income country 
context. We have two objectives: (1) to assess the ability of the HPVM to provide reliable and 
accurate estimates and (2) to learn from their experiences by identifying both “best practices” and 
challenges. We then discuss the implications of and challenges expected when using the HPVM to 
estimate marginal WTP for piped water in low and middle income countries. 
6.2.1 Hedonics of Water Provision and Contamination in the United States 
The HPVM has been frequently used in high income countries to value water resource 
related amenities of three types: recreational and aesthetic value of water bodies (Lansford and 
Jones, 1995; van Dijk et al., 2016); access to irrigation water (Selby, 1945; Hartman and Anderson, 
1962; Faux and Perry, 1999; Schlenker, Hanemann and Fisher, 2007; Petrie and Taylor, 2007; all 
reviewed in Buck et al., 2014); and water quality, including both local environmental quality 
(Mendelsohn et al., 1992; Michael, Boyle, and Bouchard, 1996; Boyle, Poor, and Taylor, 1999; 
Leggett and Bockstael, 2000; Gibbs et al., 2002; Poor et al., 2010) and disamenities related to 
drinking water contamination (Boyle et al., 2010; Zabel and Guignet, 2012; Guignet, Walsh, and 
Northcutt, 2016; Christensen et al., 2019). As most homes in high income countries are connected 
to a water supply network, non-market valuation research has instead focused on estimating 
demand for “water quality, water service reliability, and water resource protection issues” (Zhang 
and Fogarty, 2014). Of the hedonic literature in high income countries, studies valuing disamenities 
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of drinking water contamination are those most closely related to estimating demand for piped 
water supply in low and middle income contexts; both contribute to estimates of the value of 
reliable and good-quality drinking water for households in private residences. While these 
measures are related, empirical measures valuing disamenities in high income countries should not 
be used to benchmark hedonic estimates valuing amenities from middle and low income countries, 
as not enough is understood about how to compare relative magnitudes of hedonic premiums.25 
Instead, we focus on learning from high income country studies about causal pathways between 
characteristics of water supply and home value as well as the application of the hedonic method. 
Empirical studies of water contamination find varying effects on home prices (see Table 1 
and Appendix E for more detailed discussion). Evidence from the United States suggests that 
groundwater contamination can be capitalized in home prices under three conditions (also 
reviewed by Patchin (1988, 1992) and Mundy (1992) in Dotzour (1997)): (1) when drinking water 
is affected, (2) when significant expenditures must be made to avert the effects of drinking water 
contamination, and (3) public and home buyer perceptions are important. They find, however, that 
the effect of contamination disappears after mitigation efforts or when it is no longer reported in 
 
25 We expect there to be a difference between the willingness-to-accept the loss of an amenity (e.g., water 
contamination) and the willingness-to-pay for the same amenity (e.g., clean water). The difference has been 
attributed to (1) the income effect, (2) the substitution effect (Hanemann, 1991), and (3) loss aversion (Zhao 
and Kling, 2001). First, all things equal, we expect WTP to be higher in high income countries due to the 
income effect. Second, we expect WTA > WTP due to the “endowment effect” and “loss aversion” (e.g., 
Kahneman et al. (1990)). The income effect predicts that the WTA/WTP ratio is higher in middle and low 
income countries than in high income countries. With more substitutes for piped water supply available in 
middle and low income countries where there is poor water supply, we would expect that the WTA/WTP 
ratio to be higher in high income countries and therefore amplify the difference between the WTA in high 
income countries and WTP in middle and low income countries. However, it is unclear which effect dominates 
– the income or substitution effect. Therefore, we generally expect WTA water contamination in high income 
countries to be larger than WTP for clean water in middle and low income countries. But studies in middle 
and low income countries rarely estimate hedonic premiums for only clean water. Estimates are often 
provided for a piped water connection, which may or may not provide both a clean and reliable water supply. 
As a result, it is difficult to compare relative magnitudes of hedonic premiums from high income countries 
with those from middle and low-income countries. 
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the media. These conditions are related to the attributes of water supply and its perception (Figure 
1).  
First, the effects are significant when drinking water is directly affected (i.e., quality of 
drinking water supply in Figure 1). Boyle et al. (2010) and Guignet, Walsh, and Northcutt (2016) 
study homes that use private wells. Groundwater contamination therefore affects the household 
water supply. Lead contamination in Flint, Michigan, had demonstrated health effects in those using 
the municipal water supply, particularly children (Grossman and Slusky, 2017; Hanna-Attisha et al., 
2016). In one of the earlier studies (Dotzour, 1997) where the groundwater contamination did not 
affect piped water supply and no immediate threat to health was perceived, there were no 
significant effects on home prices. Boyle and Kiel’s (2001) review of 30 papers also corroborates 
this point: they find that while the impacts of environmental externalities on house prices are 
generally statistically significant and have the correct sign, estimated dollar values fluctuate and 
measures that obtain the best results “seem to be those that would be most easily observed by 
individuals.”  
Second, capitalization can occur when property owners must make significant expenditures 
in averting the effects of contamination (i.e., the costs of water supply in Figure 1). This can be one 
explanation for the temporary effects documented by Case et al. (2006), Boyle et al. (2010), and 
Guignet, Walsh, and Northcutt (2016). Successful and complete homeowner or government 
mitigation of the groundwater contamination can partially explain why home prices rebound and 
no statistically significant effect remains. Homeowners can install point of use filtration systems 
(Boyle et al., 2010); governments can implement successful mitigation strategies, including 
connecting homes to uncontaminated municipal sources (Page and Rabinowitz, 1993; Case et al., 
2006; Guignet, Walsh, and Northcutt, 2016). Finally, public and home buyer perceptions are 
important, demonstrated by the documented effects of publication of contamination (Page and 







Table 6.1. Effect of water contamination on home prices in the United States 
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Boyle and Kiel (2001) highlight three other general, methodological points in their review 
of hedonic methods (falling into the “Research methods and design” box in Figure 1). First, 
neighborhood variables are important when water quality is poor (Epp and Al-Ani, 1979). 
Additionally, including multiple measures of water quality can be problematic due to high 
correlation between measures (Steinnes, 1992; Michael, Boyle and Bouchard, 2000; in Boyle and 
Kiel, 2001). Boyle and Kiel (2001) find that research is often conducted over short periods and are 
therefore generally unable to capture changes in price over time. 
Hedonic studies of drinking water contamination in the United States can also provide a 
comparison for how well the models perform, i.e., how much of the variation the models can 
explain. We find that the model R2 of these studies range from 0.32 to 0.82 (see Table 1). 
6.2.2 Expected Challenges to the Accuracy of the HPVM: A Special Case of Piped Water in 
Developing Countries 
Findings from the United States suggest that water supply could be frequently capitalized 
into home values in developing countries as drinking water supply often has issues and requires 
significant individual investments to cope with poor water supply conditions. However, inferences 
drawn from high income studies need to be qualified. First, there can be different household 
preferences and how attributes of water supply are perceived by the public and home buyers 
(Figure 1). 
Additionally, the nature of water supply in developing countries complicates the application 
of the hedonic method. While water is commonly assumed to be a “homogeneous good that has no 
direct substitute or complement” in industrialized countries, water in developing countries is 
heterogeneous, with multiple sources (i.e., substitutes and complements) that differ in conditions of 
access (distance to source and price), reliability, and quality, as well as costs and benefits (Nauges 
and Whittington, 2009). Demand for water is affected by these issues. Not accounting for them can 
lead to (1) biased and inefficient estimates and (2) muddled policy implications.  
 
184 
In Figure 1, the first group of attributes of piped water supply includes access, reliability, 
and quality. These three characteristics can vary greatly between and within cities; we expect them 
to have effects on the hedonic premium and its interpretation. First, access to piped supply within 
cities is often not universal. When overall access to piped water supply in a city is low, the benefits 
of having a connection may include a status premium. When overall access is high, the costs of not 
having a connection may include a willingness to accept a disamenity. We would also expect 
selection effects to be stronger when access is extremely low or high. Second, the reliability of 
water supply can also vary – with both planned and unplanned service disruptions. With longer 
disruptions, households may need to install storage tanks and pumps, resulting in significant 
expenditures in order to cope with the supply conditions. Capitalization may occur as a result of 
these expenditures. Third, water characteristics also vary, in terms of color, taste, smell, 
temperature, and contaminants with negative health impacts. It is important to understand 
household and home buyer perceptions, particularly with respect to contaminants that affect 
human health.  
These complexities affect the interpretation of the hedonic market premium and its 
comparison between papers. A piped water connection can mean 24/7 provision of potable water 
or only a few hours every couple of days, with water that then needs to be boiled and/or filtered. 
Differences in water supply characteristics are not limited to the present – expectations about 
future changes in piped water service availability, reliability, and quality may also affect market 
premiums. We expect capitalization effects to be strongest in cities that have large variations in 
water service delivery access, reliability, and quality and resulting variations in household level 
mitigation strategies (i.e., coping behaviors and expenditures). 
Price of service delivery (i.e., water tariffs and connection fees) and the availability of 
alternative water sources also affect household piped water demand and perhaps capitalization 
into home prices too. Market premiums for piped water connections should also be related to the 
 
185 
payment for piped water services, which includes the connection fee and monthly water bills. All 
things equal, we expect market premiums for piped water connections to be lower in cities where 
connection fees are lower. Market premiums would also be higher in cities with restrictions on new 
connections. Similarly, we would expect market premiums to be higher in cities where water tariffs 
are lower than utility supply costs and can be thought of as providing untargeted subsidies to 
households (Komives et al., 2005). It therefore important to understand how households pay their 
water bills. If it is included in their rent, the market premium would then include the monthly water 
bill. For those that do not pay a monthly water bill, the market premium would encompass not only 
the marginal demand for access to the piped water network but also the value of the “free” water 
obtained through the connection. In addition to costs related to water utility prices for access and 
usage, households could also face additional costs for installing in-home piped water connections – 
storage tanks, pumps, and plumbing. Depending on local contexts, comparable homes, and 
preferences, these costs could be priced into the home value. 
Together with the true WTP for piped water services, housing market characteristics affect 
the hedonic premium capitalization in home price. We also expect there to be differences when 
applying the HPVM in low and middle income countries compared to high income countries 
because housing markets can be very different. For example, housing markets may not be active, 
competitive, and in equilibrium (Malpezzi, 1999). Mobility of households – therefore market 
activity – varies greatly in developing countries, from 3% to 43% (Strassman, 1991; Malpezzi, 
1999). Tenure security, not always guaranteed and systematically affecting housing prices, also 
affects mobility and market activity (Friedman et al., 1988). Systematic differences in housing 
supply factors can also introduce heterogeneity in markets. These factors include: accessibility of 
housing finance and mortgage rates, prevalence of informality in land markets, government 
allocation of land and subsidies (Malpezzi, 1999).  When applying the HPVM, these conditions are 
necessary for (1) the home price to reflect home and neighborhood characteristics and (2) to 
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interpret the derived marginal implicit prices as marginal willingness to pay.26 As a result, we 
cannot expect that the HPVM will perform similarly in low and middle income countries. 
Research design and methods affect the measurement of the hedonic premium that is 
capitalized and, as a result, the hedonic WTP estimate. With respect to research design, endogeneity 
in the form of simultaneity can be a large concern. As mentioned before, the allocation of water 
services can be influenced by political power and wealth. The “elite-focused culture of governance” 
is a significant and well-recognized issue in water services provision (Bakker et al., 2008; Tiwale et 
al., 2018; Alda-Vidal et al., 2018). Simultaneously, access to water services can affect home prices. 
Estimating only one portion of the model results in endogeneity and therefore biased estimates of 
the market premium. As a result, simultaneity is of particular importance in estimating market 
premiums for piped water services. However, this has not been addressed adequately in the 
literature, as none of the authors reviewed have accounted for this type of endogeneity. 
There are many methodological choices that researchers make that can affect the 
measurement of the hedonic premium. Based on the complexities of water supply described above, 
we expect that (1) the measurement of piped water services and home value, and (2) the treatment 
of omitted variables to be important. Heterogeneity across piped water supply characteristics 
creates two problems when researchers use a simple binary variable. First, it can introduce 
measurement error, which can result in a downward bias of the coefficient, as well as omitted 
variable bias. Second, it affects the interpretation of the results for policy-makers. It is important to 
understand clearly for what the residents are paying in order to make comparisons across study 
sites. Market premiums could differ because the environmental attribute being valued is different. 
 
26 Marginal implicit prices are estimates of marginal willingness to pay under two main conditions: (1) 
households are in equilibrium given the vector of housing prices and (2) the vector of housing prices clears 
the market for the given stock of housing (Taylor, 2014). Further requirements include full information on all 
housing prices and attributes; transaction and moving costs at zero; and price vectors that adjust 
instantaneously to changes in supply or demand (Taylor, 2014). 
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All else equal, we would expect market premiums to be higher for piped water connections that 
provide reliable and clean water at an affordable price (with few available substitutes) when 
compared to those that provide contaminated water with frequent service disruptions at high 
prices (with many available substitutes). Indeed, Michael, Boyle, and Bouchard (2000) demonstrate 
that the measurement of environmental quality matters (and can result in large differences in 
implicit prices) and should not be selected due to convenience. The measurement of home value is 
also important – whether it is a sale price or rental price has different implications for the 
interpretation of the hedonic premium. Omitted variables can include the use of other water 
sources, the presence of a storage tank, or other infrastructure variables. We discuss these issues in 
greater depth in the methods section below.  
6.3 Methods 
Meta-analysis is used to synthesize results from many individual studies and explain the 
differences in results between the studies. Meta-analyses allow researchers to extend beyond 
qualitative literature reviews by providing a “rigorous statistical synthesis of the literature” 
(Woodward and Wui, 2001). In environmental economics, meta-analysis has been leveraged to 
interpret non-market valuation studies across many topics: outdoor recreation, air pollution, 
recreational fishing, visibility, health risks, endangered species, and wetlands (Smith and Kaoru, 
1990; Brouwer, 2000; Brouwer et al., 1997; cited in Woodward and Wui, 2001). 
We use a meta-analysis to evaluate the reliability and validity of using the hedonic method 
to estimate the true willingness to pay for piped water services. By first collecting the estimates and 
examining procedures chosen by researchers, we can examine the HPVM’s reliability. We see if 
there is a consensus on basic procedures and econometric approaches, which would provide a test 
for content validity. The meta-regression analysis can then be used to evaluate the effects of (1) 
different research design and method choices when applying the HPVM and (2) attributes of water 
supply, households, and housing markets on the significance and magnitude of the price premium 
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for water services. It is often not possible to understand these effects in the context of a single study 
because many of these attributes are often held constant in a single study (Woodward and Wui, 
2001). Our basic approach is the same as that used in most valuation meta-analyses.  
We collect a set of primary studies with a common empirical outcome – the market 
premium, or marginal willingness-to-pay, for piped water services in the home – which then 
becomes the dependent variable in our meta-analysis. We use the market premium as a proportion 
of home value, a relative measurement instead of an absolute one (such as the market premium 
expressed as 2017 PPP USD per month). We choose the relative measure because (1) it is most 
frequently a directly outcome from hedonic models and (2) it is the measure of choice in other 
meta-analyses, described as “[comparably more] robust to inflation and differences between local 







Table 6.2. Hedonic valuation studies - results 











(Accra, Ghana, 1974-1978) 
Site services (at least one 
of access to water, 
electrical, road, site 
preparation) (0,1) 
NS 15.0% - - 
Quigley (1982) 
Low-income homeowners 
(Santa Ana, El Salvador, 1976) 
Presence of running 
water (0,1) 
** 12.5% 3 1.3% 
Jimenez (1982) 
Low-income homeowners and 
squatters in slums 
(Manila, Philippines, 1978) 
With a sink (and a water 
connection) (0,1) as a 
"proxy for individual 
water connection" 
NS 39.9% 41 7.7% 
Jimenez (1984) 
Homeowners 
(Davao, Philippines, 1979) 
Water facilities index NS 1.7% 1.3 0.1% 
Jimenez (1984) 
Renters 
(Davao, Philippines, 1979) 
Water facilities index NS 1.7% 2 0.2% 
Friedman, Jimenez & Mayo (1988) 
Renters and squatters 
(Manila, Philippines, 1983) 
Sink (0,1) ** 50.0% - - 
Friedman, Jimenez & Mayo (1988) 
Owners and squatters 
(Manila, Philippines, 1983) 
Sink (0,1) ** 20.4% - - 
Megbolugbe (1989) 
Single family home dwellers 
(Jos, Nigeria, 1981) 
Piped water (0,1) NS 7.0% 283 - 
Megbolugbe (1989) 
Multi-family home dwellers 
(Jos, Nigeria, 1981) 
Piped water (0,1) ** 3.4% 11 - 
Arimah (1992) 
Renters 
(Ibadan, Nigeria, 1988) 
Piped water (0,1) NS 1.0% 0.5 0.3% 
Aryeetey-Attoh (1992) 
Low-income renters 
(Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 1983) 
Piped water (0,1) ** 64.9% - - 
Aryeetey-Attoh (1992) 
Middle-income renters 
(Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 1983) 
Piped water (0,1) NS 1.0% - - 
Aryeetey-Attoh (1992) 
Upper-income renters 
(Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 1983) 
Piped water (0,1) ** 63.2% - - 
North & Griffin (1993) 
Low-income homeowners 
(Bicol Region, Philippines, 1978) 
Piped water in home 
(0,1) 
* 47.0% 9 2.5% 
North & Griffin (1993) 
Middle-income homeowners 
(Bicol Region, Philippines, 1978) 
Piped water in home 
(0,1) 
* 47.0% 16 1.7% 
North & Griffin (1993) 
High-income homeowners 
(Bicol Region, Philippines, 1978) 
Piped water in home 
(0,1) 








High-income homeowners, with 
household size > 7 
(Manila, Philippines, 1983) 
Access to piped water 
within the structure/lot 
(0,1) 
NS 37.2% 63 6.4% 
Daniere (1994) 
High-income homeowners, with 
household size < 7 
(Manila, Philippines, 1983) 
Access to piped water 
within the structure/lot 
(0,1) 
NS 60.0% 101 10.4% 
Daniere (1994) 
High-middle-income homeowners, 
with household size > 7 
(Manila, Philippines, 1983) 
Access to piped water 
within the structure/lot 
(0,1) 
NS -23.2% -39 -4.0% 
Daniere (1994) 
High-middle-income homeowners, 
with household size < 7 
(Manila, Philippines, 1983) 
Access to piped water 
within the structure/lot 
(0,1) 
* 48.6% 82 8.4% 
Daniere (1994) 
Low-middle-income homeowners, 
with household size > 6 
(Manila, Philippines, 1983) 
Access to piped water 
within the structure/lot 
(0,1) 
NS 22.1% 37 3.8% 
Daniere (1994) 
Low-middle-income homeowners, 
with household size < 6 
(Manila, Philippines, 1983) 
Access to piped water 
within the structure/lot 
(0,1) 
* 25.6% 43 4.4% 
Daniere (1994) 
Low-income homeowners, with 
household size > 6 
(Manila, Philippines, 1983) 
Access to piped water 
within the structure/lot 
(0,1) 
NS 10.8% 18 1.9% 
Daniere (1994) 
Low-income homeowners, with 
household size < 6 
(Manila, Philippines, 1983) 
Access to piped water 
within the structure/lot 
(0,1) 
NS 0.1% 0.2 0.0% 
Daniere (1994) 
High-income squatters, with 
household size > 7 
(Manila, Philippines, 1983) 
Access to piped water 
within the structure/lot 
(0,1) 
NS 279.7% 146 29.3% 
Daniere (1994) 
High-income squatters, with 
household size < 7 
(Manila, Philippines, 1983) 
Access to piped water 
within the structure/lot 
(0,1) 
* 78.2% 41 8.2% 
Daniere (1994) 
High-middle-income squatters, with 
household size > 7 
(Manila, Philippines, 1983) 
Access to piped water 
within the structure/lot 
(0,1) 
NS 72.9% 38 7.6% 
Daniere (1994) 
High-middle-income squatters, with 
household size < 7 
(Manila, Philippines, 1983) 
Access to piped water 
within the structure/lot 
(0,1) 
* 238.4% 124 25.0% 
Daniere (1994) 
Low-middle-income squatters, with 
household size > 7 
(Manila, Philippines, 1983) 
Access to piped water 
within the structure/lot 
(0,1) 
NS -64.3% -34 -6.7% 
Daniere (1994) 
Low-middle-income squatters, with 
household size < 7 
(Manila, Philippines, 1983) 
Access to piped water 
within the structure/lot 
(0,1) 








Low-income squatters, with 
household size > 6 
(Manila, Philippines, 1983) 
Access to piped water 
within the structure/lot 
(0,1) 
NS -39.4% -21 -4.1% 
Daniere (1994) 
Low-income squatters, with 
household size < 6 
(Manila, Philippines, 1983) 
Access to piped water 
within the structure/lot 
(0,1) 
NS 20.2% 11 2.1% 
Akpom (1996) 
Renters 
(Lagos, Nigeria, 1988) 
Steady supply of piped 
water (0,1) 
** 0.7% 3 - 
Crane, Daniere, & Harwood (1997) 
Low-income homeowners in slums 
(Bangkok, Thailand, 1993) 
Piped water (0,1) ** 135.6% 938 71.7% 
Crane, Daniere, & Harwood (1997) 
Low-income renters in slums 
(Bangkok, Thailand, 1993) 
Piped water (0,1) ** 352.7% 832 63.6% 
Crane, Daniere, & Harwood (1997) 
Low-income squatters in slums 
(Bangkok, Thailand, 1993) 
Piped water (0,1) NS 58.6% 145 11.1% 
Crane, Daniere, & Harwood (1997) 
Low-income homeowners 
(Jakarta, Indonesia, 1993) 
Piped water (0,1) NS 81.7% 434 - 
Crane, Daniere, & Harwood (1997) 
Low-income renters 
(Jakarta, Indonesia, 1993) 
Hydrant (0,1) ** 39.1% - - 
Asabere (2004) 
Homeowners 
(Accra, Ghana, 1990-2000) 
Lot has water and 
electricity connections 
(0,1) 
** 13.9% 54 - 
Knight, Herrin & Balihuta (2004) 
General dwellers 
(Uganda, 2000) 
Piped water in dwelling 
(0,1) 
** 43.9% 8 - 
Yusuf & Koundouri (2005) 
Urban homeowners 
(Indonesia, 1997) 
Piped water (0,1) ** 28.1% 312 34.1% 
Yusuf & Koundouri (2005) 
Rural homeowners 
(Indonesia, 1997) 
Piped water (0,1) NS 15.3% 34 18.9% 
Harapap & Hartono (2007) 
Urban renters 
(Indonesia, 2000) 
Piped water or pumped 
water (0,1) 
** 9.1% 17 2.0% 
Harapap & Hartono (2007) 
Rural renters 
(Indonesia, 2000) 
Piped water or pumped 
water (0,1) 
NS 0.3% 0.3 0.0% 
Gulyani & Talukdar (2008) 
Low-income renters in slums 
(Nairobi, Kenya, 2004) 
Piped water (0,1) ** 9.2% 5 0.7% 
Berger, Blomquist, & Peter (2008) 
Homeowners 
(Russia, 2000) 
Central water supply 
(0,1) 
** 35.5% 216 13.2% 
Lall & Lundberg (2008) 
General dwellers 
(Pune, India, 2002) 
Municipal piped water 
(0,1) 
** 13.8% 21 1.9% 
Nauges, Strand & Walker (2008) 
Renters and squatters 
(El Salvador, 1996-1997) 
No piped water (0,1) * 42.8% 145 3.5% 
Nauges, Strand & Walker (2008) 
Low-income renters and squatters in 
slums 
(Guatemala, 1996-1997) 
No piped water (0,1) ** 21.8% 43 1.8% 
Takeuchi, Cropper, & Bento (2008) 
Renters, owners, and squatters 
(Mumbai, India, 2003-2004) 







Anselin, Lozano-Gracia, Deichmann & Lall (2008) 
General dwellers 
(Bangalore, India, 2001) 
Days per week water is 
available through direct 
connection 
** 3.8% 15.7 - 
Anselin, Lozano-Gracia, Deichmann & Lall (2008) 
General dwellers 
(Bhopal, India, 2003) 
Days per week water is 
available through direct 
connection 
** 3.2% 6.3 - 
Yusuf & Resosudarmo (2009) 
General dwellers 
(Jakarta, Indonesia, 1997-1998) 
Water source is inside 
(0,1) 
** 103.0% 607 - 
Espinoza, Balaguer & Camilla (2009) 
Low-income renters 
(Antofagsta, Chile, 2006) 
Dwelling has drinking 
water supply (0,1) 
NS 57.7% 105 3.6% 
Espinoza, Balaguer & Camilla (2009) 
Low-income renters 
(Valparaiso, Chile, 2006) 
Dwelling has drinking 
water supply (0,1) 
** 14.0% 21 1.0% 
Espinoza, Balaguer & Camilla (2009) 
Low-income renters 
(Santiago, Chile, 2006) 
Dwelling has drinking 
water supply (0,1) 
* 56.7% 74 2.8% 
Espinoza, Balaguer & Camilla (2009) 
Low-income renters 
(Concepcion, Chile, 2006) 
Dwelling has drinking 
water supply (0,1) 
** 12.7% 23 1.1% 
Bello & Moruf (2010) 
General dwellers 
(Lagos, Nigeria, 2006) 
Availability of water (0,1) ** 0.6% 3 - 
van den Berg & Nauges (2012) 
Homeowners 
(Sri Lanka, 2003-2004) 
Access to private piped 
water connection (0,1) 
** 16.4% 46 5.3% 
Gulyani, Bassett, & Talukdar (2012) 
Renters in slums 
(Nairobi, Kenya, 2004) 
Access to piped water (in 
house or yard tap) (0,1) 
** 5.8% 3 0.6% 
Gulyani, Bassett, & Talukdar (2012) 
Homeowners in slums 
(Nairobi, Kenya, 2004) 
Access to piped water (in 
house or yard tap) (0,1) 
** 118.0% 270 36.4% 
Gulyani, Bassett, & Talukdar (2012) 
Renters in slums 
(Dakar, Senegal, 2004) 
Access to piped water (in 
house or yard tap) (0,1) 
NS 6.0% 6 1.0% 
Gulyani, Bassett, & Talukdar (2012) 
Homeowners in slums 
(Dakar, Senegal, 2004) 
Access to piped water (in 
house or yard tap) (0,1) 




House has municipal 
piped water connection 
(0,1) 




Water source outside 
dwelling (0,1) 
** 15.5% 18 2.6% 
Choumert, Stage & Uwera (2014) 
Renters 
(Kigali, Rwanda, 2011) 
Water only (no 
electricity) (0,1) 




Access to drinking water 
from any sources 
maintained by statutory 
bodies and NGOs (0,1) 




Access to drinking water 
from any sources 
maintained by the 
statutory bodies and 
NGOs (0,1) 








Squatters in slums 
(Bangladesh, 2010) 
Access to drinking water 
from any sources 
maintained by the 
statutory bodies and 
NGOs (0,1) 
* 257.9% 2 0.7% 
Choumert, Kere & Lare-Dondarini (2016) 
Homeowners 
(Dapaong, Togo, 2010) 
Water and electricity 
(0,1) 
** 47.0% 96 27.7% 
Suparman, Folmer & Oud (2016) 
Urban homeowners 
(Indonesia, 1993-2007) 
In-house piped water 
connection (0,1) 
** 34.2% 6 5.1% 
Suparman, Folmer & Oud (2016) 
Rural homeowners 
(Indonesia, 1993-2007) 
In-house piped water 
connection (0,1) 
** 34.2% 3 3.8% 
Simiyu, Swilling, Rheingans & Cairncross (2017) 
Renters in slums 
(Kisumu, Kenya, 2014) 
Nearby water point (0,1), 
with "compound 
connection" as the base 
case 
NS 2.0% 0.6 0.2% 
Nakamura (2017) 
Renters and owners in slums 
(Pune, India, 2013) 
Exclusive water supply 
(0,1) 
* 23.2% 55 8.1% 
Amoah & Moffatt (2017) 
Renters 
(Accra, Ghana, 2014) 
Access to reliable piped 
water in residence (0,1) 
** 32.4% 30 7.0% 
1Market premium is presented for having the amenity. It is converted when the author uses the lack of the amenity as the variable of interest. 
*Statistically significant at 0.1 
**Statistically significant at 0.05 
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We identified and selected a set of 36 primary studies for inclusion in the analysis, listed in 
Table 2. Our objective was to identify papers that used the hedonic method to estimate the value of 
piped water supply services in a developing country context. We searched for studies using the 
internet (Google Scholar), the university library, and academic databases: Web of Science, JSTOR, 
SCOPUS, and ScienceDirect. We used key words such as “hedonic valuation” and “housing market.” 
We did not limit our search to papers only focusing on water services as this sample is very limited 
(N=13). Instead, we expanded our search to include studies that include water services in their 
hedonic price function but do not focus on specifically water services. We limited the search to 
studies conducted in developing countries as defined by the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 
2018). Following established protocol, we also used reference lists in identified studies to find 
additional papers.  
From these studies, we constructed a database of estimated hedonic market premiums as 
well as corresponding explanatory information about both the study and the sample. Table 2 
presents the studies used in this meta-analysis. It also reports the number of market premium, or 
marginal willingness to pay, estimates gathered from each study. Each observation corresponds to 
one estimate of a market premium. If a study reports numerous values, then several data points are 
collected (Woodward and Wui, 2001). Following Van Houtven et al. (2017), multiple estimates from 
a single study were only included if they were based on distinct, non-overlapping subsamples of 
households. Otherwise, multiple estimates were either dropped or averaged into one estimate. 
Explanatory variables follow the framework in Figure 1. Note that due to the limitations described 
earlier, we have a minimal number of variables describing household characteristics, attributes of 
water supply, and housing market characteristics. Explanatory variables related to research design 
and methods are naturally more easily collected and include study characteristics such as research 
design, sample size, model specification, econometric methods, and other quality variables such as 
having a research focus on water and date of publication (Nelson and Kennedy, 2009). 
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6.4 Meta-Regression Model 
We would like to be able to explain the variation in market premium estimates and the 
extent to which it is related to observable factors discussed in our framework (Figure 1). We focus 
on two empirical outcomes. First, we would like to understand under which conditions there is a 
statistically significant relationship between piped water services and home value. Second, we 
examine the magnitude of the market premium as a proportion of monthly rent. This is often a 
direct interpretation of the coefficient derived from the model.  
We explain the heterogeneity in market premium significance and magnitude using 
systematically collected study and sample characteristics. Using our framework, we hypothesize 
that the market premium depends on four types of measurable factors: household preferences; 
attributes of water supply; housing market characteristics; and research design and methodology: 
𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑖 = 𝑓(household preferences, water supply attributes,
housing market characteristics, research design & methods) 
In the following subsections, we describe the measurement of the dependent and 







Table 6.3. Variable descriptions and summary statistics 
 
Variable Description N Mean SD Min P25 P50 P75 Max 
significant10 
=1 if coefficient on water supply service in the hedonic model is 
significant at the 10% level 
75 0.63 0.49 0 0 1 1 1 
significant5 
=1 if coefficient on water supply service in the hedonic model is 
significant at the 5% level 
56 0.64 0.48 0 0 1 1 1 
mpremium 
Average market premium for water supply services as a 
percentage of home value, with non-significant market 
premiums assumed to be zero 
75 0.41 0.68 -0.64 0.05 0.22 0.50 3.53 
mpremium_month 
Average monthly market premium for water supply services, in 
2017 PPP USD 
69 88 176 -39 3 23 96 938 
monthly_hh_income Average monthly household income, in 2017 PPP USD 60 912 751 65 498 727 1024 4125 
monthly_home_value Average monthly home value, in 2017 PPP USD 69 254 504 1 52 169 236 4028 
missing =1 if either income or home value is missing 75 0.24 0.43 0 0 0 0 1 
Asia =1 if the country is in Asia 75 0.61 0.49 0 0 1 1 1 
owners =1 if study sample is owners only 75 0.35 0.48 0 0 0 1 1 
squatters =1 if study sample is squatters only 75 0.13 0.34 0 0 0 0 1 
prop_pw Proportion of sample with piped water access 75 0.52 0.33 0.00 0.26 0.53 0.85 0.98 
prop_pw_sq Square of proportion of sample with piped water access 75 0.38 0.34 0.00 0.07 0.28 0.73 0.96 
n_other_water_var 
Number of other water supply variables included in hedonic 
model 
75 1.20 2.02 0 0 0 2 11 
tenure_insecurity =1 if study sample consisted of tenure insecure residents 75 0.28 0.45 0 0 0 1 1 
waterfocus =1 if study focuses on water supply services 75 0.36 0.48 0 0 0 1 1 
discrete_choice 
=1 if researchers use a discrete choice framework to estimate 
the bid-rent function 
75 0.28 0.45 0 0 0 1 1 
semilog =1 if the model functional form is semi-log 75 0.57 0.50 0 0 1 1 1 
n_sanitation_var Number of sanitation variables included in hedonic model 75 1.39 0.96 0 1 1 2 5 
n_other_infra_var 
Number of other infrastructure variables included in hedonic 
model 
75 1.44 1.07 0 1 1 2 5 
length_of_tenure =1 if length of tenure is included in hedonic model 75 0.36 0.48 0 0 0 1 1 
endo_nostrat 
=1 if researchers do not account for endogeneity in their study 
design/methods 
75 0.80 0.40 0 1 1 1 1 
samplesize Sample size, in thousands 75 1.02 1.31 0.06 0.09 0.54 1.41 5.91 
wvar_PW =1 if water supply service measured in study is "piped water" 75 0.79 0.41 0 1 1 1 1 
value_sale =1 if home value is recorded as the sale value 75 0.19 0.39 0 0 0 0 1 




6.4.1 Market Premiums for Water Supply Services 
To obtain comparable measurements of market premiums across different hedonic 
methods and hedonic price functional forms, we standardize measures. First, for semi-log hedonic 
price functions, we used the coefficient on the water service variable. The percent change in home 
value is (𝑒?̂? − 1) × 100. Inference using the Box-Cox coefficients can only be approximated when 
using the regression output. We evaluate the percent change in home value at the mean value, with 
change in home value, ∆𝑦 = (?̂?(?̂?) + 1)
1 ?̂?⁄
. Despite being standard practice, the error disturbance 
is not accounted for in making this conditional predication (Abreyava, 2002). We are unable to 
improve upon the standard practice because we do not have information about the distribution of 
the error term. For studies that use bid-rent or discrete choice models, we report author estimates 
of market premiums as a percent of home value. 
6.4.2 Household Preferences 
We approximate for household preferences using observable household characteristics and 
research context. We include two measures that were available across most studies: the home value 
and average household income. We also include regional fixed effects, which capture any context 
specific preferences, as well as variables for if the sample consists of squatters, renters, or owners. 
While we would have also liked to include additional measures such as education and household 
size, these were not widely available across studies. 
We standardize the measurement of home value across studies for comparability. First, we 
convert all home values (rent and home sale price) to a monthly figure. As a result, we keep 
monthly rent as it is presented in the paper. For annual rent, we divide by twelve to obtain monthly 
rent. To calculate the equivalent monthly value of home price, we follow van den Berg and Nauges 
(2012) and treat the home price as a perpetuity, with the present value being the stated home price. 
We calculate the equivalent monthly rent using the present value formula, assuming a real discount 
rate of 10%. For the remainder of the paper, “home value” refers to this standardized measure – 
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with rents and sale prices pooled for comparison. Standardization does not affect market premiums 
as a percent of home value. The measurement and treatment of home value in the HPVM is 
discussed further in the “research methods and design” subsection. 
We include a measure for household income – the reported monthly average household 
income for each study. We provide average monthly household income for subsamples where 
available; otherwise, we use the average figure for the entire sample. We include a dummy variable 
for missing household income. 
Estimates of home value and household income are converted to current 2017 USD values 
corrected using purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rates published annually in the World 
Development Report and available in the World Bank database. For studies conducted prior to 
1990 for which PPP exchange rates are unavailable, predicted PPP exchange rates are used. 
6.4.3 (Perceived) Attributes of Water Supply 
In our framework, we identify three major groups of attributes of water supply: 
characteristics such as access, reliability, and water quality; costs and benefits of having piped 
water; and the substitutes and complements available. However, the studies focusing on water 
supply did not systematically report most of these attributes. Rarely do hedonic studies that 
focused on topics other than water supply report any of the attributes of water supply. For example, 
the price of piped water service delivery (water tariffs and connection fees) and how renters pay 
their water bills (if it is included in their rent) are not well documented in the hedonic studies. As a 
result, our meta-analysis is limited in its ability to understand how changing attributes of water 
supply can change the hedonic premium captured in the housing market. 
We are able to include two measures that partially describe the attributes of piped water 
supply: access to piped water service and number of other water-related variables included in the 
hedonic model. First, we include the proportion of the sample with piped water access (prop_pw, 
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prop_pw_sq).27 While we would like to understand how access affects hedonic premiums, we also 
leverage this measure as an approximate indicator for intermittency of piped water supply because 
“utilities that are able to supply a higher percentage of the population within their designated 
service area are also better able to provide continuous supply” (Kaminsky and Kumpel, 2018). In 
addition, we include measures for access for two methodological reasons. First, the market 
premium depends on the level of service when the hedonic price function is nonlinear (Freeman et 
al., 2014). Second, we include the square term because we would like to account for any selection 
effects that occur when access is extremely low or high. 
We also include a count of other water-related variables included in the hedonic model 
(n_other_water_var). Water-related variables include other sources of water, such as private wells, 
public wells, neighbor’s water, and other infrastructure related to water use – such as storage tanks 
and number of bathrooms. This variable is able to partially account for the availability of 
substitutes and complements. 
6.4.4 Housing Market Characteristics 
We would like to be able to account for differences in hedonic premiums driven by 
differences in certain housing market characteristics, such as market activity and mobility, 
competitiveness, and if the market is in equilibrium. We are only able to collect one measure 
related to market activity and mobility: tenure security (if the sample is a squatter or slum 
community). We expect that those who live in squatter or slum communities experience more 
tenure insecurity. As a result, there may an undersupply of piped water connections due to a 
reluctance to invest in new connections because of the risk of eviction; the undersupply could 
therefore lead to higher premiums for existing piped water connections. This measure is slightly 
 
27 For studies that did not provide this figure, we used other sources, listed here: Rio de Janeiro in 1983 
(88.4%) (Britto, 2019); Accra, Ghana in 1979 (85%) (World Bank, 1994); Manila in 1983 (53%) (World Bank, 
1978); Davao in 1979 (35%) (Tabbada, 1983). 
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different from the one described previously under household characteristics. We focus here on 
those who live in slums, which could include renters and owners, not just squatters. There is 
another related measure, which is an indicator variable for if the length of tenure is included in the 
hedonic model, but we discuss this in the research design and methods subsection. 
6.4.5 Research Design and Methods 
The most easily observed measures come from researchers’ choice of research design and 
methods. As a result, most of the independent variables we use in our meta-analysis fall in this 
subsection. We include two variables that capture research design choices: if the authors of the 
study focus on water supply services as its main research question (waterfocus) and if the authors 
use a discrete choice framework to estimate the bid-rent function (discrete_choice). We include a 
metric for researcher focus on water supply for two reasons. First, water researchers (and donors) 
can select locations where water supply is a serious problem and market premiums therefore may 
be higher. For example, Crane, Daniere, and Harwood (1997) state that their “sample was collected 
exclusively in west and north Jakarta where water availability is an especially severe problem.” 
Second, there may be an “expectation bias” introduced by researchers who expect to find a 
significant effect of water services on home values. We also include an indicator variable for studies 
that use a discrete choice framework. Though the discrete choice model imposes more structure on 
the preference function than the hedonic model, two frameworks “perform equally well in 
estimating the marginal value of an attribute” (Cropper et al., 1993).  
The measures for the research methods fall into two groups: (1) procedures that target 
accuracy by mitigating issues of endogeneity (Kuminoff et al., 2010) and (2) measurement 
procedures that affect the precision of the study. With respect to issues of endogeneity, we first 
examine how studies handle omitted variable bias. We include an indicator variable (semilog) for 
the choice of a semi-log functional form over linear, double log and Box-Cox functional forms. 
Careful selection of functional form can generate results robust to omitted variable bias. We include 
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three other variables to directly account for omitted variable bias in these studies: the number of 
sanitation-related variables present in the hedonic model (n_sanitation_var), the number of other 
infrastructure-related variables present in the hedonic model (n_other_infra_var, such as electricity, 
telecommunications, or road access), and the inclusion of the number of years the resident has lived 
in their home (length_of_tenure). The length of tenure is important to capture in studies where 
home values are self-reported, because both “the bias and the lack of precision in homeowners’ 
estimates are correlated with tenure, but not with socioeconomic characteristics” (Gonzalez-
Navarro & Quintana-Domeque, 2009).28 We also create an indicator variable (endo_nostrat) for if 
the authors do not employ techniques to address more complex forms of endogeneity, such as 
simultaneity, (spatial) autocorrelation, and selection bias. The indicator variable is equal to zero if 
these techniques are used and equal to one if the first stage hedonic price function is simply 
estimated without any techniques to address any of the forms of endogeneity discussed above.   
We then look at four areas of measurement that may affect the precision of the study. First, 
we include the sample size in thousands (samplesize). Variation in sample size may affect the 
significance of the estimates (Braden et al., 2011). Second, we include an indicator variable for how 
water services are measured in the hedonic study, with wvar_PW equal to one if the water service 
variable of interest in the study is a simple indicator variable for “access to” or “presence of” piped 
water in the home. The variable is equal to zero otherwise. Third, we include the how the home 
 
28 The measurement of home value is a common challenge faced by all hedonic modelers, and self-reported 
measures have been found to lead to consistent results and can be comparable to results using sales price 
data. There is literature in both high-income and low-income countries that describes the differences 
between self-reported and sales price data. In both contexts, owners tend to overestimate the value of their 
house. But the error in owner’s estimates is not highly correlated with home or owner characteristics.  
Results are broadly consistent between those based on self-reported values and those based on actual 
transactions (Goodman & Ittner, 1992; Freeman, 1979; Kain & Quigley, 1972; Gonzalez-Navarro & Quintana-
Domeque, 2009; Jimenez, 1982). While Jimenez (1982) and Gonzalez-Navarro and Quintana-Domeque (2009) 
find a larger difference in valuations for self-reported housing values (55% and 150% vs. 20% in Kain and 
Quigley (1972)), they find that the model results are not different. Most of the studies in our meta-analysis 
rely on self-reported home valuations; our results are robust to the inclusion of an indicator variable for the 
use of self-reported values and do not find significant coefficients.  
 
202 
value is measured: as a sale price, rental price, or implicit rental price derived from the estimated 
sale price. We include two indicator variables for sale price (value_sale) and implicit rental price 
(value_implicit), with rental price as the base case. It is important to understand how home values 
are measured and included in the model, since different measurements can be associated with 
distinct economic concepts. For example, market premiums as a proportion of monthly rent is a 
different measure from market premiums as a proportion of (estimated) sale price. The rental price 
represents the value of existing amenities in the current time period, rather than future changes in 
asset values (Taylor, 2003, Epple et al., 2013). There can also be differences in rates at which local 
amenities are capitalized into property prices (e.g., due to differential mobility and transactions 
costs), and renters and homeowners may have systematic differences in preferences related to 
environmental amenities (Clark & Nieves, 1996). 
Fourth, we examine the composition of the study sample: if they are owners only, squatters 
only, renters only, or mixed. We include two indicator variables for owners only (owners) and 
squatters only (squatters), with the base case as renters only.  
6.5 Results 
6.5.1 Summary of the Hedonics of Piped Water Supply in Low and Middle Income Countries 
We find 13 hedonic studies that focus on valuing water supply in developing countries. We 
expect these studies to provide the most thoughtful valuation estimates for piped water supply. 
However, we find there is a large range of market premiums within this subsection of the literature, 
with market premium estimates for piped water supply ranging from 0.032 to 3.53 of home value. 
Additionally, not all market premiums are statistically significant. Of 26 market premium estimates, 
21 are statistically significant at the 10% level.29 There are also large outliers in this subsample of 
 
29 The five statistically insignificant estimates for piped water connections are from rural areas (Harapap and 
Hartono, 2007; Yusuf and Koundouri, 2005), squatters in Bangkok (Crane et al., 1997), homeowners in 
Jakarta (Crane et al., 1997), and one of the four cities in Chile studied by Balaguer et al. (2009). 
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estimates – with two above 100% of the home value, both from Crane et al. (1997). We summarize 
the study findings below, drawing attention to the large range of research contexts, designs, and 
methods used. 
Two studies find evidence suggesting that willingness to pay for a piped water connection 
can be low when service is intermittent and/or when “obtaining access to a piped water connection 
is not seen as a big improvement in terms of water safety and quality” (van den Berg and Nauges, 
2012). Anselin et al. (2008)30 report two of the smallest market premiums in this literature review, 
with 0.032 for Bhopal and 0.038 for Bangalore, for a piped water supply service improvement of 
one day per week (on average, it is a 33% improvement in service hours). Their market premium is 
calculated using a spatial lag model that captures both (1) a direct effect on the household and (2) a 
spatial multiplier effect that captures the benefits from a household’s piped water access that spill 
over to their neighbors, which also in turn, benefit the household. Anselin et al. (2008) also control 
for access to other water supply sources and water storage. Van den Berg and Nauges (2012) also 
find a small market premium of 0.16 for homes in Southwest Sri Lanka. The authors explain that in 
Southwest Sri Lanka, “unconnected households are satisfied with the quality (i.e., taste, color, smell, 
and safety) and service of non-piped water,” and that among connected households, there were 
“frequent complaints about piped water being available for less than 24 hours a day,” which was 
also the case in Bhopal and Bangalore (van den Berg and Nauges, 2012).  
The low market premiums found by van den Berg and Nauges (2012) and Anselin et al. 
(2008) are complemented by two other studies that find similarly low market premiums but use 
simpler research design and methods. Harapap and Hartono (2007) and Espinoza et al. (2009) 
report market premiums of 0.09 in urban areas of Indonesia and 0.13 and 0.14 in Concepcion and 
 
30 One of the highest quality studies. Their hedonic market premiums for a service improvement of one day 
per week (54 INR for Bhopal, 117 INR for Bangalore) are consistent with results from a willingness to pay 
survey conducted for the same households (45 INR for Bhopal, 119 INR for Bangalore). 
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Valparaiso, Chile, respectively. These two studies use simple OLS regressions to estimate the 
hedonic price functions, with indicator variables for the “availability of piped or pumped water” 
(Harapap and Hartono, 2007) or the “dwelling having a drinking water supply” (Espinoza et al., 
2009). The authors do not describe the service levels provided or the availability of alternative 
sources and water storage.31 Van den Berg and Nauges (2012) also reference Nauges et al. (2008), 
who report slightly higher market premiums for piped water connections of 0.22 in Guatemala 
using OLS and 0.43 in El Salvador using an instrument for the size of the lot. Nauges et al. (2008) 
use private piped water connections as the reference group and instead include dummy variables 
for having a private well (in El Salvador), access to truck services (in Guatemala), and other types of 
water access (i.e., public taps, public wells, someone else’s tap). The authors suggest that the 
estimates from Guatemala may be “more trustworthy,” as the sample consists entirely of marginal 
“barrios” and therefore have less noise (Nauges et al., 2008). 
In a contrasting study, Amoah and Moffatt (2017) find higher market premiums for having 
“reliable piped water in residence,” as we would expect. Using a log-linear model, they find a 
market premium of 0.32 in Accra, Ghana, equivalent to about 7% of household income (Amoah and 
Moffatt, 2017).32 The authors then compare the results from two other valuation methods, finding 
that the hedonic WTP measure is theoretically consistent and similar to the WTP derived using the 
contingent valuation method (7.5% of household income) and higher than that derived using the 
travel cost method (3.6% of household income).  
 
31 We know from other studies that water services in Indonesia at the time of the study were of poor quality, 
had low pressure and incomplete coverage (Kooy and Bakker, 2008), but water services in urban Chile had 
high coverage levels and were being well-managed, with a noteworthy targeted subsidy program (Hearne 
and Donoso, 2005; Gómez-Lobo and Contreras, 2003). 
32 The market premium is misinterpreted in the paper, as the percentage increase is equated to the coefficient 
from the log-linear model. As a result, we present a corrected market premium of 0.32. 
 
205 
There are two studies that examine the value of piped water supply in rural areas when 
compared to urban areas in Indonesia; both use data from the Indonesia Family Life Survey but 
draw different conclusions. Yusuf and Koundouri (2005) use the Heckman selection model to 
investigate how the decision on house location (urban vs. rural) affects the household’s valuation of 
piped water in Indonesia. They find a market premium of 0.28 for urban areas, or IDR 14,053 (3.6 
per cent of expenditure). They do not find a significant coefficient in rural areas. Unlike Yusuf and 
Koundouri (2005), Suparman et al. (2016) fail to reject the hypothesis that the WTP for piped water 
is different in rural and urban areas. They attribute the lack of difference to two main reasons. First, 
that “health, […] closely related to the availability of clean and safe drinking water, is valued 
approximately equally in both areas,” and second, because sources of safe drinking water have 
declined in rural areas, the availability of safe alternatives in both rural and urban areas have 
converged (Suparman et al., 2016). Using an autoregressive-structural equation approach to 
account for time-varying omitted variables and measurement error, they find a market premium of 
0.34 of home value in both urban and rural areas (equivalent to 5% and 3% of total household 
expenditure, respectively).  
Also examining piped water supply in rural areas, North and Griffin (1993) look at 1,900 
rural households in the Philippines. Following Ellickson (1981), they directly estimate the bid-rent 
function and find that households in “all income ranges are willing to pay about half their monthly 
imputed rent to have piped water in the house” (North and Griffin, 1993). The authors control for 
access to other water sources but do not characterize the service levels provided from the piped 
water supply beyond “most convenient and under most conditions the safest” (North and Griffin, 
1993). 
There are four studies reporting large market premiums; the authors often explain their 
results by (1) acknowledging that dummy variables “may capture the presence of unobserved 
amenities” and therefore their “results should be interpreted as upper bound values” (Choumert et 
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al., 2016) or (2) stating that their results are comparable with those from other studies (Choumert, 
Stage, and Uwera, 2014; Vasquez, 2013; Crane et al., 1997). Vásquez (2013) finds a market 
premium of 0.60 of rental prices in urban Guatemala using a maximum simulated likelihood 
approach with household characteristics as instruments. Choumert et al. (2016) find a market 
premium of 0.47 for joint access to water and electricity in Dapoang, Togo, 33 and Choumert, Stage, 
and Uwera (2014) find a market premium of 0.97 in Kigali, Rwanda. Both studies correct for issues 
of spatial autocorrelation, but neither address other endogeneity issues such as potential reverse 
causality or other key omitted variables. Finally, Crane, Daniere, and Harwood (1997) conduct a 
comparative study of piped water supply in slums in Jakarta and Bangkok. They find the largest 
hedonic market premiums – 3.53 times the value of the home for renters and 1.36 times the value 
of the home for owners in Bangkok.34 The authors acknowledge that these values are “relatively 
high, [… but still…] comparable to values noted in other studies,” citing North and Griffin’s (1993) 
market premium of around half of monthly rent (Crane et al., 1997). Offering no other explanation 
for the large market premiums found, Crane et al.’s (1997) findings that households are willing to 
pay over 50% of their monthly household income for piped water services are difficult to believe. 
6.5.2 Market Premiums for Piped Water Supply Services 
After expanding the pool of studies to include those that do not focus solely on water 
supply, we derive 70 market premiums for piped water supply services from the total of 34 studies. 
We examine both significance and magnitude, as a proportion of home value. Of the 70 market 
 
33 An earlier version of their study (Choumert et al., 2014) had a hedonic price function that included “access 
to piped water within the dwelling” as a separate indicator variable. However, they found that the coefficients 
on piped water and electricity access, separately, were not statistically significant in their preferred 
specification (log-linear model), but their discussion section was clearly making a case for the importance of 
water and sanitation services. 
34 They do not find statistically significant relationships between piped water supply and home values for 
squatters in Bangkok and owners in Jakarta; the magnitudes of the non-significant coefficients are 0.59 and 
0.82, respectively, and are still higher than most other market premiums.  
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premiums, 44 are significant at the 10% level. Not all of the papers report significance at the 5% 
level. Of the 51 estimates testing for significance at the 5% level, 33 are significant. 




Figure 2 shows the meta-sample distributions for market premium magnitudes (that are 
significant at the 10% level). The distribution of significant market premiums has a sample mean of 
0.53, a median of 0.34, and a standard deviation of 0.73. The minimum and maximum values in the 
sample are -0.35 and 3.53, respectively. Most of the market premiums fall below 0.50, or 50%, of 
home values. We have a few outliers, namely one negative market premium for renters in 
Bangladesh (Ahmad, 2015) and six that are greater than 1.00, or 100%, of home values. Extremely 
large market premiums of 353% are reported for renters in Bangkok (Crane et al., 1997), 258% for 
squatters in Bangladesh (Ahmad, 2015), 238% for high-middle income squatters of household sizes 
less than seven in Manila, Philippines (Daniere, 1994).35  
 
35 We do not exclude these measures as outliers in the meta-regression because it is important to be able to 
explain their occurrence, especially since these large market premiums are not noted to be especially large by 
the authors of the studies. 
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6.5.3 Household Preferences as Shaped by Household Characteristics and Research Context 
We find that the mean monthly home value is US$220 PPP/month, with a standard 
deviation of US$294 PPP. The median monthly home value is US$169 PPP/month. There is one 
outlier value of US$2,055 PPP/month, from single family homes in Jos, Nigeria (Megbolugbe, 1989). 
We do not attribute this large value to measurement error and thus do not exclude it in our 
analysis.36 Larger market premiums are associated with smaller home values, suggesting that 
household willingness to pay for piped water services may be more of a fixed value than a relative 
value. 
The average household income is US$912 PPP/month, with a standard deviation of US$751 
PPP and median of US$727 PPP/month. Out of 75 observations, 15 are missing average household 
income. As we would expect, there is a small, positive correlation between market premiums and 
monthly household income. 
Hedonic studies have been conducted in many different countries and with samples 
consisting of homeowners, renters, and those who have less tenure security, as squatters or those 
living in slums. Most of the market premiums come from Asia (N=46) – with most from the 
Philippines (N=24), Indonesia (N=10), and India (N=5). There are 10 market premiums from Latin 
and South America, and 17 market premiums measured in Africa. There is also one study looking at 
housing in Russia (Berger et al., 2008).  
Most of the market premiums are estimated for owner-only samples (N=26) and renter-
only samples (N=23). There are ten squatter-only sample estimates of market premiums for piped 
water services and the rest consist of mixed samples (N=16). Market premiums for different tenure 
groups are generally similar and have large ranges for market premiums. Mixed samples report 
slightly lower market premiums (as a proportion of home value). The market premiums for renter-
 
36 At the time of the study (1982), one Nigerian naira (NGN) was valued at 1.4 USD and has since fallen, with 
an exchange rate of 306 NGN for one USD in 2017. 
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only samples range from -35% to 353% and average 38%, or US$72 PPP/month. For homeowner-
only samples, the market premiums range from -23% to 136%, averaging 35% or US$115 
PPP/month. Squatter-only samples report market premiums ranging from -64% to 280%, 
averaging 89% or US$45 PPP/month. Mixed samples have mean market premiums of 25% of home 
value (US$92 PPP/month), ranging from 0% to 103%. 
6.5.4 (Perceived) Attributes of Piped Water Supply 
We find that there is a wide range of access levels across study contexts. With respect to the 
proportion of households with piped water connections, the average across all estimates is 0.50. 
Out of 67 samples with levels of access to piped water connections, 14 samples report proportions 
of less than 0.20, and 21 report proportions of 0.80 or higher. 
Thirty-three out of 75 hedonic models include other water-related variables. The average 
number of other water-related variables is 2.7, with a standard deviation of 2.3. 
6.5.5 Housing Market Characteristics 
Of the 75 market premiums, 21 come from households that experience tenure insecurity – 
living in slums or squatter communities. Ten of the 21 samples are squatter-only samples, five are 
renter-only, three are owner-only, and three are mixed samples. We find that the mean market 
premium is significantly larger for households experiencing tenure insecurity (mean=0.77, 
SD=1.13) than for those that do not (mean=0.27, SD=0.28). 
6.5.6 Research Design and Methods 
Of the 75 market premiums estimated, 36% of them come from studies that focus on piped 
water supply services. Of the 27 estimates that come from studies focusing on water, 22 are 
significant. In comparison, of the 48 estimates that comes from studies that do not focus on water, 
23 do not find a statistically significant effect of piped water services on home values. Twenty-one 
of the hedonic market premiums are estimated using a discrete choice framework.  
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Omitted variable bias can be addressed using different functional forms and by including 
pertinent variables. We find that semi-log models tend to be the most commonly used, with 57% of 
the market premiums estimated using this functional form. Most hedonic models (84%) include 
other sanitation-related variables, with an average of 1.39 variables. Other infrastructure-related 
variables are also commonly included (85%), averaging 1.44 variables. Most hedonic models do 
not, however, include the household’s length of tenure (36%).  
In the papers published between 1981 and 1996, authors did not address the more difficult 
endogeneity problems of the independent variables in the estimation of the first stage hedonic price 
function. Later studies employed various techniques to address different forms of endogeneity 
(simultaneity, (spatial) autocorrelation, selection bias). Crane et al. (1997), Nauges et al. (2008), 
Vásquez (2013), Choumert et al. (2016), and Nakamura (2017) all used instrumental variable 
techniques to address endogeneity concerns.  Anselin et al. (2008) and Asabere (2004) used 
estimators that correct for spatial autocorrelation. Suparman et al. (2016) used a structural 
equation approach to reduce omitted variable bias and to correct for endogeneity of the presence of 
a piped water connection. Yusuf and Koundouri (2005) used a selection correction for location 
choice (urban vs. rural), and Brueckner (2013) and Berger et al. (2008) corrected for reporting 
bias. As a result, we have 15 market premium estimates from studies utilizing more sophisticated 
techniques.  
We also find that most papers do not move beyond estimating the first stage’s hedonic price 
function, which only provides the market premium for an amenity. The problem of identification in 
estimating the second stage is well known (Taylor, 2008; Nakamura, 2017). Papers that focus on 
water do not attempt Rosen’s (1974) second stage estimations. Two other papers do, but they do 
not focus on water (Arimah, 1992; Quigley, 1982). Two papers of these use Bajari and Kahn’s 
(2005) three-stage approach (Lall & Lundberg, 2008; Nakamura, 2017).  
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With respect to areas of measurement that may affect study precision, we examine sample 
size, measurement of piped water services, measurement of home value, and composition of study 
sample. First, with respect to sample size, we find that studies range from a minimum of 57 
observations to a maximum of 5,910 observations. Market premiums that are statistically 
significant at the 10% level are estimated using samples averaging 1,322 observations, while those 
that are not average 525 observations. Second, the measurement of water services is commonly 
simplistic, with authors using an indicator variable for “access to” or “presence of” piped water in 
the home for 79% of hedonic models. Third, we find that while most (63%) models use rental price 
as the measure for home value, 19% use home sale price, 11% use implicit rental price (derived 
from home sale price). The composition of the study sample is discussed previously as a household 
characteristic. 
A majority of market premiums are estimated in urban areas (N=68), with three that are 
estimated for the entire country (Knight et al., 2004; Brueckner, 2013; Suparman et al., 2016). With 
respect to study age, the oldest study had data collected in 1976. The longest intervals are 32 years 
(1947-1978) (Asabere, 1981), 15 years (1993-2007) (Suparman et al, 2016), and 11 years (1990-
2000) (Asabere, 2004). All other studies are cross-sectional, with data collected in one or two years.   
6.5.7 Significance of Piped Water Supply Services 
Table 4 reports the results of the probit model for a statistically significant coefficient on 
piped water supply services in the hedonic model. The first specification for the explanatory model 
looks only at variables related to household characteristics: household income, home value, region, 
and tenure status. Estimation of model (1) shows that home value and squatters have statistically 
significant, negative coefficients. More valuable homes are less likely to find a significant effect of 
piped water supply services on home value. Squatters are also less likely to find a significant effect. 
The second specification adds covariates related to piped water supply attributes: the 
proportion of the study sample with access to piped water, its square term, and the number of other 
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water variables included in the model. None of the coefficients on these covariates are statistically 
significant. The coefficient on squatters remains statistically significant at the 1% level, but the 
coefficient on home value loses its significance at the 10% level. The addition of the covariates 
related to piped water supply does not change the sign of coefficients on other variables. 
Model (3) includes one additional variable on tenure security, a housing market 
characteristic. While the coefficient on this variable is not statistically significant, its addition leads 
to a loss of statistical significance for squatters, and owners now has a statistically significant 
coefficient at the 10% level.  
Model (4) adds variables related to research design and methods: a study’s focus on piped 
water (water_focus) and the use of the discrete choice framework (discrete_choice). Models (5) and 
(6) examining the effects of research method variables related to accuracy and precision, 
respectively: choice of functional form of the hedonic price function (semilog); number of variables 
included in the model related to sanitation (n_sanitation_var), other infrastructure 
(n_other_infra_var), and length of tenure (length_of_tenure); not addressing other forms of 
endogeneity (endogeneity); sample size (samplesize); use of an indicator variable for piped water 
supply (water_dummy); and type of home value measured (value_sale, value_implicit, with 
value_rent as the reference category).  The coefficient on water_focus is statistically significant and 
positive through the remaining models (5 and 6). While the coefficient on discrete_choice is not 
statistically significant in model (4), it becomes statistically significant at the 5% level in models (5) 
and (6), with the addition of other methodological variables. Models (5) and (6) have similar 
reports with respect to coefficient sign and significance. We find that the coefficient on the number 
of variables included in the model related to other infrastructure is positive and significant at the 
5% level. Hedonic models that include other infrastructure access are more likely to report a 
significant coefficient on piped water supply services. The coefficient on endogeneity is significant at 
the 1% level and negative. Studies that do not address more complex forms of endogeneity are less 
 
213 
likely to find statistically significant hedonic premiums for piped water supply. The form of the 
water supply variable also matters: models that simply use an indicator variable for the presence of 





Table 6.4. Meta-analysis results explaining significance of water supply services 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES significant10 significant10 significant10 significant10 significant10 significant10 
       
ln_monthly_hh_income 0.25 0.32 0.30 0.27 0.82*** 0.97** 
 (0.23) (0.25) (0.25) (0.23) (0.32) (0.41) 
ln_monthly_home_value -0.19* -0.13 -0.12 -0.23* -0.98** -1.11** 
 (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.40) (0.49) 
missing 0.50 0.39 0.22 0.73 2.69*** 3.31*** 
 (0.39) (0.45) (0.43) (0.54) (0.80) (0.93) 
Asia -0.029 -0.28 -0.40 -0.58 -1.23** -1.28** 
 (0.32) (0.38) (0.40) (0.48) (0.51) (0.60) 
owners -0.53 -0.58 -0.61* -0.57 -0.41 -1.13 
 (0.38) (0.35) (0.33) (0.36) (0.36) (0.73) 
squatters -1.25*** -1.32*** -1.00 -1.41* -2.21** -2.77*** 
 (0.41) (0.46) (0.66) (0.77) (0.99) (0.97) 
prop_pw  0.014 0.51 2.62 8.22* 9.63 
  (2.83) (2.91) (2.82) (4.83) (6.58) 
prop_pw_sq  -0.99 -1.49 -3.33 -7.67* -9.08* 
  (2.51) (2.63) (2.54) (3.96) (5.44) 
n_other_water_var  0.092 0.12 0.051 -0.16 -0.099 
  (0.085) (0.091) (0.14) (0.18) (0.19) 
tenure_insecurity   -0.40 0.055 1.12 0.78 
   (0.48) (0.54) (0.86) (1.04) 
waterfocus    1.03** 2.68*** 3.03*** 
    (0.49) (0.92) (1.01) 
discrete_choice    0.56 2.21** 2.45** 
    (0.52) (1.04) (1.02) 
semilog     -0.51 -0.86 
     (0.58) (0.68) 
n_sanitation_var     0.19 0.062 
     (0.32) (0.22) 
n_other_infra_var     0.49** 0.61** 
     (0.24) (0.30) 
length_of_tenure     -0.32 0.11 
     (0.55) (0.68) 
endo_nostrat     -3.71*** -4.32*** 
     (1.17) (1.21) 
samplesize      0.0072 
      (0.23) 
wvar_PW      1.20* 
      (0.67) 
value_sale      1.08 
      (0.70) 
value_implicit      -0.20 
      (0.76) 
Constant -0.12 -0.38 -0.20 -0.41 -0.045 -1.04 
 (1.53) (1.68) (1.67) (1.48) (2.13) (2.48) 
       
Observations 75 75 75 75 75 75 
Pseudo-R2 0.1121 0.1581 0.1640 0.2089 0.3698 0.4052 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




The addition of these variables related to research design and methods changes the 
statistical significance of other variables. Coefficients on household income, home value, region, 
squatters, and the square term of the proportion of the study sample with access to piped water all 
become statistically significant. We find that samples with higher levels of income are more likely 
have report a significant coefficient on piped water services. However, all else equal, samples with 
more valuable homes are less likely to report a significant hedonic market premium for piped water 
services. Additionally, studies in Asia are less likely to find significant relationships between home 
value and water services; squatters continue to be less likely to have a significant market premium. 
Interestingly, the coefficient on the square term for access to piped water is statistically significant 
at the 10% level and negative. This suggests that for low levels of access, the relationship between 
home value and piped water services is more likely to be significant, but for higher levels of piped 
water access, the relationship is less likely to be statistically significant. 
Our results indicate robust effects of having a study focus on piped water supply services, 
squatters, and not having a strategy to handle endogeneity on a statistically significant coefficient 
on piped water supply services. With respect to other study characteristics, we are unable to find a 
strong relationship with statistical significance of the coefficient on piped water supply services. 
Household and piped water supply attributes are weak explanatory variables for market premium 
significance without the presence of research method and design explanatory variables. 
6.5.8 Piped Water Supply Service Market Premiums 
Table 5 presents the results of the meta-analysis regression explaining the magnitude of 
market premiums (mpremium). As in the probit model for statistical significance, the first 
specification for the explanatory model looks household characteristics. Estimation of model (1) 
shows that none of the variables related to household characteristics are statistically significant and 
have weak explanatory power (R2 = 0.085). In model (2), we add covariates describing the 
attributes of water supply. The coefficients on access to piped water supply in the sample 
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(prop_pw) and its square term (prop_pw_sq) are statistically significant at the 5% level. The 
coefficients are negative and positive, respectively, suggesting a U-shaped relationship centered at 
0.5 between access to piped water supply and hedonic market premiums. Market premiums (as a 
percentage of home value) are higher when water access is low or high. The addition of covariates 
in model (2) changes the significance of squatters, which now has a positive relationship with 
market premiums; the sign of the coefficient on owners is now negative, but still not significant. The 
signs and significance of the other coefficients remain unchanged. Explanatory power of model (2) 
(R2 = 0.136) is improved compared to that of model (1). Model (3) adds tenure security, which is 
not significant, but the explanatory power increases substantially to 0.195. The coefficient on 
squatters loses its statistical significance. 
As in the probit regressions, models (4), (5), and (6) add variables related to research 
design and methods, accuracy, and precision. We find that having a study focus on water services 
has a positive and significant relationship with hedonic market premium magnitudes. This effect is 
robust across all three specifications. The number of variables related to other infrastructure is 
positive and significant at the 5% level in model (6). The addition of research design and method 
variables causes the coefficient on the number of other water supply variables to be negative and 
significant at the 10% level. Having a larger sample size is associated with smaller market 
premiums, significant at the 5% level. Using an indicator variable to describe piped water services 
is associated with larger market premiums and is also significant at the 5% level. The coefficient on 
the proportion of the study sample with access to piped water services remains robustly significant 
at the 5% level and the magnitudes also remain stable. Two variables related to household 
characteristics gain statistical significance but are not robustly significant across specifications: 
household income and the sample being located in Asia. We also find a positive income effect: 
higher household incomes are associated with high market premiums for piped water services. 
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Table 6.5. Meta-analysis results explaining magnitude of market premiums for piped water 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES mpremium mpremium mpremium mpremium mpremium mpremium 
       
ln_monthly_hh_income 0.072 0.039 0.066 0.069 0.042 0.19** 
 (0.044) (0.052) (0.050) (0.058) (0.063) (0.083) 
ln_monthly_home_value -0.019 0.012 -0.0099 -0.029 -0.034 -0.073 
 (0.051) (0.050) (0.038) (0.039) (0.041) (0.047) 
missing 0.038 -0.023 0.20 0.36** 0.34 0.63** 
 (0.13) (0.19) (0.15) (0.16) (0.21) (0.26) 
Asia 0.057 0.14 0.26 0.38 0.45* 0.48** 
 (0.19) (0.18) (0.23) (0.23) (0.26) (0.22) 
owners 0.018 -0.065 -0.0093 0.056 0.050 0.015 
 (0.14) (0.13) (0.098) (0.11) (0.13) (0.15) 
squatters 0.54 0.60** 0.17 0.26 0.24 0.071 
 (0.33) (0.27) (0.49) (0.57) (0.60) (0.53) 
prop_pw  -2.03** -2.24** -1.99* -2.24** -2.12** 
  (0.92) (1.01) (1.00) (1.04) (0.97) 
prop_pw_sq  2.06** 2.30** 2.16** 2.44** 2.10** 
  (0.96) (1.07) (1.03) (1.11) (0.96) 
n_other_water_var  0.020 -0.0026 -0.061* -0.070* -0.073* 
  (0.043) (0.032) (0.034) (0.040) (0.037) 
tenure_insecurity   0.53 0.65 0.68 0.70 
   (0.40) (0.42) (0.47) (0.51) 
waterfocus    0.34* 0.32* 0.46** 
    (0.18) (0.17) (0.20) 
discrete_choice    -0.20 -0.032 0.18 
    (0.17) (0.20) (0.21) 
semilog     0.22 0.27 
     (0.16) (0.16) 
n_sanitation_var     -0.041 0.013 
     (0.063) (0.056) 
n_other_infra_var     0.058 0.14** 
     (0.042) (0.060) 
length_of_tenure     -0.071 -0.36 
     (0.20) (0.31) 
endo_nostrat     -0.012 -0.18 
     (0.13) (0.13) 
samplesize      -0.17** 
      (0.077) 
wvar_PW      0.51** 
      (0.20) 
value_sale      -0.040 
      (0.18) 
value_implicit      -0.33 
      (0.28) 
Constant -0.094 0.22 -0.044 -0.23 -0.20 -1.21 
 (0.38) (0.33) (0.41) (0.38) (0.41) (0.74) 
       
Observations 75 75 75 75 75 75 
R-squared 0.085 0.136 0.195 0.244 0.262 0.339 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




Samples in Asia, on average, find higher market premiums. The additional variation 
explained by research design and methods covariates is significant, with an R2 of 0.339 in model 
(6), compared to an R2 of 0.195 in model (3). 
Our meta-analysis results show that larger market premiums are related to (1) low and high 
proportions of homes in the sample with piped water, (2) households with higher incomes, (3) 
having a research focus on water supply, (4) inclusion of other infrastructure variables in the 
hedonic model, and (5) the measurement of piped water supply using an indicator variable.  
6.6 Discussion 
The meta-analysis regression and qualitative examination of the heterogeneity in hedonic 
market premiums illustrates common challenges in the application of the hedonic property 
valuation method. We find a wide range of market premiums, from –US$39 per month to US$938 
per month, with an average of US$88 per month.  
We find that the hedonic valuation method is broadly unreliable for two reasons. First, the 
standard errors of the market premium estimates are large, as indicated by the lack of statistical 
significance of piped water in many models; 28 of 75 hedonic models do not find a significant 
coefficient on piped water supply at the 10% level. Only 36 of the hedonic models estimated – less 
than half – find statistical significance at the 5% level. Furthermore, we find that many of the 
research procedures affect the statistical significance of the coefficient and therefore the magnitude 
of the variance. Second, as a close substitute for test-retest experiments, we find five hedonic 
studies that use Indonesia’s IFLS survey data but have different results. Recall that Yusuf and 
Koundouri (2005) find a market premium of 0.28 (312 PPP 2017 USD) for urban homeowners in 
Indonesia, while Suparman et al. (2016) find a market premium of 0.34 (6 PPP 2017 USD) for the 
same sample. Their main results about the differences between urban and rural homeowners are 
also conflicting. Moreover, three additional studies find varying market premiums of 0.16 (18 PPP 
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2017 USD) (Brueckner, 2013), 0.09 (17 PPP 2017 USD) (Hartono and Harahap, 2007), and 1.03 
(607 PPP 2017 USD) (Yusuf and Koundouri, 2005). 
With respect to content validity, we do not find there to be agreement among researchers 
on the procedures and econometric approaches to be used in HPVM in estimating accurate market 
premiums for piped water connections. There is a lack of consensus around research design – how 
to deal with endogeneity (if at all), the structure of the price function, and consideration of suitable 
contexts. There is also a general lack of agreement around methods and the consequent 
interpretation of results.  While most studies use an indicator variable for the presence of piped 
water connections, the theoretical justification and interpretation is not consistent. Additionally, 
inclusion of other infrastructure-related and water and sanitation variables is not consistent across 
all studies. 
In assessing construct validity, we find that the hedonic estimates of marginal WTP for 
piped water connections is consistent with economic theory (Gunatilake et al., 2007). First, we are 
more likely to find a significant relationship between home value and having a piped water 
connection as household income increases. Second, controlling for home value, we find that 
households with higher incomes have higher market premiums for piped water connections. We 
are unable to test for the relationship with price as most papers do not report the existing water 
tariff or average water bill for household in their sample.  
A second component of construct validity is to compare hedonic marginal WTP estimates 
with those found using stated preference methods and coping costs. This also serves to provide 
guidance in the literature about what a plausible and “reasonable” hedonic market premium for 
piped water should be.  Van Houtven et al. (2017) conduct a meta-analysis of stated preference 
method estimates of household willingness to pay for improved water services. Drawing from 60 
studies, Van Houtven et al. (2017) find that the average incremental monthly WTP for 
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improvements37 range in value from $0.02 to over $176, with an average value of $22 (median of 
$12).38 From their meta-analysis regression, they find a significant and positive willingness to pay a 
price premium for access to a private connection (compared to a public source) to be an increase of 
143%, or about $31.39  
Based on previous studies, we expect findings from stated preference studies to be similar 
to those from hedonic studies (Cummings et al., 1986; in Amoah & Moffatt, 2017). Two studies in 
our review compare SP estimates to hedonic market premiums and find similar results. Amoah and 
Moffatt (2017) find that the value derived from the contingent valuation method is greater than 
that of the hedonic method ($15.25/month compared to $11.85/month, respectively); Anselin et al. 
(2008) find there to be “a surprising degree of consistency” between the estimates from their SP 
survey and the hedonic method (45 INR vs. 54 INR, respectively, in Bhopal, and 119 INR vs. 117 
INR, respectively, in Bangalore). While these few studies provide a suggestion of how results from 
the two methods should compare, it remains unclear exactly how much larger or smaller estimates 
from these two methods should be. Of the statistically significant results, the mean hedonic market 
premium is $106, with a median of $28. The median hedonic market premium is close to the mean 
willingness to pay of $31 estimated by stated preference techniques, but the mean hedonic market 
premium is over three times as large. As a result, we find that hedonic market premiums may be 
accurate when compared to results from stated preference studies, but they are not precise.40  
 
37 Improvements are from baseline conditions to service levels proposed in stated preference scenarios. 
38 Converted to 2017 PPP USD for comparability. 
39 Because the average WTP for access to a public source is not reported, we use the mean value ($21.70) 
reported in the study. 
40 We caveat this comparison with a recognition that we cannot exactly compare hedonic market premiums 
with WTP elicited from stated preference studies. Hedonic market premiums estimate uncompensated 
demand while stated preference methods often estimate compensated demand. However, estimates of 
income elasticities of household water demand are relatively small (Nauges and Whittington, 2009), so we 
expect the difference between Hicksian and Marshallian demand to be small. 
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When comparing hedonic market premiums to household expenditures spent coping with 
unreliable, poor quality public water supplies, we expect coping costs to be lower because “coping 
costs can generally be expected to represent a lower bound for WTP” (Pattanayak et al., 2005).41 
Indeed, we find coping cost estimates (adjusted to 2017 USD) from four illustrative studies to be 
lower than the median and mean hedonic market premiums.42 In Kathmandu, Nepal, mean monthly 
coping costs are $4.06 in 2001 (Pattanayak et al., 2005) and $13 in 2014 (Gurung et al., 2017). Cook 
et al. (2016) find mean monthly coping costs of $22 in rural Kenya. Zérah (1998) estimates monthly 
coping costs to be $8.30 in New Delhi, India. Note that these figures presented are illustrative and 
are not meant to provide a rigorous comparison, because we have only a few measures, not a 
comprehensive meta-analysis. 
However, it is unclear how much larger hedonic market premiums should be when 
compared to the lower bound illustrated by coping costs. Only one paper compares hedonic market 
premiums and averting expenditures for the same set of homes. Christensen et al. (2019) use 
difference-in-differences and event study research designs to robustly identify the impacts of a 
water supply crisis and estimate welfare effects using home values in Flint, Michigan. The authors 
find that when compared with control housing markets, average homes in Flint have a decrease of 
33%, equivalent to a 50% increase, in home value (Christensen et al., 2019). The authors find 
hedonic estimates (a reduction of $22,200 per home) that are close to averting expenditures 
($18,249 per household, including $7,249 for replacement of domestic pipes, hot water heaters, 
dishwashers, and washing machines) (Christensen et al., 2019). The coping costs from the four 
 
41 However, there have been reports of WTP being lower than coping costs due to an erosion of household 
confidence in the water system (Virjee and Gaskin, 2010) or investments in storage tanks that simulate 
continuous water supply, “resulting in indifference to proposed water service improvements” (Mycoo, 1997; 
Majuru et al., 2016). 
42 Chosen because they are rigorous and include water collection times; three are reviewed in Majuru et al.’s 
(2016) systematic review. 
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studies average $12/month, nearly half of the median hedonic market premium, $28/month, and 
about one-tenth the mean hedonic market premium, $106/month. Compared to Christensen et al.’s 
(2019) findings, this suggests that hedonic estimates are generally too large when compared with 
coping costs.  
Overall, we find that the hedonic market premiums can be accurate but are not precise, as 
many estimates are implausibly large. The distribution of market premiums (recall Figure 2) is 
skewed to the right. The median is less than the mean for both the percent of home values (mean 
51%; median 34%) and significant market premiums in USD (mean $106; median $28). While the 
median values are consistent with expectations when compared to estimates from stated 
preference methods (but weakly not consistent with the averting expenditure method), the mean 
values are much larger and are not consistent with expectations. This demonstrates that while 
many hedonic studies estimate market premiums that are reasonable, there are also many studies 
that find large implausible estimates. The hedonic method, when applied in the developing country 
context to estimate the marginal WTP for piped water supply, faces systematic challenges. 
6.7 Conclusion 
Our review of the HPVM literature on household demand for piped water in developing 
countries suggests that the method is still not well developed in this context, and its application has 
not generated consistently reliable and valid results. First, we find that the value of piped water is 
frequently, but not always, capitalized in housing markets. Sixty-three percent of hedonic property 
models find a significant effect of piped water on home prices. Significant market premiums also 
estimated have a large range, from -35% to 353%, or -$1.26 to $938. Second, there are challenges to 
content validity with inconsistent research designs and methods used. While the meta-analysis 
shows that the hedonic market premiums have relationships with household income consistent 
with economic theory, the relationships with findings from other non-market valuation methods 
are inconsistent with theoretical expectations. Construct validity is also challenged when 
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comparing with WTP estimates from stated preference and averting expenditure studies. We find 
that the estimated hedonic market premiums can, however, be useful, if the identified challenges to 
reliability, content and construct validity are addressed.  
Despite the large range and right skewed distribution, the median market premium of 34%, 
or $28, not all estimates are entirely implausible when compared to coping costs and stated 
preference estimates. In returning to our theoretical framework, our findings lead us to conclude 
with six best practices when applying the hedonic method in valuing piped water supply in 
developing countries. In Table 6, we assess the extent to which the hedonic papers that focused on 
water adhered to these best practices. While none of the papers have applied all of the best 
practices, three papers form the foundation on which future work can improve: Anselin, Lozano-
Gracia, Deichmann & Lall (2008), Nauges, Strand & Walker (2008), and Suparman, Folmer & Oud 
(2016). For future researchers, to construct a valid and reliable hedonic estimate, we suggest the 
following checklist of best practices: 
1. Select a study site with an even distribution between homes that have piped water 
access and those that do not. This would provide a solution to the problem of common 
support, where there is a lack of comparable homes in the two groups (with and without piped 
water access). We find a robustly Additionally, if the main independent variable (i.e., piped 
water supply) is determined for some level of confounders, the common support problem is 
exacerbated and “inference may be ill-advised” (Cheng et al., (2010); Westreich and Cole, 
2010). In the case of water supply, confounders can include income, political power, and cost 
of supply. At low levels of coverage, piped water access is often first extended to wealthy and 
politically well-connected neighborhoods. Similarly, at high levels of coverage, homes that 
remain unconnected frequently belong to the poor or are extremely costly to supply. Solutions 
are not immediately obvious; the simplest is restriction of the sample being examined but 
limits the target population for inference (see Westreich and Cole (2010) for more). 
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2. Understand the characteristics of water supply, including access, reliability, quality, 
costs, benefits, and availability of substitutes and complements. This is important for two 
reasons. First, we find evidence that these characteristics can affect hedonic market premiums 
estimated. For example, the inclusion of availability of other water sources in the hedonic 
model is associated with lower hedonic market premiums. Most authors do not include a 
description of water supply characteristics (only seven do: Aryeetey-Attoh (1992), Yusuf and 
Koundouri (2005), Anselin et al. (2008), van den Berg and Nauges (2012), Vásquez (2013), 
Suparman et al. (2016), Nakamura (2017)); fewer still account for them in the hedonic model. 
Second, an understanding of water supply characteristics is required for clear author 
interpretation of the resulting hedonic market premium estimate and consequent comparisons 
across studies. Is the market premium for an in-home piped water connection that supplies 
24/7, potable water at a subsidized rate in a city where other water sources are expensive and 
require private capital expenditures for storage and treatment? Or is the market premium for a 
piped water connection that provides water of poor quality intermittently in a city where 
households can easily and cheaply drill private wells or purchase affordable, potable water 
from private water vendors operating in a competitive market? Researchers should clearly 
understand and account for existing costs to the owner of piped water supply, including the 
existing water tariff (shared or not), connection fees, costs of in home plumbing, and 
expectations about future tariff changes. 
3. Qualitatively assess housing markets for activity, competitiveness, and equilibrium 
conditions. These conditions are necessary for (1) the home price to reflect home and 
neighborhood characteristics and (2) to interpret the derived marginal implicit prices as 
marginal willingness to pay.43 For example, mobility of households (and therefore market 
 
43 Marginal implicit prices are estimates of marginal willingness to pay under two main conditions: (1) 
households are in equilibrium given the vector of housing prices and (2) the vector of housing prices clears 
the market for the given stock of housing (Taylor, 2003). Further requirements include full information on all 
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activity) varies greatly in developing countries, from 3% to 43% (Strassman, 1991; Malpezzi, 
1999). Tenure security, while systematically affecting housing prices, also affects mobility and 
market activity (Friedman et al., 1988). Systematic differences in housing supply factors can 
also introduce heterogeneity in markets and affect economic analyses. These factors include: 
accessibility of housing finance and mortgage rates, prevalence of informality in land markets, 
government allocation of land and subsidies (Malpezzi, 1999). Without understanding the 
broader housing market, researchers and readers cannot be assured that the estimates of 
market premiums for piped water services are unbiased and plausible. The reviewed papers 
rarely describe these important contextual characteristics necessary to justify the use of the 
hedonic method and often do not have a reasonable theory for how piped water is capitalized 
into home values. 
4. Seriously consider the measurement of water services and its interpretation. Building 
upon the second point in this checklist, we urge both researchers and readers to thoughtfully 
and seriously consider how piped water services are being measured, as it affects both the 
results of the analysis and interpretation. For example, the unusual results reported by Ahmad 
(2015) (significant and negative market premium for renters and a significant, large, and 
positive market premium for squatters) can perhaps be explained by how he measured piped 
water services: as “access to drinking water from any sources maintained by the statutory 
bodies or non-government organizations.” Though interpreted to be piped water, it is not clear 
if a distinction was made between public taps and private taps. We find that researchers that 
measure piped water services as a dummy variable report larger market premiums compared 
to those that use a service bundle of which piped water is one, a lack of piped water services, 
or use a piped water supply characteristic. There are also sometimes distinctions between 
 
housing prices and attributes; transaction and moving costs at zero; and price vectors that adjust 
instantaneously to changes in supply or demand (Taylor, 2003). 
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piped water to the property (as a yard tap) and piped water inside the home, but this is not 
always made clear. Additionally, the term “access” is not clarified in studies – is it that the 
household can obtain a private water connection if they so desire or is it that the household 
currently has a private water connection in their home? Future work needs to incorporate a 
nuanced understanding of the water supply system when constructing a valid measure for 
piped water supply in homes. 
5. Omitted variable bias should be carefully considered and mitigated by selecting home 
and neighborhood characteristics that are generated by different processes (preferably 
separate from water service provision). Municipal water services are often generated by 
similar processes as other public, infrastructure services. As a result, it is especially important 
to include neighborhood characteristics that are generated by other processes: for example, 
safety/crime rate; distance to the central business district and markets; availability of cultural 
and religious centers; quality and/or proximity of primary and secondary schools; and 
neighborhood income and ethnicity. The papers reviewed generally did not include such 
neighborhood characteristics, but we found that the inclusion of other infrastructure services 
does have a positive effect on both the likelihood of a statistically significant market premium 
for piped water supply and the magnitude.  
6. Address endogeneity, especially in the form of simultaneity, where the increased 
political power of wealthier neighborhoods brings piped water services to their 
households. The “elite-focused culture of governance” is a significant and well-recognized 
issue in water services provision (Bakker et al., 2008; Tiwale et al., 2018; Alda-Vidal et al., 
2018). Simultaneously, access to water services can affect home prices. Estimating only one 
portion of the model results in endogeneity and therefore biased estimates of the market 
premium. As a result, simultaneity is of particular importance in estimating market premiums 
for piped water services. However, this has not been addressed adequately in the literature, as 
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none of the authors reviewed have accounted for this type of endogeneity. Unsurprisingly, we 
find that addressing other forms of endogeneity makes it more likely for the HPVM to find a 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
Below, I first summarize the major findings and limitations of each individual chapter. Then, 
I discuss the chapters’ findings together and its implications for water supply in Kathmandu and 
future work. 
In Chapter 2, we find that real coping costs more than doubled between 2001 and 2014, 
from US$5 to US$12 per month (in 2014 prices, or 2% and 3% of household income, respectively). 
Households responded to the deteriorating condition of the piped water infrastructure by drilling 
more private wells, installing more storage tanks, and purchasing water from tanker truck and 
bottled water vendors. These capital investments and expenditures have been accompanied by a 
decline in time households spend collecting water from outside the home. With respect to coping 
costs’ determinants, we find that having a larger household, higher income, using more water 
sources, and a private water connection that is perceived to be unreliable is associated with higher 
coping costs. 
Chapter 2 demonstrates that with detailed data collection, it is possible to estimate the 
many different economic costs associated with coping with a poor water supply. However, there 
were a few limitations. First, this is an observational study. Though the regression analysis shows 
that poor reliability has a significant relationship with higher coping costs, we are limited by our 
research design and cannot make a strong causal argument attributing the overall increase in 
coping costs to the delay in infrastructure investment. Future work can use a more refined research 
design; for example, natural experiments can leverage announcements of delays in project 
completion. Second, our coping costs cannot be interpreted as the short-run lower bound estimates 
for household willingness to pay. As a result, we cannot predict the welfare improvements for 
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households that have made substantial capital investments. Third, quantities used to calculate 
coping costs – financial costs, time spent collecting water, amount of water collected, etc. – were all 
self-reported. Improvements in accuracy of a few key measurements, such as amount of water 
collected, can be made. 
Chapter 3 finds that with more reliable tap water connections, households spend more time 
collecting water. Initial evidence suggests that the difference is attributable to two things. First, 
there is more time spent collecting water within a home with a reliable connection because water is 
available through the tap for longer periods of time. Second, households that have unreliable water 
connections have shifted away from collecting water outside the home, choosing instead to 
purchase vended water. As for water collection and labor productivity, we find that more time 
collecting water is associated with less time spent working, but water collection activities are not 
associated with employment decisions. These time investments in collecting water do result in 
higher water consumption. We also find that water collection time patterns closely reflect leisure 
and chore time patterns. 
This is different from what has been found in much of the prior literature and has become 
common knowledge – that piped water access comes with large time savings. We find, instead, that 
the characteristics of the piped water connection matter, especially as other private options (wells, 
vended water) become more common. Time spent collecting water inside the home is becoming 
more important as households reduce time collecting water outside the home. There are significant 
policy implications. With intermittent piped water supply, decisions around water supply schedules 
should consider the effects on those who work and collect water for their households. We need to 
understand how water is collected inside the home – if other things can be done at the same time 
and if water collection right before and/or after work is disruptive. Our study begins to address 
these questions, but we face a few limitations that are centered around measurement. First, we do 
not directly measure water collection inside the home. Second, our measure of reliability is based 
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on the number of minutes piped water is supplied to the home. If water is supplied on a known 
schedule, this measure is less valid. Intermittent water supply can still be reliable if water is 
supplied exactly according to the schedule. Third, we do not examine the correlation between time 
spent on water collection and the productive time of all household members. As a result, we cannot 
adjust for how responsibilities are allocated within a household.  
Chapter 4 has three major findings. First, household preferences for an increasing block 
tariff and fixed charges are not easily explained by household socioeconomic characteristics and 
water use. Second, in modeling household fair water bills, we find that households support a water 
tariff that has the water bill increasing as water use increases. However, we do not find evidence of 
household support for an increasing, non-linear relationship between the water bill and water use. 
Finally, we show that households desire affordable piped water services and water bills that are 
calculated fairly for everyone. However, we find that the notion of fairness varies – with many 
considering a discount for those who use less water to be fair, while others consider fair to be one 
price for all, regardless of the quantity used. 
In challenging two major assumptions made by tariff designers, we identify opportunities 
for tariff reforms to be made more politically and publicly acceptable in Kathmandu, Nepal. 
Household objectives are assumed to be fairness, equity, affordability, and economic efficiency. We 
find that some households believe in equity (lower prices for lower levels of consumption), while 
others desire equality (same price rate for all). There is little evidence that households prefer an 
affordable water tariff for the poor, with only a few respondents choosing a tariff structure because 
they believe it “helps poor households.” Finally, we demonstrate that households value economic 
efficiency and affordability for themselves, with many respondents reporting a very low “fair water 
bill” at all quantities used and a desire for discounts for using less water. We do not explore 
household notions of economic efficiency at a societal level. Therefore, tariff designers that focus 
their messaging on affordability and fairness of the water tariff may be better able to garner 
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political and public support for reforms that can help utility managers achieve their own goals of 
cost recovery and revenue stability.  
Chapter 4 has four major limitations, and they provide avenues for future research. First, 
there does not exist a well-formed theoretical model for how household tariff preferences are 
formed. We identify relationships with notions of fairness and social justice, cost-minimization, and 
water conservation, but we do not examine them individually. As a result, it is difficult to separate 
the individual effects. Second, our study only asks households to provide one answer to the “fair 
water bill” question. As a result, we are only able to model “fair water bill” as a function of quantity 
consumed at an aggregate, community level. Future work can examine household-level fair water 
bill and quantity relationships by asking respondents about fair water bills for multiple different 
quantities. Third, we caution that these results are specific to Kathmandu, a locale with extreme 
conditions. While our results suggest that these findings may be robust to different water shortage 
conditions, further work is needed to test if these results hold under other conditions. Finally, we 
do not provide information about the quality of water supplied beyond “better service” when 
asking about the fair water bill. Future work should control for expectations about the quality of 
service in examining a fair water bill. 
In Chapter 5, we find that water vendors in Kathmandu Valley play a critical role in filling 
the supply gap from an inadequate public water supply – they supply 20% of the water for 
households and businesses. However, the water vending services provided are expensive, with end 
users paying approximately 3.4 times as much for vended water as they pay for water from the 
public piped water system. Though the prices are high, vendor costs of supply are also high. The 
portions of the water vending supply chain we examined were all quite competitive. Our estimates 
of net income were not excessive, and there are no constraints on how much water can be extracted 
and sold, where their products can be sold, to whom their products can be sold, or the prices at 
which water can be sold. Indeed, when taking into account firm capital investment decisions, we 
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found that many non-integrated vendors were either losing money or not profitable. There are 
many independent vendors present in the market, and households report that they are not 
dependent on any one vendor. Though there are professional associations, competitive pressures 
are too strong for the associations to assert price control. 
Chapter 5 has limitations in two areas: data collection and research design. First, the survey 
instrument relied on self-reported figures based on memory and recall for firm revenue and costs. 
There have not been studies assessing the presence of systematic bias; however, we speculate that 
there is not a negligible level of error in reported figures given the granularity of the data we 
requested. Additionally, we did not have complete data for the bottled water part of the supply 
chain – the distributing bottled water vendors. Future work in Kathmandu should include these 
water vendors; future work at other study sites should strive to build a more complete idea of the 
vending supply chain before constructing the sampling frame. Second, our research design is 
descriptive. Future work can build upon our findings and explore questions related to causality and 
advance theoretical understanding.  
Chapter 6 shows that the HPVM is not well developed in estimating household demand for 
piped water in developing countries. Its application has not generated consistently reliable and 
valid results. Across the literature, the hedonic value of piped water is frequently, but not always, 
capitalized in housing markets. Sixty-three percent of hedonic property models find a significant 
effect of piped water on home prices, with market premiums ranging widely – from -35% to 353%, 
or -$1.26 to $938/month. There are also inconsistent research designs and methods used; there is a 
lack of consensus around best practices. The resultant right-skewed distribution of market 
premiums reflects the challenges to reliability and validity. The median market premium of 34% is 
not entirely implausible when compared to coping costs and stated preference estimates. The 
chapter concludes with a list of suggested best practices in working toward constructing valid and 
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more reliable hedonic estimates of willingness to pay for piped water services in developing 
countries. 
Chapter 6 faces three major limitations, all stemming from the limited information we have 
about the hedonic studies. First, we caution that it is challenging to compare hedonic estimates 
from vastly different water supply systems. There is large knowledge gap from the studies about 
the characteristics of piped water supply, the financial costs of piped water, and the availability of 
substitutes and complements. As a result, we are limited in our ability to make comparisons across 
studies. Second, as illustrated by the theoretical framework, there are many additional 
determinants of hedonic market premiums for which we have incomplete information. While there 
is not much that can be done for a meta-analysis, future work using the hedonic method can utilize 
the framework to draw more considered inferences. Third, there is also limited information to 
make comparisons between methods – stated preference and averting expenditure methods. More 
work needs to be done to understand how different non-market valuation methods compare. 
7.1 Final Reflections 
In this dissertation, I address the two gaps in the literature on delayed water infrastructure 
and the multi-faceted study of its consequences by illustrating the structure and complexity of (1) 
how household coping behaviors, expenditures, and policy preferences change over time; (2) the 
rise of private water vendor businesses and their supply chains; (3) different demands for private 
water connections across different geographies and water systems. Our comprehensive data 
collection efforts and research in Kathmandu illustrate the experiences of those most affected by 
the infrastructure investment delays and poor water supply. We show the extent to which 
households and private water vendors have invested in coping. Households have spent more on 
both capital expenditures and their time collecting water inside the home; private individuals have 
invested substantial capital in starting small and medium sized enterprises selling water. 
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By examining these narratives holistically, we are better equipped to implement water 
policies for both the present and the future. For example, our work on tariff reform as it relates to a 
portion of coping costs can guide present-day tariff reforms as KUKL gears up for the Melamchi 
Water Supply Project’s completion. Furthermore, we can begin to understand the long-term 
impacts of infrastructure delays – how these delays can shape the development path of water 
supply services in Kathmandu Valley. When we examine the four dissertation chapters on 
Kathmandu together, we begin to understand Kathmandu’s water development path and its 
possible future paths. We find some evidence that suggests the rise of an alternative water supply 
system – one that is independent of the piped water supply system. However, there is also evidence 
that supports the piped water supply system’s continued dominance. Below, I summarize four 
major insights that rise from our holistic examination of the consequences of delays in investment 
in Kathmandu’s piped water supply system. 
First, compared to 2001, households in 2014 have increasingly invested in difficult to 
reverse private capital – private wells, pumping and treatment systems, storage tanks. When 
households switch from traditionally reversible coping behaviors (i.e., water collection, purchasing 
vended water) to irreversible or difficult to reverse ones (i.e., digging a private well, installing a 
storage tank and pumps), the short run benefits from public water supply improvements are 
diminished. The incremental value of an improved public water supply system to a household with 
a private well, pumps, storage tanks, and treatment systems, will be lower. In Kathmandu, we see 
increased expenditures in both reversible and irreversible coping measures in the last decade. 
Further work is needed to explore if (1) the investments in private capital substituted for easily 
reversible behaviors and (2) if household beliefs about public water supply future performance 
affect their investment behaviors. Then, we would be able to see if widespread private investments 
can drive a city’s development path away from a centralized piped water supply system.  
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Furthermore, we find evidence that under conditions of intermittent piped water supply, 
households spend more time collecting water from reliable piped water connections compared to 
those with unreliable piped water connections. This raises the question of how demand for piped 
water changes once a household has switched to a decentralized method of water supply – for 
example, using a private well and/or purchasing vended water, along with their own storage, 
pumping, and treatment systems. Though these decentralized systems are more expensive and 
complex, we find that households consequently spend less time collecting water at inconvenient or 
disruptive times of day. Are these behavioral changes enough to reduce long-term household 
demand for piped water, illustrating important path dependencies? There are opportunities to 
study the relationship between private, decentralized water supply and piped water supply. As 
water vending becomes more widespread, it becomes more important to understand its effects on 
demand for piped water – and consequently, the benefits of extending piped water systems. 
Third, we find that private water vendors have also invested large amounts of capital – in 
private wells and boreholes, pumps, tanker trucks, water bottling plants, etc. While household 
purchases of vended water are easily reversible, private water vendors’ capital investments are not. 
With rapid improvement and broad expansion of piped water supply, water vendors may see a 
decrease in income and profit margins. If private water vendors compete for the same households 
as the public water utility, negative welfare benefits would accrue to private water vendors with 
public water supply improvements. Further work is needed to understand improvements in public 
water supply affect water vending businesses and how proliferation of water vending affects a 
city’s water development path. 
Finally, we find that tariff reform in Kathmandu will be challenging but plausible. 
Households are willing to pay higher tariffs for improved piped water supply, but it is conditional 
on significant improvements. We also find that many households report a very low fair water bill at 
all quantities. The willingness of users to engage with the existing public water supply system is key 
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to sustaining its long-term viability. Water tariffs are the main way households interact with a 
water utility over time, and its reform can be a critical policy tool that improves the relationship 
between household and water supplier. We find evidence that households with higher perceived 
monthly expenditures (excluding capital costs) on household water supply state larger “fair water 
bills.” But these higher tariffs are conditional on significant improvements. Further work is needed 
to explore if this relationship indeed translates into a higher willingness to pay for piped water 
services; timing of tariff increases – before or after improvements – should also be explored. A 
higher household willingness to pay for piped water services after incurring high coping costs 
would support a different development path. In this path, as alternative, expensive water supply 
systems become more widespread, the draw of a well-functioning, centralized piped water supply 
increases because households are more acutely aware of the costs of an inadequate piped water 
supply. 
The first three points illustrate the development and growth of an alternative water supply 
system – one where private household supply and water vendors dominate. They form initial 
evidence of path dependence – with positive feedback loops pushing Kathmandu’s residents away 
from a centralized piped water system. The third point highlights an alternative path forward – one 
supporting the public water supply system. It is still unclear how these three forces balance and 
which ones dominate. Further work is needed to understand KUKL’s long-term prospects as the 
prevailing water supply system for Kathmandu Valley. With this improved understanding, 
appropriate policy tools such as tariff reform can be better designed. Furthermore, the welfare 
effects of large private investments in alternative water supply systems need to be considered. 
Significant private investments may reduce short-term benefits of infrastructure investments due 
to path dependencies, but they could also increase long-term benefits if households continue to be 
dissatisfied with alternative, more expensive water supply options. Further research is needed to 
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assess which effect is stronger and if changes in willingness to pay translate into increased revenue 
streams for the water utility. 
The case of Kathmandu is a key example of the consequences of delayed water 
infrastructure investments and continued deteriorating piped water supply conditions. This 
dissertation demonstrates that the gap in water supply generated by infrastructure delays can 
systematically change its economic conditions. Alternative water supply systems can flourish, 
challenging the existing notion of universal piped water as the dominant end state. Second, through 
a holistic examination households and private vendors, I show a clear evolution in water supply and 
household preferences and behavior over time. These insights reveal the limitations of stand-alone, 
cross-sectional studies, as understanding the dynamics of water supply and human behavior are 




APPENDIX A: ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION OF REGRESSION RESULTS PRESENTED IN TABLE 2.6 
First, we examine the results from Models 3 and 4, for 2001. In Model 3, household income 
has a positive, statistically significant coefficient, indicating that households with higher incomes 
have higher coping costs. However, respondent education, gender, and household size do not have 
statistically significant coefficients. In Model 4, after adding additional explanatory variables, the 
coefficient on household income remains significant and positive. Using a private water connection 
has a statistically significant, negative coefficient. In 2001 households that used a private water 
connection, on average and all else equal, had coping costs that were 252 NPR per month lower 
than households without private connections. For households using a private well, the coefficient is 
negative but not statistically significant. Most of the coefficients on the variable describing a 
household’s perceptions of piped water quality are not statistically significant. The only statistically 
significant coefficients are for the taste of the PWC water in the wet season (negative), health in the 
dry season (positive), and the reliability of the PWC during the dry season (positive). The 
explanatory variable describing a household’s concern about water issues with respect to other 
environmental policies does not have a statistically significant association with coping costs. 
The results for Model 5 (2014 data with only the exogenous household characteristics) are 
different compared to those for Model 3. The coefficients on respondent education and household 
size are significant and positive, while the coefficients on respondent gender and income are not 
significant. The results for Model 6 (2014 data with the full set of explanatory variables) show that 
the coefficients on respondent education and household size remain significant and positive. The 
coefficient on income becomes positive, as for the 2001 models, and significant at the 10% level. 
The results for model 6 also differ from model 4 for a household’s use of a private well and private 
water connection. In model 6, the coefficient on using a PWC is not significant, while it is significant 
at the 1% level in model 4. Having and using a private water connection in 2014 is not significantly 
related to a decrease in coping costs. Additionally, the coefficient on the use of a private well, while 
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not significant, changes from negative (in model 4) to positive (in model 6). The coefficient on 
number of sources used is positive and significant at the 1% level. For the average household, 
increasing the number of sources used by one is associated with an increase of 288 NPR per month. 
In Model 6, the coefficients on households reporting negative perceptions about health and 
reliability in the dry season are positive and significant at the 5% level. This implies that as 
households hold a more negative perception about the health effects and reliability of piped water, 
coping costs are higher. The coefficient on another measure of reliability, the number of hours of 
service from the PWC each month has a positive and significant (at the 5% level) coefficient. This is 







APPENDIX B: CHAPTER 4 SUPPLEMENTAL TABLES  
Table B.1. Sample representativeness, proportions as compared to Census 2011 
 
Kathmandu Lalitpur Bhaktapur  
Census Survey Difference Census Survey Difference Census Survey Difference 






House ownership 0.39 0.90 0.5*** 0.57 0.97 0.4*** 0.66 0.94 0.28*** 
Outer wall – mud bonded bricks/stone 0.15 0.16 0.01 0.30 0.20 −0.1*** 0.38 0.44 0.06 
Outer wall – cement bonded bricks/stone 0.80 0.84 0.04*** 0.65 0.80 0.15*** 0.58 0.46 −0.12** 
Roof – RCC 0.77 0.80 0.03* 0.66 0.80 0.14*** 0.56 0.59 0.03 
Roof – galvanized iron 0.17 0.20 0.03** 0.23 0.19 −0.04 0.31 0.36 0.05 
Roof – tile/slate 0.02 0.00 −0.02*** 0.06 0.01 −0.05*** 0.10 0.05 −0.05 
Drinking water source – tap 0.62 0.61 −0.01 0.69 0.44 −0.24*** 0.78 0.45 −0.33*** 
Cooking fuel – wood 0.08 0.00 −0.07*** 0.18 0.01 −0.17*** 0.25 0.12 −0.14*** 
Cooking fuel – kerosene 0.03 0.00 −0.03*** 0.03 0.00 −0.03** 0.03 0.00 −0.03 
Cooking fuel – LP gas 0.88 0.99 0.11*** 0.77 0.99 0.21*** 0.69 0.87 0.18*** 
Type of toilet – without toilet 0.01 0.06 0.05*** 0.04 0.00 −0.04*** 0.03 0.09 0.06*** 
Type of toilet – flush toilet (sewerage) 0.69 0.91 0.22*** 0.45 0.92 0.47*** 0.48 0.54 0.06 
Type of toilet – flush toilet (septic tank) 0.20 0.02 −0.17*** 0.39 0.08 −0.31*** 0.38 0.35 −0.03 
Facility – radio 0.56 0.49 −0.08*** 0.57 0.56 −0.02 0.56 0.56 0 
Facility – TV 0.75 0.98 0.23*** 0.66 0.97 0.3*** 0.83 0.97 0.15*** 
Facility – computer 0.35 0.70 0.34*** 0.33 0.64 0.31*** 0.29 0.46 0.17*** 
Facility – telephone 0.28 0.72 0.44*** 0.30 0.61 0.31*** 0.25 0.42 0.17*** 
Facility – mobile phone 0.91 0.99 0.08*** 0.86 0.97 0.11*** 0.87 0.97 0.11*** 
Facility – motor 0.05 0.09 0.04*** 0.06 0.03 −0.03** 0.04 0.03 −0.01 
Facility – motorcycle 0.30 0.66 0.36*** 0.33 0.69 0.37*** 0.28 0.49 0.21*** 
Facility – cycle 0.10 0.15 0.05*** 0.17 0.36 0.19*** 0.13 0.26 0.13*** 
Facility – refrigerator 0.28 0.77 0.49*** 0.27 0.76 0.49*** 0.18 0.41 0.23*** 
Average household size 4.00 5.00 1.00 4.26 5.14 0.88 4.44 5.03 0.59 
Population above 5 years of age 0.94 0.96 0.02*** 0.94 0.27 −0.67*** 0.94 0.08 −0.86*** 
Literate population 0.81 0.88 0.07*** 0.78 0.81 0.03*** 0.77 0.71 −0.06*** 
Educational attainment – primary 0.20 0.09 −0.12*** 0.23 0.11 −0.11*** 0.23 0.12 −0.12*** 







Educational attainment – secondary 0.12 0.09 −0.02*** 0.12 0.09 −0.03*** 0.13 0.12 −0.02 
Educational attainment – SLC 0.15 0.14 −0.01** 0.14 0.15 0.01 0.15 0.13 −0.02 
Educational attainment – intermediate 0.16 0.16 0.00 0.14 0.12 −0.02** 0.13 0.05 −0.08*** 








Table B.2. Comparing respondents who did not understand IBTs with those who did 
 Understand Did not understand Difference 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Obs Mean Std. Mean SE t Pr(|T|>|t|) 
fair_bill 1,040 540.9 586.0 243 474.3 821.3 66.7 45.4 1.47 0.14 
hyp_usage 1,229 15,952 8,045 271 17,048 8,397 −1,096 544 −2.01 0.04 
hyp_usage_sq 1,229 3.2 × 108 2.8 × 108 271 3.6 × 108 3.0 × 108 −4.2 × 107 1.9 × 107 −2.21 0.03 
ibt 1,210 0.58 0.49 268 0.90 0.31 −0.31 0.03 −9.96 0.00 
consider_ktm 1,229 0.77 0.42 271 0.71 0.45 0.06 0.03 2.10 0.04 
change_mind 1,229 0.06 0.24 271 0.08 0.28 −0.02 0.02 −1.33 0.18 
ln_income 1,193 10.90 0.77 257 10.99 0.70 −0.08 0.05 −1.61 0.11 
nhh 1,229 5.07 2.14 271 4.96 2.05 0.11 0.14 0.78 0.44 
resp_edu 1,229 8.09 6.20 271 9.52 6.22 −1.44 0.42 −3.45 0.00 
resp_illiterate 1,229 0.23 0.42 271 0.16 0.37 0.07 0.03 2.64 0.01 
resp_hhhead 1,229 0.52 0.50 271 0.56 0.50 −0.03 0.03 −1.04 0.30 
ln_monthlywaterexp 1,229 5.44 2.27 271 5.42 2.04 0.02 0.15 0.15 0.88 
pwc_m3 1,229 2.14 4.33 271 4.11 6.31 −1.97 0.32 −6.19 0.00 




Table B.3. Regressions of fair bill for subsamples of respondents’ preferred tariff structure 










(IBT == 0) 
fair_bill 
(IBT == 0) 
fair_bill 
(IBT == 0) 
hyp_usage 0.0225 0.0188 0.0184 0.0343** 0.0356** 0.0366** 
 (0.0148) (0.0141) (0.0145) (0.0145) (0.0153) (0.0156) 






 (4.99 × 
10−7) 






ln_income  87.10* 76.49  164.3*** 146.1*** 
  (49.00) (46.50)  (43.61) (41.32) 
nhh  5.484 −0.314  −24.01 −24.79 
  (10.81) (11.39)  (16.61) (16.87) 
resp_edu  −1.768 −1.524  8.365 8.064 
  (3.887) (3.697)  (9.384) (9.442) 
resp_illiterate  −3.159 12.17  86.03 88.39 
  (64.00) (66.17)  (93.16) (94.67) 
resp_hhhead  58.28 34.93  111.3*** 110.7*** 
  (41.72) (37.57)  (39.71) (40.53) 
ln_monthlywaterexp   49.63***   17.29 
   (11.40)   (13.26) 
pwc_m3   −8.813   5.401 
   (6.512)   (4.788) 
priority_water   −85.20**   −6.109 
   (37.92)   (60.19) 
Constant 207.6* −774.3 −859.8* 259.1*** −1,584*** −1,496*** 
 (120.0) (463.7) (474.7) (90.11) (444.9) (423.8) 
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 600 592 592 434 413 413 
R2 0.095 0.113 0.147 0.196 0.233 0.239 
F-statistic 15.30 14.48 15.19 13.92 13.40 10.33 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. 




Table B.4. Regressions of fair bill on hypothetical monthly usage – entire sample 
 (1) (2) (4) (5) 
Variables fair_bill fair_bill fair_bill fair_bill 
hyp_usage 0.0247** 0.0215** 0.0219** 0.0216** 
 (0.00928) (0.00928) (0.00950) (0.00919) 
hyp_usage_sq −1.25 × 10−7 −4.41 × 10−8 −5.91 × 10−8 −4.14 × 10−8 
 (2.97 × 10−7) (3.00 × 10−7) (3.09 × 10−7) (3.01 × 10−7) 
ln_income  101.9*** 82.64** 87.96*** 
  (32.98) (31.68) (29.68) 
nhh  −0.988 −4.847 −8.566 
  (8.777) (9.037) (8.578) 
resp_edu  1.084 0.930 2.624 
  (3.615) (3.545) (3.874) 
resp_illiterate  −11.71 −5.376 17.88 
  (43.99) (45.48) (45.52) 
resp_hhhead  50.47 42.60 34.83 
  (31.20) (30.20) (29.89) 
ln_monthlywaterexp   35.14*** 37.41*** 
   (10.60) (9.496) 
pwc_m3   3.159 2.247 
   (3.920) (3.646) 
priority_water   −57.21 −65.42 
   (39.94) (39.61) 
ibt    −187.7*** 
    (64.91) 
Municipality – Lalitpur −57.19 −35.29 −12.25 −17.56 
 (64.08) (68.37) (66.25) (63.62) 
Municipality – Bhaktapur −243.1*** −181.1*** −79.56 −80.67 
 (48.47) (59.52) (95.78) (94.12) 
Municipality – Kirtipur −300.9*** −256.8*** −161.3*** −135.5*** 
 (45.09) (43.37) (48.52) (40.03) 
Municipality – Madhyapur 
Thimi 
−115.3* −57.13 −53.18 −32.57 
 (66.06) (67.14) (67.59) (60.91) 
Constant 215.9*** −918.7*** −869.7*** −810.3** 
 (71.18) (315.6) (319.9) (312.5) 
Observations 1,283 1,243 1,243 1,237 
R2 0.086 0.100 0.114 0.132 
F-statistic 18.62 13.04 14.41 14.50 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. 





Table B.5. Regressions of fair bill on hypothetical monthly usage – entire sample, with the check 
variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables fair_bill fair_bill fair_bill fair_bill 
check_understanding −147.9** −143.9* −155.0** −97.96 
 (73.40) (73.73) (73.77) (81.89) 
hyp_usage 0.0249*** 0.0217** 0.0223** 0.0219** 
 (0.00901) (0.00905) (0.00927) (0.00906) 
hyp_usage_sq −1.17 × 10−7 −3.64 × 10−8 −5.80 × 10−8 −4.33 × 10−8 
 (2.91 × 10−7) (2.95 × 10−7) (3.04 × 10−7) (2.99 × 10−7) 
ln_income  101.3*** 81.42** 86.54*** 
  (32.86) (31.28) (29.16) 
nhh  −1.148 −5.046 −8.249 
  (8.683) (8.912) (8.417) 
resp_edu  1.522 1.315 2.661 
  (3.594) (3.516) (3.816) 
resp_illiterate  −4.767 1.885 19.73 
  (46.95) (48.56) (46.89) 
resp_hhhead  54.28* 47.03 38.61 
  (32.15) (31.37) (31.75) 
ln_monthlywaterexp   33.28*** 35.93*** 
   (10.44) (9.536) 
pwc_m3   4.853 3.416 
   (3.856) (3.704) 
priority_water   −68.01* −71.13* 
   (39.10) (38.76) 
ibt    −166.4** 
    (70.64) 
Constant 394.2*** −745.0** −664.9** −686.8** 
 (126.9) (291.8) (296.7) (281.3) 
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,283 1,243 1,243 1,237 
R2 0.094 0.108 0.122 0.135 
F-statistic 16.23 12.79 14.99 15.22 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. 








APPENDIX C: CHAPTER 5 SUPPLEMENTAL TABLES 
Table C.1. Firm-level profits of vendors with only commercial water sources – US$/month (excluded observations in gray) 
Vendor ID 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Dry season                






9 758 1,642 76 1,213 3,208 
Product costs 21 0 21 32 0 53 0 0 0 32 211 211 0 0 211 
Supply chain costs 867 425 0 0 182 103 30 43 173 455 1,516 2,166 509 1,516 2,816 
Direct labor costs 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 






3 -969 -735 -434 -304 182 
Overhead and 
management 6 0 147 105 0 168 0 0 316 211 421 126 0 474 442 
Maintenance and 
repairs 0 105 0 0 105 53 0 158 0 53 0 0 0 211 0 
Rent and utilities 105 37 105 158 126 421 84 158 105 211 2,158 316 1 684 168 
Other 15 0 0 0 0 5 5 5 32 11 11 0 0 2 36 







Depreciation 678 76 927 
1,46
4 84 115 27 29 532 213 2,166 1,985 54 5,109 781 
EBIT 
-
1,180 -188 -847 
-
1,21









Taxes 30 0 0 0 0 0 9 9 4 11 70 0 12 0 13 
Interest 0 92 0 0 0 0 145 0 807 0 0 0 0 221 77 
Net income 
-
1,210 -280 -847 
-
1,21









Gross margin/revenue -0.73 0.07 0.94 0.94 0.76 0.81 0.96 0.96 0.89 0.81 -1.28 -0.45 -5.72 -0.25 0.06 
EBITDA/revenue -0.98 -0.25 0.23 0.46 0.45 0.01 0.85 0.67 0.59 0.63 -4.70 -0.72 -5.73 -1.38 -0.14 
EBIT/revenue -2.31 -0.41 -2.39 -2.24 0.34 -0.14 0.81 0.64 0.24 0.54 -7.55 -1.93 -6.44 -5.59 -0.39 
                     
Wet season                     
Revenue 568 202 354 543 152 303 707 575 
1,26
3 872 455 1,263 76 543 3,069 







Supply chain costs 867 425 0 0 182 103 30 43 173 455 1,516 2,166 509 1,516 2,816 
Direct labor costs 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Gross margin -319 -222 333 512 -30 148 677 531 
1,09
0 385 -1,272 
-
1,114 -434 -973 43 
Overhead and 
management 6 0 147 105 0 168 0 0 316 211 421 126 0 474 442 
Maintenance and 
repairs 0 105 0 0 105 53 0 158 0 53 0 0 0 211 0 
Rent and utilities 105 37 105 158 126 421 84 158 105 211 2,158 316 1 684 168 
Other 15 0 0 0 0 5 5 5 32 11 11 0 0 2 36 





Depreciation 678 76 927 
1,46
4 84 115 27 29 532 213 2,166 1,985 54 5,109 781 
EBIT 
-
1,123 -441 -847 
-
1,21







Taxes 30 0 0 0 0 0 9 9 4 11 70 0 12 0 13 
Interest 0 92 0 0 0 0 145 0 807 0 0 0 0 221 77 
Net income 
-
1,153 -533 -847 
-
1,21







Gross margin/revenue -0.56 -1.10 0.94 0.94 -0.20 0.49 0.96 0.92 0.86 0.44 -2.80 -0.88 -5.72 -1.79 0.01 
EBITDA/revenue -0.78 -1.80 0.23 0.46 -1.73 -1.65 0.83 0.37 0.50 -0.11 -8.49 -1.23 -5.73 -4.31 -0.20 
EBIT/revenue -1.98 -2.18 -2.39 -2.24 -2.28 -2.03 0.79 0.32 0.08 -0.36 -13.26 -2.80 -6.44 
-
13.72 -0.45 

















































Table C.2. Firm-level profits of vendors with commercial water sources and tanker trucks – US$/month (excluded observations in gray) 
Vendor ID 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 

























1 2,274 4,194 
Product costs 421 562 728 0 32 303 105 16 5 5 53 53 0 0 21 0 53 303 










0 894 1,085 466 1,249 3,085 3,579 
Direct labor costs 932 522 362 596 379 348 653 964 708 386 
1,21
5 848 414 582 
1,01
7 1,042 255 358 






















management 316 0 0 0 105 253 158 526 129 68 316 105 189 337 0 947 189 84 
Maintenance and 
repairs 116 263 211 158 126 105 316 4,211 421 158 316 211 158 421 158 632 0 316 
Rent and utilities 1,105 316 84 32 168 189 32 242 474 37 421 789 105 137 321 368 400 105 
Other selling costs 85 0 0 22 54 22 28 111 64 25 70 47 0 85 45 119 47 47 
EBITDA 
-















Depreciation 248 929 245 460 176 322 232 465 
1,17
6 548 305 
1,83
5 445 442 563 1,275 1,574 685 
EBIT 
-

















Taxes 12 37 22 114 26 35 26 26 45 61 48 2 0 118 14 44 2 16 
Interest 289 0 0 53 205 614 0 63 211 98 254 0 0 0 224 0 0 0 
Net income 
-

















Gross margin/revenue 0.00 0.31 0.31 0.49 0.52 0.51 0.37 0.44 0.47 0.72 0.62 0.63 0.80 0.76 0.78 0.80 -0.49 -0.01 
EBITDA/revenue -0.45 0.09 0.21 0.39 0.33 0.31 0.27 -0.59 0.33 0.66 0.47 0.49 0.73 0.62 0.71 0.62 -0.77 -0.14 
EBIT/revenue -0.52 -0.26 0.12 0.17 0.26 0.20 0.23 -0.68 0.19 0.56 0.43 0.26 0.66 0.55 0.63 0.51 -1.46 -0.31 
                     





















3 4,775 1,459 
5,45
7 5,293 1,996 2,880 
Product costs 421 360 253 0 32 227 105 16 5 5 53 53 0 0 21 0 53 101 








5 677 449 399 1,245 2,964 3,215 
Direct labor costs 602 345 244 404 268 297 432 596 420 298 814 672 337 405 928 688 225 211 














management 316 0 0 0 53 253 158 526 129 68 316 105 189 337 0 947 189 84 
Maintenance and 
repairs 116 263 211 158 126 105 316 4,211 421 158 316 211 158 421 158 632 0 316 







Other selling costs 85 0 0 22 54 22 28 111 64 25 70 47 0 85 45 119 47 47 
EBITDA 
-











Depreciation 248 929 245 460 176 322 232 465 
1,17
6 548 305 
1,83

















Taxes 12 37 22 114 26 35 26 26 45 61 48 2 0 118 14 44 2 16 

















Gross margin/revenue -0.07 0.07 -0.03 0.30 0.40 0.45 0.21 0.03 0.41 0.73 0.42 0.65 0.79 0.41 0.75 0.63 -0.62 -0.22 
EBITDA/revenue -0.71 -0.35 -0.24 0.15 0.06 0.18 0.02 -2.77 0.13 0.65 0.12 0.47 0.69 -0.26 0.66 0.24 -0.94 -0.42 
EBIT/revenue -0.81 -1.03 -0.42 -0.16 -0.09 0.02 -0.07 -3.02 -0.18 0.51 0.04 0.18 0.60 -0.56 0.55 0.00 -1.73 -0.65 










































Start year (source) 2010 2003 2009 2004 2012 2008 2012 2004 1999 2006 2010 2006 2009 2007 2009 1998 2011 2008 
Start year (tanker 









Table C.4. Firm-level profits of vendors with only tanker trucks – US$/month 
Vendor ID 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 
Dry season               
Revenue 3,234 2,122 7,629 2,501 6,063 2,931 
10,35
8 1,819 2,274 1,895 2,122 2,274 2,274 2,956 
Product costs 354 227 1,819 531 884 619 1,996 379 455 379 531 455 455 455 
Supply chain costs 4,604 3,694 6,540 2,002 4,614 1,906 4,580 728 910 758 948 910 910 1,638 
Direct labor costs 559 360 774 349 889 549 3,659 544 659 453 307 512 501 445 
Gross margin -2,283 -2,159 
-
1,503 -381 -325 -144 124 169 250 305 337 398 408 418 
Overhead and 
management 105 84 126 0 105 0 337 84 84 84 42 84 84 47 
Maintenance and 
repairs 526 263 474 105 421 263 105 316 316 368 158 316 211 232 
Rent and utilities 0 0 42 0 0 221 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other selling costs 74 40 85 36 60 54 9 39 41 44 41 41 41 23 
EBITDA -2,988 -2,546 
-
2,230 -522 -911 -683 -327 -270 -191 -192 96 -44 72 117 
Depreciation 158 59 162 357 138 309 417 141 101 110 148 118 59 165 




1,049 -991 -745 -411 -292 -302 -53 -162 13 -48 
Taxes 25 12 46 120 25 38 3 0 26 7 15 12 7 15 
Interest 61 0 92 0 0 281 0 86 0 0 137 0 68 0 






1,310 -748 -497 -318 -309 -205 -174 -62 -64 
Gross margin/revenue -0.71 -1.02 -0.20 -0.15 -0.05 -0.05 0.01 0.09 0.11 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.14 
EBITDA/revenue -0.92 -1.20 -0.29 -0.21 -0.15 -0.23 -0.03 -0.15 -0.08 -0.10 0.05 -0.02 0.03 0.04 
EBIT/revenue -0.97 -1.23 -0.31 -0.35 -0.17 -0.34 -0.07 -0.23 -0.13 -0.16 -0.02 -0.07 0.01 -0.02 
               
Wet season               
Revenue 1,213 707 4,093 2,501 3,032 1,971 4,547 1,213 1,516 1,516 1,061 1,137 1,137 1,642 
Product costs 133 76 985 531 442 417 935 253 303 303 227 227 227 253 
Supply chain costs 2,177 1,571 3,629 2,002 1,885 1,906 4,580 485 607 607 493 455 455 910 
Direct labor costs 368 208 426 349 574 461 1,905 408 541 394 201 335 324 292 
Gross margin -1,465 -1,147 -948 -381 131 -814 
-








management 0 42 126 0 105 0 337 84 84 84 42 84 84 47 
Maintenance and 
repairs 526 263 474 105 421 263 105 316 316 368 158 316 211 232 
Rent and utilities 0 0 42 0 0 221 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other selling costs 74 40 85 36 60 54 9 39 41 44 41 41 41 23 
EBITDA -2,065 -1,492 
-




3,323 -372 -376 -284 -101 -321 -206 -114 
Depreciation 158 59 162 357 138 309 417 141 101 110 148 118 59 165 
EBIT -2,223 -1,552 
-




3,740 -513 -477 -395 -250 -440 -264 -279 
Taxes 25 12 46 120 25 38 3 0 26 7 15 12 7 15 
Interest 61 0 92 0 0 281 0 86 0 0 137 0 68 0 
Net income -2,309 -1,564 
-




3,743 -599 -503 -401 -402 -451 -339 -294 
Gross margin/revenue -1.21 -1.62 -0.23 -0.15 0.04 -0.41 -0.63 0.06 0.04 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.11 
EBITDA/revenue -1.70 -2.11 -0.41 -0.21 -0.15 -0.69 -0.73 -0.31 -0.25 -0.19 -0.10 -0.28 -0.18 -0.07 
EBIT/revenue -1.83 -2.19 -0.45 -0.35 -0.20 -0.84 -0.82 -0.42 -0.31 -0.26 -0.24 -0.39 -0.23 -0.17 









































Start year (tanker 









Table C.4. Firm-level profits of vendors with only tanker trucks – US$/month (continued) 
Vendor ID 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 
Dry season               
Revenue 2,842 5,154 6,139 3,486 3,183 4,825 1,819 2,122 3,789 2,829 2,779 2,425 1,819 3,739 
Product costs 789 985 960 455 606 1,067 379 455 455 531 379 409 379 821 
Supply chain costs 1,300 2,548 2,972 1,820 1,360 2,470 265 592 1,760 1,100 1,061 755 106 1,352 
Direct labor costs 318 1,120 1,705 585 589 643 491 261 757 353 453 316 278 499 
Gross margin 435 501 501 627 627 645 684 814 817 847 886 945 1,056 1,067 
Overhead and 
management 0 337 253 316 211 0 84 32 105 42 84 42 74 253 
Maintenance and repairs 158 316 316 316 105 263 211 105 484 179 421 158 211 211 
Rent and utilities 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 42 0 13 0 11 0 0 
Other selling costs 30 137 46 41 42 45 39 17 92 31 41 39 46 61 
EBITDA 247 -289 -113 -46 269 337 350 618 135 582 339 696 726 543 
Depreciation 228 161 294 91 115 345 118 164 158 43 30 169 102 240 
EBIT 20 -450 -406 -137 154 -8 232 455 -23 539 309 527 624 304 
Taxes 105 54 15 15 22 170 13 92 37 20 15 16 35 65 
Interest 0 0 0 0 0 0 184 0 142 47 0 164 57 0 
Net income -86 -503 -422 -153 132 -178 34 363 -202 472 294 347 532 239 
Gross margin/revenue 0.15 0.10 0.08 0.18 0.20 0.13 0.38 0.38 0.22 0.30 0.32 0.39 0.58 0.29 
EBITDA/revenue 0.09 -0.06 -0.02 -0.01 0.08 0.07 0.19 0.29 0.04 0.21 0.12 0.29 0.40 0.15 
EBIT/revenue 0.01 -0.09 -0.07 -0.04 0.05 0.00 0.13 0.21 -0.01 0.19 0.11 0.22 0.34 0.08 
               
Wet season               
Revenue 1,667 3,436 4,800 1,743 3,183 3,057 909 1,061 1,617 1,213 1,667 1,213 1,213 2,274 
Product costs 474 657 745 227 606 676 189 171 208 227 227 205 253 505 
Supply chain costs 1,170 1,698 2,335 910 1,360 2,166 133 486 851 493 637 391 71 1,170 
Direct labor costs 241 943 1,484 408 589 478 314 173 493 205 335 205 231 375 
Gross margin -217 137 235 198 627 -264 274 232 65 287 468 412 658 223 
Overhead and 
management 0 337 253 316 211 0 84 32 158 42 84 42 74 253 
Maintenance and repairs 158 316 316 316 105 263 211 105 484 179 421 158 211 211 
Rent and utilities 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 42 0 13 0 11 0 0 
Other selling costs 30 137 46 41 42 45 39 17 92 31 41 39 46 61 







Depreciation 228 161 294 91 115 345 118 164 158 43 30 169 102 240 
EBIT -633 -813 -672 -566 154 -916 -179 -128 -827 -20 -108 -6 227 -540 
Taxes 105 54 15 15 22 170 13 92 37 20 15 16 35 65 
Interest 0 0 0 0 0 0 184 0 142 47 0 164 57 0 
Net income -738 -867 -688 -582 132 
-
1,086 -376 -220 -1,006 -88 -123 -186 134 -605 
Gross margin/revenue -0.13 0.04 0.05 0.11 0.20 -0.09 0.30 0.22 0.04 0.24 0.28 0.34 0.54 0.10 
EBITDA/revenue -0.24 -0.19 -0.08 -0.27 0.08 -0.19 -0.07 0.03 -0.41 0.02 -0.05 0.13 0.27 -0.13 
EBIT/revenue -0.38 -0.24 -0.14 -0.32 0.05 -0.30 -0.20 -0.12 -0.51 -0.02 -0.06 -0.01 0.19 -0.24 







































Table C.4. Firm-level profits of vendors with only tanker trucks – US$/month (continued) 
Vendor ID 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 
Dry season               
Revenue 2,829 1,971 4,244 3,158 2,299 2,299 3,284 3,789 6,859 6,114 3,411 4,168 9,549 9,752 
Product costs 303 379 808 379 442 442 379 442 1,667 1,895 455 657 1,251 1,415 
Supply chain costs 926 133 2,026 1,061 124 124 758 823 2,183 728 152 136 3,087 3,109 
Direct labor costs 437 289 180 453 373 363 506 512 683 1,065 108 439 1,345 1,226 
Gross margin 1,163 1,170 1,230 1,265 1,360 1,370 1,641 2,013 2,326 2,426 2,696 2,936 3,867 4,002 
Overhead and 
management 105 84 84 84 84 74 105 53 0 29 42 0 142 215 
Maintenance and repairs 105 263 316 421 263 211 158 211 211 211 211 211 316 526 
Rent and utilities 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 53 0 0 
Other selling costs 27 39 63 46 43 43 30 35 33 54 24 0 60 60 
EBITDA 926 783 767 714 969 1,043 1,348 1,715 2,082 2,131 2,419 2,673 3,349 3,201 
Depreciation 131 102 207 67 124 40 81 69 320 777 92 317 235 692 
EBIT 794 682 560 647 845 1,003 1,267 1,646 1,762 1,354 2,328 2,356 3,114 2,510 
Taxes 11 13 114 7 13 13 12 11 41 22 7 23 25 22 
Interest 114 0 84 0 74 61 74 105 181 0 25 395 0 0 
Net income 669 668 361 641 758 928 1,181 1,530 1,541 1,332 2,295 1,938 3,090 2,488 
Gross margin/revenue 0.41 0.59 0.29 0.40 0.59 0.60 0.50 0.53 0.34 0.40 0.79 0.70 0.40 0.41 
EBITDA/revenue 0.33 0.40 0.18 0.23 0.42 0.45 0.41 0.45 0.30 0.35 0.71 0.64 0.35 0.33 
EBIT/revenue 0.28 0.35 0.13 0.20 0.37 0.44 0.39 0.43 0.26 0.22 0.68 0.57 0.33 0.26 
               
Wet season               
Revenue 1,061 985 1,971 1,895 1,314 1,314 1,314 1,137 1,857 3,234 1,137 2,476 4,244 5,179 
Product costs 114 189 379 227 253 253 152 133 417 985 152 417 556 758 
Supply chain costs 380 66 964 637 71 71 364 412 1,619 485 152 134 1,571 1,592 
Direct labor costs 253 218 128 335 254 248 289 211 294 800 64 333 740 815 
Gross margin 314 511 499 696 736 742 509 381 -473 963 769 1,592 1,378 2,014 
Overhead and 
management 53 84 84 84 84 74 53 53 0 29 42 0 95 143 
Maintenance and repairs 105 263 316 421 263 211 158 211 211 211 211 211 316 526 
Rent and utilities 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 53 0 0 
Other selling costs 27 39 63 46 43 43 30 35 33 54 24 0 60 60 







Depreciation 131 102 207 67 124 40 81 69 320 777 92 317 235 692 
EBIT -2 23 -172 78 222 375 188 15 
-
1,037 -108 401 1,011 673 593 
Taxes 11 13 114 7 13 13 12 11 41 22 7 23 25 22 
Interest 114 0 84 0 74 61 74 105 181 0 25 395 0 0 
Net income -127 10 -370 72 135 301 102 -101 
-
1,258 -130 369 594 648 571 
Gross margin/revenue 0.30 0.52 0.25 0.37 0.56 0.57 0.39 0.34 -0.25 0.30 0.68 0.64 0.32 0.39 
EBITDA/revenue 0.12 0.13 0.02 0.08 0.26 0.32 0.20 0.07 -0.39 0.21 0.43 0.54 0.21 0.25 
EBIT/revenue 0.00 0.02 -0.09 0.04 0.17 0.29 0.14 0.01 -0.56 -0.03 0.35 0.41 0.16 0.11 






























Start year (tanker 














APPENDIX E: GROUNDWATER CONTAMINATION STUDIES 
Early studies examining groundwater contamination do not find a statistically significant 
effect on residential properties (Malone and Barrows, 1990; Page and Rabinowitz, 1993; Dotzour, 
1997). The authors speculate that the lack of capitalization of groundwater contamination can be 
due to three reasons: (1) sellers delaying sales but not decreasing values (Malone and Barrows, 
1990), (2) owners connected to piped supply perceiving that there are not health risks or (3) 
property owners are not liable costs of cleanup, as Superfund site property owners can be (Page 
and Robinowitz, 1993; Dotzour, 1997). Guignet, Walsh, and Northcutt (2016) caution inference 
using their results, highlighting simple econometric identification strategies, small sample sizes, 
and coarse measures of water quality. Despite this, the authors make salient points about causal 
paths. 
More recent hedonic studies estimating impacts of groundwater contamination find 
statistically significant effects that diminish over time (Case et al., 2006; Boyle et al., 2010; Guignet, 
Walsh, and Northcutt, 2016). Case et al. (2006) find an average decrease of 4.7% in prices that 
occurs only after the volatile organic compound contamination becomes publicly known; the effect 
disappears after five years. Case et al. (2006) attribute this decline in in the discount associated 
with groundwater contamination is likely to signal a “decline in the market’s assessment of the 
value of clean groundwater, rather than a decline in the physical severity of the contamination.” 
However, it should be noted that local water providers immediately stopped using the 
contaminated water source and remediation efforts were ongoing. Boyle et al. (2010) also find a 
temporary 0.5-1.0% decline in home price for each 0.001 milligram per liter of arsenic above the 
regulatory standard detected in private wells, where the average arsenic concentration was 0.086 
 
268 
mg/L, or 0.036 mg/L more than the regulatory standard.44 They speculate that the dissipation of 
the price effect after three years could be due to the installation of in‐home water treatment 
systems or to the “dissipation of perceived risk once the media coverage stopped.” Guignet, Walsh, 
and Northcutt (2016) find that contamination of groundwater (from nitrogen, arsenic, and ethylene 
bromide) that exceeds health standards corresponds to an average 2-6% depreciation in home 
prices, with higher costs of 15% decreases at levels twice the standard. They also find that the effect 
diminishes over time, with the presence of a robust, state-wide mitigation strategy.  
Only one study by Christensen et al. (2018) examines the impacts of contaminated drinking 
water supplied by piped systems. While still not an estimate for the value of a piped water 
connection, it is more closely related than estimating the effects of groundwater contamination. 
Christensen et al. (2018) use difference-in-differences and event study research designs to robustly 
identify the impacts of a water supply crisis and estimate welfare effects using home values in Flint, 
Michigan. The authors find that when compared with control housing markets, average home 
values in Flint decrease by 33% (Christensen et al., 2018). As this water contamination crisis is still 
on-going, it is not clear what the long-term effects are, if any, on home prices. It is also difficult to 
separate the effect of lead contamination from systematic governance failures in Flint, Michigan.45 
The authors “find little evidence of differential impacts across homes within Flint,” which would 
have made a stronger argument for attributing the decrease in home prices to lead contamination 
rather than a failed government at multiple levels. 
 
44 The mean arsenic concentration of the nearest test result in excess of the regulatory standard (0.05 mg/L) 
was reported to be 86.36 parts per billion (ppb), or 0.086 mg/L. The mean increase in arsenic concentration 
is 36.36 ppb, or 0.036 mg/L. 
45 The authors list the loss of trust in local government as an additional economic impact of the crisis, but 
other researchers argue that the Flint water crisis was a product of environmental racism and financial stress, 
reflective of larger government failures (Campbell et al., 2016). 
